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INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL COMMISSION
In Search of a Universal
Ethic:
A New Look at the Natural Law *
(2009)
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter 1: Convergences
1.1. The wisdom traditions and religions of the world
1.2. The Greco-Roman sources of the natural law
1.3. The teaching of Sacred Scripture
1.4. The developments of the Christian tradition
1.5. Further developments
1.6.The Magisterium of the Church and natural law
Chapter 2: The Perception of Common Moral Values
2.1. The role of society and culture
2.2. Moral experience; “one must do good”
2.3. The discovery of the precepts of the natural law: universality of the
natural law
2.4. The precepts of the natural law
2.5. The application of common precepts: historicity of the natural law
2.6. The moral dispositions of the person and his concrete action
Chapter 3: The Theoretical Foundations of Natural Law
3.1. From experience to theory
3.2. Nature, person and freedom
3.3. Nature, man and God: from harmony to conflict
3.4. Ways towards a reconciliation
Chapter 4: Natural Law and the City [πóλις]
4.1. The person and the common good.
4.2. The natural law, measure of the political order
4.3. From natural law to the norm of natural justice
4.4. The norm of natural justice and positive law.
4.5. The
political order is not the eschatological order
4.6. The
political order is a temporal and rational order
Chapter 5: Jesus Christ, the Fulfilment of the Natural Law
5.1. The incarnate Logos, the living Law
5.2. The Holy Spirit and the new law of freedom
Conclusion
* * *
INTRODUCTION
1. Are there objective moral values which can unite human
beings and bring them peace and happiness? What are they? How are they
discerned? How can they be put into action in the lives of persons and
communities? These perennial questions concerning good and evil are today more
urgent than ever, insofar as people have become more aware of forming one single
world community. The great problems that arise for human beings today have an
international, worldwide dimension, inasmuch as advances in communications
technology have given rise to closer interaction among individuals, societies
and cultures. A local event can have an almost immediate worldwide repercussion. The consciousness of global solidarity is thus emerging, which finds its
ultimate foundation in the unity of the human race. This finds expression in
the sense of planetary responsibility. Thus, the question of ecological
balance, of the protection of the environment, resources and climate, has become
a pressing preoccupation faced by all humanity, and whose solution extends far
beyond national boundaries. Likewise, threats of terrorism, organized crime and
new forms of violence and oppression that weigh upon societies have a global
dimension. The accelerated developments of biotechnologies, which sometimes
threaten the very identity of man (genetic manipulation, cloning…), urgently
call for an ethical and political reflection of a universal breadth. In this
context, the search for common ethical values experiences a revival of relevance.
2. By their wisdom, their generosity and sometimes their heroism, men and women
give active witness to these common ethical values. Our admiration for such
people is a sign of a spontaneous initial grasp of moral values. Academic and
scientific reflection on the cultural, political, economic, moral and religious
dimensions of our social existence nourishes this reflection on the common good
of humanity. There are also artists who, by the manifestation of beauty, react
against the loss of meaning and give renewed hope to men and women. Likewise,
some politicians work with energy and creativity to put programs into place for
the elimination of poverty and the protection of fundamental freedoms. Very
important also is the constant witness of the representatives of religions and
spiritual traditions who wish to live by the light of the ultimate truth and the
absolute good. All contribute, each in his own manner and in a reciprocal
exchange, to the promotion of peace, a more just political order, the sense of
common responsibility, an equitable distribution of riches, as well as respect
for the environment, for the dignity of the human person and his fundamental
rights. However, these efforts cannot succeed unless good intentions rest on a
solid foundational agreement regarding the goods and values that represent the
most profound aspirations of man, both as an individual and as member of a
community. Only the recognition and promotion of these ethical values can
contribute to the construction of a more human world. 3. The search for this common ethical language concerns everyone. For
Christians, it is mysteriously in harmony with the work of the Word of God, “the
true light that enlightens every man” (Jn 1:9), and with the work of the Holy
Spirit who knows how to germinate in hearts “love, joy, peace, patience,
kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control” (Gal 5:22-23). The
community of Christians, which shares “the joys and hopes, the griefs and the
anxieties of the men of this age” and “therefore experiences itself really and
intimately in solidarity with mankind and its history”(1), cannot in any way hide
from this common responsibility. Enlightened by the Gospel, engaged in a
patient and respectful dialogue with all persons of good will, Christians
participate in the common endeavour to promote human values: “Whatever is true,
whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely,
whatever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of
praise, think about these things” (Phil 4:8). They know that Jesus Christ, “our
peace” (Eph 2:14), who has reconciled all human beings to God by his
cross, is the principle of the most profound unity towards whom the human race
is called to converge.
4. The search for a common ethical language is inseparable from an experience
of conversion, by which persons and communities turn away from the forces that
seek to imprison them in indifference or cause them to raise walls against the
other and against the stranger. The heart of stone – cold, inert and indifferent to the lot of one’s neighbor and of the
human race – must be transformed, under the action of the Spirit, into a heart
of flesh(2), sensitive to wisdom that calls us to compassion, to the desire for
peace and hope for all. This conversion is the condition for true dialogue.
5. Contemporary attempts to define a universal ethic are not lacking. Shortly
after the Second World War, the community of nations, seeing the consequences of
the close collusion that totalitarianism had maintained with pure juridical
positivism, defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) some
inalienable rights of the human person. These rights transcend the positive law
of states and must serve them both as a reference and a norm. These rights are
not simply bestowed by a lawmaker: they are declared, which is to say, their
objective existence, prior to any decision of the lawmaker, is made manifest.
They flow, in fact, from the “recognition of the inherent dignity…of all members
of the human family” (Preamble).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes one of the most beautiful
successes of modern history. It “remains one of the highest expressions of
human conscience in our times”(3), and it offers a solid basis for promoting a
more just world. Nevertheless, the results have not always been as high as the
hopes. Certain countries have contested the universality of these rights,
judged to be too Western, prompting a search for a more comprehensive
formulation. Moreover, a certain propensity towards multiplying human rights
more according to the disordered desires of the consumerist individual or the
demands of interest groups, rather than the objective requirements of the common
good of humanity, has – in no small way – contributed to their devaluation. Disconnected from the moral sense of values, which transcend particular
interests, the multiplication of procedures and juridical regulations leads into
a quagmire, which, when all is said and done, only serves the interests of the
most powerful. Above all, a tendency comes to the fore to reinterpret human
rights, separating them from the ethical and rational dimension that constitutes their foundation and their end, in favor
of pure utilitarian legalism(4).
6. In order to make explicit the ethical foundation of human rights, some have
tried to elaborate a “global ethic” in the framework of a dialogue between
cultures and religions. The “global ethic” refers to the collection of
fundamental obligatory values which for centuries have formed the patrimony of
human experience. It is found in all the great religious and philosophical
traditions(5). This project, worthy of interest, is indicative of the current
need for an ethic possessing universal and global validity. But does a purely
inductive search, conducted on the parliamentary model, for an already existing
minimal consensus, satisfy the requirements for basing law on what is absolute?
Moreover, does not this minimal ethic lead to relativizing the strong ethical
requirements of each of the religions or particular schools of wisdom? 7. For several decades, the question of the ethical foundations of law and
politics has been set aside in certain sectors of contemporary culture. Under
the pretext that every claim to possess an objective and universal truth would
be the source of intolerance and violence, and that only relativism can
safeguard the pluralism of values and democracy, a juridical positivism is
espoused, which renounces any reference to an objective ontological criterion of
what is just. In this perspective, the final horizon of law and the moral norm
is the law in force, which is considered to be just by definition since it is
the will of the legislator. But this opens the way to the arbitrary use of
power, to the dictatorship of the numerical majority and to ideological
manipulation, which harm the common good. “In today’s ethics and philosophy of
law, the postulates of juridical positivism are widespread. As a result,
legislation often only becomes a compromise among different interests: one seeks
to transform into law private interests or desires that are opposed to the
duties flowing from social responsibility”(6). But juridical positivism is
notoriously insufficient, for a legislator can only act legitimately within
certain limits, which derive from the dignity of the human person, and in
service to the development of what is authentically human. Now, the legislator
cannot abandon the determination of what is human to extrinsic and superficial
criteria, as would be the case, for example, if he were to legalize, on his own,
everything that is possible in the realm of biotechnology. In brief, he must
act in an ethically responsible manner. Politics cannot cut itself off from
ethics nor can civil laws and the juridical order prescind from a higher moral
law.
8. In this context in which reference to absolute objective values, universally
recognized, has become problematic, some people, wishing nevertheless to give a
rational basis to common ethical decisions, advocate “discourse ethics” in
keeping with a “dialogical” understanding of morality. Discourse ethics
consists in using, in the course of ethical debate, only norms to which all the
concerned participants –renouncing “strategies” aimed at imposing their own
views – can give their assent. In this way, one can determine if a rule of
conduct and action, or a specific behaviour is moral because, by bracketing off
cultural and historical
conditioning, the principle of discussion offers a guarantee of universality and
rationality. Discourse ethics is above all interested in a method by which,
thanks to debate, ethical principles and norms can be tested and become
obligatory for all the participants. It is essentially a process for testing
the value of proposed norms, but it cannot produce new substantial contents. Discourse ethics is, therefore, a purely formal ethic that does not concern
fundamental moral orientations. It also runs the risk of limiting itself to the
search for compromise. Certainly, dialogue and debate are always necessary for
obtaining an achievable agreement on the concrete application of moral norms in
any given situation, but they should not relegate moral conscience to the
margins. A true debate does not replace personal moral convictions, but it
presupposes and enriches them.
9. Aware of what is currently at stake in the question, we would like, in this
document, to invite all those pondering the ultimate foundations of ethics and
of the juridical and political order, to consider the resources that a renewed
presentation of the doctrine of the natural law contains. This law, in
substance, affirms that persons and human communities are capable, in the light
of reason, of discerning the fundamental orientations of moral action in
conformity with the very nature of the human subject and of expressing these
orientations in a normative fashion in the form of precepts or commandments. These fundamental precepts, objective and universal, are called upon to
establish and inspire the collection of moral, juridical and political
determinations that govern the life of human beings and societies. They
constitute a permanent critical instance of them and guarantee the dignity of
the human person in the face of the fluctuations of ideologies. In the course
of its history, in the elaboration of its own ethical tradition, the Christian
community, guided by the Spirit of Jesus Christ and in critical dialogue with
the wisdom traditions it has encountered, has assumed, purified and developed
this teaching on the natural law as a fundamental ethical norm. But
Christianity does not have the monopoly on the natural law. In fact, founded on
reason, common to all human beings, the natural law is the basis of
collaboration among all persons of good will, whatever their religious
convictions.
10. It is true that the term “natural law” is a source of numerous
misunderstandings in our present cultural context. At times, it evokes only a
resigned and completely passive submission to the physical laws of
nature, while human beings seek instead – and rightly so – to master and to
direct these elements for their own good. At times, when presented as an
objective datum that would impose itself from the outside on personal
conscience, independently of the work of reason and subjectivity, it is
suspected of introducing a form of heteronomy intolerable for the dignity of the
free human person. Sometimes also, in the course of history, Christian theology
has too easily justified some anthropological positions on the basis of the
natural law, which subsequently appeared as conditioned by the historical and
cultural context. But a more profound understanding of the relationships
between the moral subject, nature and God, as well as a better consideration of
the historicity that affects the concrete applications of the natural law, help
to overcome these misunderstandings. It is likewise important today to set out
the traditional doctrine of the natural law in terms that better manifest the
personal and existential dimension of the moral life. It is also necessary to
insist more on the fact that the expression of the requirements of the natural
law is inseparable from the effort of the total human community to transcend
egotistical and partisan tendencies and develop a global approach of the
“ecology of values” without which human life risks losing its integrity and its
sense of responsibility for the good of all.
11. The idea of the natural law takes on numerous elements that are common to
humanity’s great wisdom traditions, both religious and philosophical. In chapter 1, therefore, our document begins by evoking
“convergences”. Without
pretending to be exhaustive, it indicates that these great religious and
philosophical wisdom traditions bear witness to a largely common moral patrimony
that forms the basis of all dialogue on moral questions. Even more, these
suggest, in one way or another, that this patrimony reveals a universal ethical
message inherent in the nature of things, which everyone is capable of
discerning. The document then calls to mind several essential milestones in the
historical development of the idea of the natural law and mentions certain
modern interpretations that are partially at the origin of the difficulties that
our contemporaries have concerning this notion. In chapter 2 (“The perception
of common moral values”), our document describes how, beginning with the most
basic data of moral experience, the human person immediately apprehends certain
fundamental moral goods and formulates, as a result, the precepts of the natural
law. These do not constitute a code entirely made of
intangible prescriptions but a permanent and normative guiding principle in the
service of the concrete moral life of the person. Chapter 3 (“The foundations
of the natural law”), passing from common experience to theory, deepens the
philosophical, metaphysical and religious foundations of the natural law. In order to respond to some contemporary objections, it specifies the role of
nature in personal action and inquires into the possibility of nature
constituting a moral norm. Chapter 4 (“Natural Law and the City”) makes
explicit the regulating role of natural law precepts in political life. The doctrine of the natural law already possesses coherence and validity on the
philosophical level of reason, common to all human beings, but chapter 5 (“Jesus
Christ, the fulfillment of the natural law”) shows that it acquires its full
meaning within the history of salvation: sent by the Father, Jesus Christ is, in
fact, by his Spirit, the fullness of all law.
Chapter 1: Convergences
1.1. The wisdom traditions and religions of the world
12. In diverse cultures, people have progressively elaborated and developed
traditions of wisdom in which they express and transmit their vision of the
world as well as their thoughtful perception of the place that man holds in
society and the cosmos. Before all conceptual theorizing, these wisdom
traditions, which are often of a religious nature, convey an experience that
identifies what favors and what hinders the full blossoming of personal life and
the smooth running of social life. They constitute a type of “cultural capital”
available in the search for a common wisdom necessary for responding to
contemporary ethical challenges. According to the Christian faith, these
traditions of wisdom, in spite of their limitations and sometimes even their
errors, capture a reflection of the divine wisdom at work in the hearts of human
beings. They call for attention and respect, and can have value as a
praeparatio evangelica.
The form and extent of these traditions can vary considerably. Nevertheless,
they testify to the existence of a patrimony of moral values common to all human
beings, no matter how these values are justified within a particular worldview. For example, the “golden rule” (“And what you hate, do not do to anyone” [Tob
4:15]) is found in one form or another in the majority of wisdom traditions(7). Furthermore, these traditions generally agree in recognizing that the great
ethical rules not only impose themselves on a specific human group, but also
hold true for each individual and for all peoples. In fact, several traditions
recognize that these universal moral behaviours are demanded by the very nature
of man: they express the manner by which he is to enter, in a creative and
harmonious way, into a cosmic or metaphysical order that transcends him and
gives meaning to his life. This order is, in fact, filled with an immanent
wisdom. It carries a moral message that human beings are capable of discerning. 13. In the Hindu traditions, the world – the cosmos as well as human societies
– is regulated by an order or fundamental law (dharma), which one must respect
in order not to cause serious imbalances. Dharma then defines the
socio-religious obligations of man. In its specificity, the moral teaching of
Hinduism is understood in the light of the fundamental doctrines of the
Upanishads: belief in an indefinite cycle of transmigrations (samsāra), with the
idea that good and bad actions committed during the present life (karman) have
an influence on successive rebirths. These doctrines have important
consequences for one’s behaviour with respect to others: they entail a high
degree of goodness and tolerance, a sense of disinterested action for the
benefit of others, as well as the practice of non-violence (ahimsā). The principal current of Hinduism distinguishes between two bodies of texts:
śruti
(“that which is understood”, namely, revelation) and smrti (“that which one
remembers”, namely, tradition). The ethical prescriptions are especially found
in the smrti, most particularly in the dharmaśātra (of which the most important
is the mānava dharmaśātra or laws of Manu, ca. 200-100 B.C.). Besides the
basic principle according to which “the immemorial custom is the transcendent
law approved by sacred scripture and the codes of the divine legislators
(consequently, all men of the three principal classes, who respect the supreme
spirit that is in them, must always conform themselves with diligence to the
immemorial custom”)(8), one also finds an equivalent practice of the golden rule:
“I will tell you what is the essence of the greatest good of the human being.
The man who practices the religion (dharma) of do no harm to anyone without
exception (ahimsā) acquires the greatest good. This man is the master of the
three passions: cupidity, anger and avarice, and renouncing them in relation to
all that exists, acquires success. … This man who considers all creatures like
‘himself’ and treats them as his own ‘self’, laying down the punishing rod and
dominating his anger completely, assures for himself the attainment of happiness. … One will not do to another what one considers harmful to oneself. This, in
brief, is the rule of virtue. … In refusing and in giving, in abundance and in
misery, in the agreeable and the disagreeable, one will judge all the
consequences by considering one’s
own ‘self’”(9). Several precepts of the Hindu tradition can be placed in parallel
with the requirements of the Decalogue(10). 14. One generally defines Buddhism by the four “noble truths” taught by the
Buddha after his enlightenment: 1) reality is suffering and lack of
satisfaction; 2) the origin of suffering is desire; 3) the cessation of
suffering is possible (by the extinction of desire); 4) a way exists leading to
the cessation of suffering. This way is the “noble eightfold path” which
consists in the practice of discipline, concentration and wisdom. On the ethical level, the favorable actions can be summarized in the five precepts (śila,
sīla): 1) do not injure living beings nor take away life; 2) do not take what is
not given; 3) do not engage in immoral sexual conduct; 4) do not use false or
lying words; 5) do not ingest intoxicating products that diminish mastery over
oneself. The profound altruism of the Buddhist tradition, which is expressed in
a resolute attitude of non-violence, amicable benevolence and compassion, thus
agrees with the golden rule.
15. Chinese civilization is profoundly marked by the Taoism of Lâozî or Lao-Tse
(or Tzu) (6th century B.C.). According to Lao-Tse, the Way or Dào is the
primordial principle, immanent within the entire universe. It is an
indiscernible principle of permanent change under the action of two contrary and
complementary poles, the yïn and the yáng. It is up to man to espouse this
natural process of transformation, to let himself go in the flux of time by
means of the attitude of non-action (wú-wéi). The search for harmony with
nature, inseparably material and spiritual, is thus at the heart of the Taoist
ethic. As for Confucius (551-479 B.C.), “Master Kong”, he attempts, on the
occasion of a period of profound crisis, to restore order by respect for rites,
founded on filial piety that must be at the heart of all social life. Social
relations, in fact, take family relations as their model. Harmony is obtained
by an ethic of the happy mean, in which the ritualized relation (the li), which
places man into the natural order, is
the measure of all things. The ideal to be attained is ren, the perfect virtue
of humanity, achieved by self-control and benevolence towards others.
“‘Reciprocity (shù)’: is not this the key word? That which you would not wish
done to you, do not do to others”11. The practice of this rule expresses the
way of heaven (Tiān Dào).
16. In the African traditions, the fundamental reality is life itself. It is
the most precious good, and the ideal of man consists not only in living to old
age sheltered from cares, but most of all in remaining, even after death, a
vital power continually reinforced and vivified in and by his progeny. Life is,
in fact, a dramatic experience. Man, the microcosm at the heart of the
macrocosm, intensely lives the drama of the confrontation between life and death. The mission that falls to him of assuring the victory of life over death,
orients and determines his ethical action. In a consistent and rational ethical
horizon, man, therefore, must identify the allies of life, win them to his cause
and thus assure his survival that is, at the same time, the victory of life. Such is the profound meaning of traditional African religions. The African
ethic thus manifests itself as an anthropocentric and vital ethic: the acts
deemed favorable to the opening up of life, to conserving, protecting and
causing it to flourish or to increasing the vital potential of the community,
are, because of this, considered good; every act presumed prejudicial to the
life of individuals or the community is judged to be bad. Traditional African
religions thus appear to be essentially anthropocentric, but attentive
observation coupled with reflection shows that neither the place accorded to the
living man nor the cult of the ancestors constitutes something closed. The traditional African religions attain their highest point in God, the source of
life, the creator of all that exists.
17. Islam understands itself as the restoration of the original natural
religion. It sees in Muhammad the last prophet sent by God to put human beings
definitively back on the right path. But Muhammad has been preceded by others:
“For there is no community in which an ‘admonisher’ has not appeared”(12). Islam, therefore, ascribes to itself a universal vocation and addresses itself to all
human beings, who are considered as “naturally” Muslims. Islamic law,
inseparably communitarian, moral and
religious, is understood as a law directly given by God. The Islamic ethic is,
therefore, fundamentally a morality of obedience. To do good is to obey the
commandments; to do evil is to disobey them. Human reason intervenes to
recognize the revealed character of the law and to derive from it the concrete
juridical implications. To be sure, in the 9th century, the Mu’tazilite school
proclaimed the idea that “good and evil are in things”, which is to say, that
certain behaviour is good or bad in itself, prior to the divine law that
commands or forbids it. The Mu’tazilites, therefore, judged that man could by
his reason know what is good and evil. According to them, man spontaneously
knows that injustice or falsehood is bad and that it is obligatory to return
what has been entrusted to one, to keep harm away from oneself, to show
gratitude to one’s benefactors, of whom God is the first. But the Ash’arites,
who dominate Sunni orthodoxy, have upheld an opposing theory. As partisans of
occasionalism, which does not recognize any consistency in nature, they consider
that the divine positive revelation of God alone defines good and evil, right
and wrong. Among the prescriptions of this divine positive law, many take up
again or repeat the great elements of the moral patrimony of humanity and can be
placed in relation to the Decalogue(13).
1.2. The Greco-Roman sources of the natural law
18. The idea that there exists a norm of natural justice (The term “droit natural” translated as “norm of natural justice”) prior to positive
juridical determinations is already encountered in classical Greek culture with
the exemplary figure of Antigone, the daughter of Oedipus. Her two brothers,
Eteocles and Polyneices, confront each other to attain power and kill each other. Polyneices, the rebel, is condemned to remain unburied and burned on the pyre. But in order to fulfill the demands of piety towards her dead brother,
Antigone appeals to “the unwritten and immutable laws” against the prohibition
of burial pronounced by the king Creon.
“Creon: And so, you have dared to transgress my laws?
Antigone: Yes, for it was
not Zeus who proclaimed them, Nor justice which abides with the gods below
Neither the one nor the other established these laws among men; I do not
consider your decrees so powerful
That you, mortal man, can disregard the unwritten and immutable laws of the gods.
They don’t exist since today or yesterday but always; No one knows when they
appeared.
Out of fear of the wishes of a man
I ought not have risked being punished by the gods”(14).
19. Plato and Aristotle take up the distinction made by the Sophists between
the laws that have their origin in a convention, that is, in a purely positive
decision (thesis), and those that have force “by nature”. The first are neither
eternal nor are they in force everywhere and they do not oblige everyone. The second oblige everyone, always
and everywhere(15). Certain Sophists, like
Callicles of Plato’s Gorgias, had recourse to this distinction
in order to challenge the legitimacy of the laws instituted by human cities. To
these laws, they opposed their narrow and erroneous idea of nature, reduced to
its physical component alone. Thus, in opposition to the political and
juridical equality of the citizens of the city, they advocated what seemed to
them the most evident of the “natural laws”: the stronger must prevail over
the weaker(16).
20. There is nothing of this sort in Plato and Aristotle. They do not set the
norm of natural justice in opposition to the positive laws of the city [πóλις]. They are convinced that the laws of the city are generally good and constitute
the implementation, more or less successful, of a norm of natural justice which
is in conformity with the nature of things. For Plato, the norm of natural
justice is an ideal norm, a rule for both legislators and citizens, which
permits the grounding and the evaluation of positive laws(17). For Aristotle,
this supreme norm of morality corresponds to the realization of the essential
form of nature. What is natural is moral. The norm of natural justice is
invariable; positive law changes according
to peoples and different epochs. But the norm of natural justice is not
situated beyond positive law. It is embodied in the positive law, which is the
application of the general idea of justice to social life in its variety.
21. In Stoicism, the natural law becomes the key concept of a universalist
ethic. What is good and ought to be done is that which corresponds to nature,
understood in both a physico-biological and rational sense. Every man, whatever
the nation to which he belongs, must integrate himself as a part in the Whole of
the universe. He must live according to his nature(18). This imperative
presupposes that an eternal law exists, a divine Logos, which is present both in
the cosmos – which it infuses with rationality – as well as in human reason. Thus, for Cicero the law is the “the supreme reason inserted in nature, which
commands what must be done and forbids the contrary”(19). Nature and reason
constitute the two sources of our knowledge of the fundamental ethical law,
which is of divine origin.
1.3. The teaching of Sacred
Scripture
22.The gift of the law on Sinai, of which the “Ten Words” constitute the
centre, is an essential element of the religious experience of Israel. This law
of the Covenant includes fundamental ethical precepts. They define the manner
in which the chosen people must respond to God’s choice by their holiness of
life: “Say to all the congregation of the sons of Israel, you shall be holy; for
I the Lord your God am holy” (Lev 19:2). But these ethical behaviours are also
valid for other peoples, in that God demands an account from foreign nations
that violate justice and what is right(20). In fact, God had already sealed, in
the person of Noah, a covenant with the totality of the human race, which
implied, in particular, respect for life
(Gen 9)(21). More fundamentally, creation itself appears as the act by which God
structures the entire universe by giving it a law: “Let them [the stars] praise
the name of the Lord! For he commanded and they were created. And he has
established them for ever and ever; he set down a law which cannot pass away”
(Ps 148:5-6). This obedience of creatures to the law of God is a model for
human beings.
23. Alongside the texts associated with the history of salvation, with the
major theological themes of election, promise, law and covenant, the Bible also
contains a wisdom literature that does not directly treat the national history
of Israel, but deals with the place of man in the world. It develops the
conviction that there is correct way, a “wise” way, of doing things and
conducting one’s life. Man must apply himself to the search for this wisdom and
then make every effort to put it into practice. This wisdom is not so much
found in history as in nature and everyday life(22). In this literature, Wisdom
is often presented as a divine perfection, sometimes hypostasized. In a striking way, she manifests herself in creation, of which she is “the fashioner”
(Wis 7:22). The harmony that reigns among creatures bears witness to wisdom.
In many ways, man is made a participant in this wisdom that comes from God. This participation is a gift from God, that
one must ask for in the prayer: “I prayed, and understanding was given to me; I
called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came to me” (Wis 7:7). This wisdom is
again the fruit of obedience to the revealed law. In fact, the Torah is like
the incarnation of Wisdom. “If you desire wisdom, keep the commandments, and
the Lord will supply it for you. For the fear of the Lord is wisdom and
instruction” (Sir 1:26-27). But wisdom is also the result of a wise observation
of nature and human morals in order to discover their immanent intelligibility
and their exemplary value(23).
24. In the fullness of time, Jesus Christ preached the coming of the Kingdom as
a manifestation of the merciful love of God made present among human beings
through his own person and calling for conversion and the free response of love
on their part. This preaching is not without consequences for ethics, for the
way in which the world and human relations are to be structured. In his moral
teaching, presented in a succinct form in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus takes
up the golden rule: “So, whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to
them; for this is the law and the prophets” (Mt 7:12)(24). This positive precept
completes the negative formulation of the same rule in the Old Testament: “And
what you hate, do not do to anyone” (Tob 4:15)(25).
25. At the beginning of the Letter to the Romans, the Apostle Paul, intending
to show the universal need for the salvation brought by Christ, describes the
religious and moral situation common to all of humanity. He affirms the
possibility of a natural knowledge of God: “For what can be known about God is
plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the
world his invisible nature, namely,
his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have
been made” (Rom 1:19-20)(26). But this knowledge has been perverted into idolatry. Placing Jews and pagans on the same level, Paul affirms the existence of an
unwritten law inscribed in their hearts(27). It permits everyone to discern good
and evil by himself: “When Gentiles who do not have the law do by nature what
the law requires, they are a law unto themselves, even though they do not have
the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while
their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or
perhaps excuse them” (Rom 2:14-15). Nevertheless, knowledge of the law does not
in itself suffice in order to lead a righteous life(28). These texts of St. Paul have had a decisive influence on Christian reflection in regard to natural law.
1.4. The developments of the Christian tradition
26. For the Fathers of the Church, the sequi naturam and the sequela Christi
are not in opposition to each other. On the contrary, the Fathers generally
adopt the idea from Stoicism that nature and reason indicate what our moral
duties are. To follow nature and reason is to follow the personal Logos, the
Word of God. The doctrine of the natural law, in fact, supplies a basis for
completing biblical morality. Moreover, it allows us to explain why the pagans,
independently of biblical revelation, possess a positive moral conception. This
is indicated to them by nature and corresponds to the teaching of revelation.
“From God are the law of nature and the law of revelation which function as
one”(29). The Fathers of the Church,
however, do not purely and simply adopt the Stoic doctrine. They modify and
develop it. On the one hand, the anthropology of biblical inspiration, which
sees man as the imago Dei – the full truth of which is manifested in Christ –
forbids reducing the human person to a simple element of the cosmos: called to
communion with the living God, the person transcends the whole cosmos while
integrating himself in it. On the other hand, the harmony of nature and reason
no longer rests on an immanentist vision of a pantheistic cosmos but on the
common reference to the transcendent wisdom of the Creator. To conduct oneself
in conformity with reason amounts to following the orientations that Christ, as
the divine Logos, has set down by virtue of the logoi spermatikoi in human
reason. To act against reason is an offense against these orientations. Very
significant is the definition of St. Augustine: “The eternal law is the divine
reason or the will of God, ordering the conservation of the natural order and
forbidding its disruption”(30). More precisely, for St. Augustine, the norms of
the righteous life and of justice are expressed in the Word of God, who then
imprints them in the heart of man “as the seal of a ring passes to the wax, but
without leaving the ring”(31). Moreover, for the Church Fathers the natural law
is henceforth understood in the framework of the history of salvation, which
leads to distinguishing different states of nature (original
nature, fallen nature, restored nature) in which the natural law is realized in
different ways. This Patristic doctrine of the natural law is transmitted to
the Middle Ages, along with the closely related concept of the “law of nations
(ius gentium)”, according to which there exist, apart from Roman civil law (ius
civile), universal principles of law, which regulate the relations among peoples
and are obligatory for all(32).
27. In the Middle Ages the doctrine of natural law attains a certain maturity
and assumes a “classical” form that constitutes the background of all further
discussion. It is characterized by four traits. In the first place, in
conformity with the nature of scholastic thought that seeks to gather the truth
wherever it is found, it takes up prior reflections on natural law, pagan or
Christian, and tries to propose a synthesis. Second, in conformity with the
systematic nature of scholastic thought, it locates natural law in a general
metaphysical and theological framework. Natural law is understood as the
rational creature’s participation in the eternal, divine law, thanks to which it
enters in a free and conscious manner into the plans of Providence. It is not a
closed and complete set of moral norms, but a source of constant guidance,
present and operative in the different stages of the economy of salvation. Third, with the recognition of the consistency of nature, in part linked to the
rediscovery of the thought of Aristotle, the scholastic doctrine of the natural
law considers the ethical and political order as a rational order, a work of
human intelligence. The scholastic notion of natural law defines an autonomous
space for that
order, distinct but not separated from the order of religious revelation(33). Finally, in the eyes of scholastic theologians and jurists, natural law
constitutes a point of reference and a criterion in the light of which they
evaluate the legitimacy of positive laws and of particular customs.
1.5. Further developments
28. In certain aspects, the modern history of the idea of natural law
represents a legitimate development of the teaching of medieval scholasticism in
a more complex cultural context, marked in particular by a more vivid sense of
moral subjectivity. Among these developments, we point out the works of the
Spanish theologians of the 16th century, who, following the example of the
Dominican Francis of Vitoria, had recourse to natural law to contest the
imperialist ideology of some Christian states of Europe and to defend the rights
of the non-Christian peoples of America. In fact, such rights are inherent in
human nature and do not depend on one’s concrete situation vis-à-vis the
Christian faith. The idea of natural law also allowed the Spanish theologians
to establish the foundations of an international law, i.e., of a universal
norm that regulates the relations of peoples and states among themselves.
29. But in other aspects the idea of natural law in the modern age took on
orientations and forms that contributed to making it difficult to accept today. During the last centuries of the Middle Ages, there developed in scholasticism a
current of voluntarism, the cultural hegemony of which has profoundly modified
the idea of natural law. Voluntarism proposes to highlight the transcendence of
the free subject in relation to all
conditioning. Against naturalism that tended to subject God to the laws of
nature, it emphasizes, in a unilateral way, the absolute freedom of God, with
the risk of compromising his wisdom and rendering his decisions arbitrary. In
the same manner, against intellectualism, suspected of subjecting the human
person to the order of the world, it exalts a freedom of indifference,
understood as a pure capacity to choose contraries, which runs the risk of
disconnecting the person from his natural inclinations and from the objective
good(34).
30. The consequences of voluntarism for the doctrine of natural law are
numerous. Above all, while in St. Thomas Aquinas the law was understood as a
work of reason and an expression of wisdom, voluntarism leads one to connect the
law to will alone, and to a will detached from its intrinsic ordering to the
good. Henceforth, all the force of the law resides only in the will of the
lawmaker. The law is thus divested of its intrinsic intelligibility. In these
conditions, morality is reduced to obedience to the commandments that manifest
the will of the lawmaker. Thomas Hobbes will end up holding the position that auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem (it is authority and not truth that makes
law)(35). Modern man, loving autonomy, could only rebel against such a vision of
the law. Then, with the pretext of preserving the absolute sovereignty of God
over nature, voluntarism deprives it of all internal intelligibility. The thesis of the potentia Dei absoluta, according to which God could act
independently of his wisdom and his goodness, relativizes all the existing
intelligible
structures and weakens the natural knowledge that man can have of them. Nature ceases to be a criterion for knowing the wise will of God: man can expect this
knowledge only from a revelation.
31. In addition, several factors have led to the secularization of the notion
of natural law. Among these, one can recall the increasing divide between faith
and reason which characterizes the end of the Middle Ages or some aspects of the
Reformation(36), but above all the will to overcome the violent religious
conflicts that bloodied Europe up until the dawn of modern times. Thus a desire
arose to establish the political unity of human communities by putting religious
confession in parentheses. Henceforth, the doctrine of natural law prescinds
from all particular religious revelation, and therefore from all confessional
theology. It claims to be founded solely on the light of reason common to all
people and is presented as the ultimate norm in the secular field.
32. Further, modern rationalism posits the existence of an absolute and
normative order of intelligible essences accessible to reason and accordingly
relativizes the reference to God as the ultimate foundation of the natural law. Certainly, the necessary, eternal, and immutable order of essences needs to be
actualized by the Creator, but it is believed that this order already possesses
in itself its coherence and rationality. Reference to God therefore becomes
optional. The natural law would be binding on all “even if there were no God
(etsi Deus non daretur)”(37). 33. The modern rationalist model of natural law is characterized: 1) by the
essentialist belief in an immutable and ahistorical human nature, of which
reason can perfectly grasp the definition and essential properties;
2) by putting into parentheses the concrete situation of human persons in the
history of salvation, marked by sin and grace, which however have a decisive
influence on the knowledge and practice of the natural law; 3) by the idea that
it is possible for reason to deduce a priori the precepts of the natural law,
beginning from the definition of the essence of the human being; 4) by the
maximal extension thus given to those deduced precepts, so that natural law
appears as a code of pre-made laws regulating almost the entire range of
behaviour. This tendency to extend the field of the determinations of natural
law was at the origin of a grave crisis when, particularly with the rapid
development of the human sciences, Western thought became more aware of the
historicity of human institutions and of the cultural relativity of many ways of
acting that at times had been justified by appeal to the evidence of natural law. The gap between an abstract maximalist theory and the complexity of the
empirical data explains in part the disaffection for the very idea of natural
law. In order that the notion of natural law can be of use in the elaboration
of a universal ethic in a secularized and pluralistic society such as our own,
it is therefore necessary to avoid presenting it in the rigid form that it
assumed, particularly in modern rationalism.
1.6. The Magisterium of the Church and natural law
34. Before the 13th century, because the distinction between the natural and
the supernatural order was not clearly elaborated, natural law was generally
assimilated into Christian morals. Thus the decree of Gratian, which provides
the fundamental canonical norm in the 12th century, begins thus: “Natural law is
that which is contained in the law and in the Gospel”. It then identifies the
content of the natural law with the golden rule and explains that the divine
laws correspond to nature(38). The Fathers of the Church had recourse to natural
law and to Sacred Scripture
to provide a foundation for the moral behaviour of Christians, but the
Magisterium of the Church, early on, had to make very few interventions to
settle disputes on the content of the moral law. When the Magisterium of the Church was led not only to resolve particular moral
discussions, but also to justify its own position before a secularized world, it
appealed more explicitly to the notion of natural law. It is in the 19th century, especially during the pontificate of Leo XIII, that recourse to
natural law becomes more necessary in the acts of the Magisterium. The most
explicit presentation is found in the Encyclical
Libertas praestantissimum
(1888). Leo XIII refers to natural law to identify the source of civil
authority and to fix its limits. He vigorously recalls that one must obey God
rather than men when the civil authorities command or recognize something
contrary to divine law or to the natural law. He also looks to natural law to
protect private property against socialism and to defend the right of workers to
an adequate living wage. In this same line, John XXIII refers to natural law to
provide a foundation for the rights and the duties of man (Encyclical
Pacem in
terris [1963]). With Pius XI (Encyclical
Casti connubii [1930]) and Paul VI
(Encyclical
Humanae vitae [1968]), natural law is revealed as a decisive
criterion for questions relating to conjugal morality. Certainly, natural law
is a law accessible to human reason, common to believers and nonbelievers, and
the Church does not have exclusive rights over it, but since revelation assumes
the requirements of the natural law, the Magisterium of the Church has been
established as the guarantor and interpreter of it(39). The Catechism of the
Catholic Church (1992) and the Encyclical
Veritatis splendor (1993) assign a
decisive place to the natural law in the exposition of Christian morals(40).
35. Today the Catholic Church invokes the natural law in four principal
contexts. In the first place, facing the spread of a culture that limits
rationality to the positive sciences and abandons the moral life to relativism,
it insists on the natural capacity of human beings to obtain by reason “the
ethical message contained in being(41)” and to know in their
main lines the fundamental norms of just action in conformity with their nature
and their dignity. The natural law thus responds to the need to provide a basis
in reason for the rights of man(42) and makes possible an intercultural and
interreligious dialogue capable of fostering universal peace and of avoiding the
“clash of civilizations”. In the second place, in the presence of relativistic
individualism, which judges that every individual is the source of his own
values, and that society results from a mere contract agreed upon by individuals
who choose to establish all the norms themselves, it recalls the
non-conventional, but natural and objective character of the fundamental norms
that regulate social and political life. In particular, the democratic form of
government is intrinsically bound to stable ethical values, which have their
source in the requirements of natural law and thus do not depend on the
fluctuations of the consent of a numerical majority. In the third place, facing
an aggressive secularism that wants to exclude believers from public debate, the
Church points out that the interventions of Christians in public life on
subjects that regard natural law (the defence of the rights of the oppressed,
justice in international relations, the defence of life and of the family,
religious freedom and freedom of education), are not in themselves of a
confessional nature, but derive from the care which every citizen must have for
the common good of society. In the fourth place, facing the threats of the
abuse of power, and even of totalitarianism, which juridical positivism conceals
and which certain ideologies propagate, the Church recalls that civil laws do
not bind in conscience when they contradict natural law, and asks for the
acknowledgment of the right to conscientious objection, as well as the duty of
disobedience in the name of obedience to a higher law(43). The reference to
natural law, far from producing conformism, guarantees personal freedom and
defends the marginalized and those oppressed by social structures which do not
take the common good into account.
Chapter 2: The perception of
Common Moral Values 36. The examination of the great traditions of moral wisdom undertaken in the
first chapter shows that certain kinds of human behaviour are recognized, in the
majority of cultures, as expressing a certain excellence in the way in which a
human being lives and realizes his own humanity: acts of courage, patience in
the trials and difficulties of life, compassion for the weak, moderation in the
use of material goods, a responsible attitude in relation to the environment,
and dedication to the common good. Such ethical conduct defines the main lines
of a properly moral ideal of a life “according to nature”, that is, in
conformity with the profound being of the human subject. On the other hand,
some forms of behaviour are universally recognized as calling for condemnation:
murder, theft, lying, wrath, greed, and avarice. These appear as attacks on the
dignity of the human person and on the just requirements of life in society. One is justified to see in this consensus a manifestation of that which – beyond
the diversity of cultures – is the human in the human being, namely “human
nature”. But at the same time, one must admit that such agreement on the moral
quality of certain behaviour coexists with a great variety of explanatory
theories. Whether we look at the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads in
Hinduism, or the four “noble truths” of Buddhism, or the Tao of Lao-Tse, or the
“nature” of the Stoics, every school of wisdom or every philosophical system
understands moral action within a general explanatory framework that comes to
legitimize the distinction between what is good and what is evil. There is a
diversity among these explanations, which makes both dialogue and the grounding
of moral norms difficult.
37. Nevertheless, apart from any theoretical justifications of the concept of
natural law, it is possible to illustrate the immediate data of the conscience
of which it wants to give an account. The object of the present chapter is
precisely to show how the common moral values that constitute natural law are
grasped. It is only later that we will see how the concept
of natural law rests on an explanatory framework which both undergirds and
legitimizes moral values, in a way that can be shared by many. To do this, the
presentation of the natural law by St. Thomas Aquinas appears particularly
pertinent, since, among other things, it places the natural law within a
morality that sustains the dignity of the human person and recognizes his
capacity of discernment(44).
2.1. The role of society and culture
38. The human person only progressively comes to moral experience and becomes
capable of expressing to himself the precepts that should guide his action. The person attains this to degree to which he is inserted in a network of human
relationships from birth, beginning with the family, relationships which allow
him, little by little, to become aware of himself and of reality around him. This is done in particular by the learning of a language – one’s mother tongue –
which teaches the person to name things and allows him to become a subject aware
of himself. Oriented by the persons who surround him, permeated by the culture
in which he is immersed, the person recognizes certain ways of behaving and of
thinking as values to pursue, laws to observe, examples to imitate, visions of
the world to accept. The social and cultural context thus exercises a decisive
role in the education in moral values. There is, however, no contradiction
between such conditioning and human freedom. Rather, it makes freedom possible,
since it is through such conditioning that the person is able to come to moral
experience, which will eventually allow him to review some of the “obvious
facts” that he had interiorized in the course of his moral apprenticeship. Moreover, in the present context of globalization, societies and cultures
themselves must inevitably practice sincere dialogue and exchange, based on the
co-responsibility of all in regard to the common good of the planet: they must
leave aside particular interests to attain the moral values that all are called
to share.
2.2. Moral experience: “one must do good”
39. Every human being who attains self-awareness and responsibility experiences
an interior call to do good. He discovers that he is fundamentally a moral
being, capable of perceiving and of expressing the call that, as we have seen,
is found within all cultures: “One must do good and avoid evil”. All the other
precepts of the natural law are based on this precept(45). This first precept is
known naturally, immediately, by the practical reason, just as the principle of
non-contradiction (the intellect cannot at the same time and under the same
aspect both affirm and deny the same thing about something) which is at the base
of all speculative reasoning, is grasped intuitively, naturally, by the
theoretical reason, when the subject comprehends the sense of the terms employed. Traditionally, such knowledge of the first principle of the moral life is
attributed to an innate intellectual disposition called synderesis(46).
40. With this principle, we find ourselves immediately in the sphere of
morality. The good that thus imposes itself on the person is in fact the moral
good; it is behaviour that, going beyond the categories of what is useful, is in
keeping with the authentic realization of this being – at the same time one and
differentiated – who is the human person. Human activity cannot be reduced to a
simple question of adaptation to the “ecosystem”: to be human is to exist and to
be placed within a broader framework that defines meaning, values and
responsibilities. By searching for the moral good, the person contributes to
the realization of his nature, beyond impulses of
instinct or the search for a particular pleasure. This moral good testifies to
itself and is understood from itself(47).
41. The moral good corresponds to the profound desire of the human person who —
like every being — tends spontaneously, naturally, towards realizing himself
fully, towards that which allows him to attain the perfection proper to him,
namely, happiness. Unfortunately, the subject can always allow himself to be
drawn by particular desires and to choose goods or to do deeds that go against
the moral good which he perceives. A person can refuse to go beyond himself. It is the price of a freedom limited in itself and weakened by sin, a freedom
that encounters only particular goods, none of which can fully satisfy the human
heart. It pertains to the reason of the subject to examine if these particular
goods can be integrated into the authentic realization of the person: if so,
they will be judged morally good, and if not, morally bad.
42. This last claim is of capital importance. It is the basis of the
possibility of dialogue with persons belonging to different cultural or
religious horizons. It values the eminent dignity of every human person, in
stressing his natural aptitude to know the moral good that he must accomplish. Like every creature, the human person is defined by a combination of dynamisms
and finalities, prior to the free choices of the will. But, unlike beings that
are not endowed with reason, the human person is capable of knowing and of
interiorizing these finalities, and thus of appreciating, in accordance with
them that which is good or bad for him. Thus he recognizes the eternal law, i.e., the plan of God regarding creation, and participates in God’s providence
in a particularly excellent manner,
guiding himself and guiding others(48). This insistence on the dignity of the
moral subject and on his relative autonomy is rooted in the recognition of the
autonomy of created realities and corresponds to a fundamental given of
contemporary culture(49).
43. The moral obligation that the subject recognizes does not come, therefore,
from a law that would be exterior to him (pure heteronomy), but arises from
within the subject himself. In fact, as indicated by the maxim we have cited –
“One must do good and avoid evil” – the moral good that reason determines
“imposes itself” on the subject. It “ought” to be accomplished. It takes on a
character of obligation and of law. But the term “law” here does not refer to
scientific laws that limit themselves to describing the factual constants of the
physical or social world, nor to an imperative imposed arbitrarily on the moral
subject from without. Law here designates an orientation of the practical
reason which indicates to the moral subject what kind of action is in accord
with the basic and necessary dynamism of his being that tends to its full
realization. This law is normative in virtue of an internal requirement of the
spirit. It springs from the heart itself of our being as a call to the
realization and transcending of oneself. It is not therefore a matter of
subjecting oneself to the law of another, but of accepting the law of one’s own
being.
2.3. The discovery of the precepts of the natural law: universality of the
natural law
44. Once we posit the basic affirmation that introduces us to the moral order –
“One must do good and avoid evil” – we see how the recognition of the
fundamental laws that ought to govern human action take effect in the subject. Such recognition is not the fact of an abstract consideration of human nature,
nor of the effort of conceptualization, which will afterwards be the distinctive
characteristic of philosophical and theological theorizing. The perception of
fundamental moral goods is immediate, vital, based on the connaturality of the
spirit with values, and engages affectivity as much as intelligence, the heart
as much as the mind. It is an acquisition often imperfect, still obscure and
dim, but it has the profundity of immediacy. It deals with the data of the most
simple and common experience, implicit in the concrete action of persons.
45. In his search for the moral good, the human person sets himself to listen
to what he is, and takes note of the fundamental inclinations of his nature,
which are something quite different from the simple blind impulses of desire. Perceiving that the goods to which he tends by nature are necessary for his
moral realization, he formulates for himself, under the form of practical
commands, the moral duty of actualizing them in his own life. He expresses to
himself a certain number of very general precepts that he shares with all other
human beings and that constitute the content of that which we call natural law.
46. One traditionally distinguishes three great sets of natural dynamisms that
are at work in the human person(50). The first, which is in common with all
substances, comprises essentially the inclination to preserve and to develop
one’s own existence. The second, which is in common with all living things,
comprises the inclination to reproduce, in order to perpetuate the species. The third, which is proper to the human person as a rational being, comprises the
inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. From these
inclinations, the first precepts of the natural law, known naturally, can be
formulated. Such precepts remain very general, but they form the first
substratum that is at the foundation
of all further reflections on the good to be practiced and on the evil to be
avoided.
47. To leave this generality and to make clear the concrete choices about what
to do, it is necessary to have recourse to discursive reason, which will
determine what are the concrete moral goods capable of fulfilling the person –
and humanity – and will formulate more concrete precepts capable of guiding him
in his action. In this new stage the knowledge of the moral good proceeds by
way of reasoning. At its origin this reasoning remains very simple: a limited
experience of life suffices, and it remains within the intellectual possibility
of everyone. One speaks here of the “secondary precepts” of the natural law,
discovered through the consideration (to varying degrees) of practical reason,
in contrast to the general fundamental precepts that reason picks up
spontaneously and which are called “primary precepts”(51).
2.4. The precepts of the natural law
48. We have identified in the human person a first inclination that he shares
with all beings: the inclination to preserve and develop his own existence. In
living beings there is habitually a spontaneous reaction to an imminent danger
of death: one flees it, one defends the integrity of one’s own existence, one
struggles to survive. Physical life appears naturally as the fundamental,
essential, primordial good, from which comes the precept to protect one’s own
life. Within this category of the preservation of life are included the
inclinations to everything that contributes, in a way proper to the human
person, to the maintenance and quality of biological life: bodily integrity; the
use of external goods necessary for the sustenance and the integrity of life,
such as food, clothing, housing, work; the quality of the biological environment... Taking his bearings from these inclinations, the human being formulates
for himself goals to be realized that contribute to the harmonious and
responsible development of his own being and which, as such, appear to him as
moral goods, values to pursue, duties to accomplish and indeed as rights to
assert. In fact, the duty to preserve one’s own life has as its correlative the
right to demand that which is necessary for one’s preservation in a favourable
environment(52).
49. The second inclination, which is common to all living beings, concerns the
survival of the species that is realized by procreation. Reproduction is
included in the prolongation of the tendency to persevere in being. If the
perpetuity of biological existence is impossible for the individual himself, it
is possible for the species and, thus, in a certain measure, overcomes the
limits inherent in every physical being. The good of the species appears in
this way as one of the fundamental aspirations present in the person. We become
particularly aware of it in our time, when certain issues such as global warming
revive our sense of responsibility for the planet, as well as for the human
species in particular. This openness to a certain common good of the species is
already an assertion of certain aspirations proper to the human person. The dynamism towards procreation is intrinsically linked to the natural inclination
that leads man to woman and woman to man, a universal datum recognized in all
societies. It is the same for the inclination to care for one’s children and to
educate them. These inclinations imply that the permanence of the union of man
and woman, indeed even their mutual fidelity, are already values to pursue, even
if they can only fully flourish in the spiritual order of interpersonal
communion(53).
50. The third set of inclinations is specific to the human being as a spiritual
being, endowed with reason, capable of knowing the truth, of entering into
dialogue with others and of forming relations of friendship. Therefore, this
third level is particularly important. The inclination to live in society
derives first of all from the fact that the human being has need of others to
overcome his own intrinsic individual limits and to achieve maturity in the
various spheres of his existence. But for his spiritual nature to fully
flourish, a person has the need to form relations of generous friendship with
his fellow human beings and to develop intense cooperation in the search for the
truth. His integral good is so intimately linked to life in community that he
enters into political society by virtue of a natural inclination and not by mere
convention(54). The relational character of the person also expresses itself by
the tendency to live in communion with God or the absolute. It manifests itself
in religious sentiment and in the desire to know God. Certainly, it can be
denied by those who refuse to
admit the existence of a personal God, but it remains implicitly present in the
search for truth and meaning, experienced by every human being.
51. Corresponding to these tendencies that are specific to the human person,
there is the need, recognized by reason, to realize concretely this life in
relationship and to construct life in society on just foundations that
correspond to the norm of natural justice. This entails the recognition of the
equal dignity of every individual of the human species, beyond the differences
of race and culture, and a great respect for humanity wherever it is found,
including that of the smallest and in the most despised of its members. “Do not
do to another that which you would not want done to you”. Here we encounter the
golden rule, which today is posited as the very principle of a morality of
reciprocity. In the first chapter of this text, we were able to find the
presence of this rule in the greater parts of the wisdom traditions, as well as
in the Gospel itself. It is in referring to a negative formulation of the
golden rule that St. Jerome manifested the universality of several moral
precepts. “That is why the judgment of God is just, who writes in the heart of
the human race: ‘That which you do not want done to you, do not do to another’. Who does not know that homicide, adultery, theft and every kind of greed are
evil, since one does not want them done to oneself? If a person did not know
that these things were bad, he would never complain when they are inflicted on
him”(55). To the golden rule are linked several commandments of the Decalogue, as
are numerous Buddhist precepts, and, indeed, some Confucian rules, and also the
greater part of the orientations of the great Charters that enumerate the rights
of the person.
52. After this brief exposition of the moral principles that derive from
reason’s consideration of the fundamental inclinations of the human person, we
find a set of precepts and values that, at least in their general formulation,
can be considered as universal, since they apply to all humanity. They also
take on the character of immutability to the extent that they derive from a
human nature whose essential components remain the same throughout history. It
can still happen that they are obscured or even erased from the human heart
because of sin and because of cultural and historical conditioning, which can
negatively affect the personal
moral life: ideologies and insidious propaganda, generalized relativism,
structures of sin(56). We must therefore be modest and prudent when invoking the
“obviousness” of natural law precepts. But this does not mean that we cannot
recognize in these precepts the common foundation for a dialogue in search of a
universal ethic. Those undertaking such a dialogue, however, must learn to
distance themselves from their own particular interests, in order to be open to
the needs of others, and to allow themselves to be summoned by the common moral
values. In a pluralistic society, where it is difficult to agree on
philosophical foundations, such a dialogue is absolutely necessary. The doctrine of natural law can make its contribution to such a dialogue.
2.5.
The application of the common precepts: historicity of the natural law
53. It is impossible to remain at the level of generality, which is that of the
first principles of the natural law. In fact, moral reflection must descend
into the concreteness of action to throw its light on it. But the more it faces
concrete and contingent situations, the more its conclusions are affected by a
note of variability and uncertainty. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
concrete application of the precepts of the natural law can take different forms
in different cultures, or even in different epochs within a single culture. It
is sufficient to recall the evolution of moral reflection on questions such as
slavery, lending at interest, duelling or the death penalty. Sometimes such
evolution leads to a better comprehension of moral requirements. Sometimes, in
addition, the evolution of the political or economic situation leads to a
re-evaluation of particular norms that had been established before. Morality,
in fact, deals with contingent realities that evolve over time. Although he
lived in the epoch of Christendom, a theologian such as St. Thomas Aquinas had
a very clear perception of
this. Practical reason, he wrote in the Summa theologiae, “deals with
contingent realities, about which human actions are concerned. Therefore,
although there is some necessity in the general principles, the more we descend
to particular matters, the more we encounter indeterminacy... In matters of
action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all in its particular
applications, but only in its general principles: and where there is the same
rectitude in particular actions, it is not equally known to all.... And here, the more one descends to particulars the more the indeterminacy grows”(57).
54. This perspective gives an account of the historicity of natural law, whose
concrete applications can vary over time. At the same time, it opens the door
to the reflection of moralists, inviting them to dialogue and to discussion. This is all the more necessary because in morality pure deduction by syllogism
is not adequate. The more the moralist confronts concrete situations, the more
he must have recourse to the wisdom of experience, an experience that integrates
the contributions of the other sciences and is nourished by contact with men and
women engaged in the action. Only this wisdom of experience enables one to
consider the multiplicity of circumstances and to arrive at a position on how to
accomplish what is good hic et nunc. The moralist must also (and this is the
difficulty of his work) have recourse to the combined resources of theology, of
philosophy, as well as of the human, economic and biological sciences, in order
to discern clearly the given facts of the situation and to identify correctly
the concrete requirements of human dignity. At the same time, he must be
particularly attentive to safeguard the fundamental givens expressed by the
precepts of the natural law that remain valid despite cultural variations.
2.6.
The moral dispositions of the person and his concrete action
55. To reach a just evaluation of the things to be done, the moral subject must
be endowed with a certain number of interior dispositions that allow him both to
be open to the demands of the natural law and, at the same time, informed about
the givens of the concrete situation. In the context of pluralism, which is
ours, one is more and more aware that one cannot elaborate a morality based on
the natural law without including a reflection on the interior dispositions or
virtues that render the moralist capable of elaborating an adequate norm of
action. This is even more true for the subject personally engaged in action and
who must formulate a judgment of conscience. It is, therefore, not surprising
that one witnesses today a new blossoming of “virtue ethics” inspired by the
Aristotelian tradition. Insisting in this way on the moral qualities required
for adequate moral reflection, one comprehends the important role that the
various cultures attribute to the figure of the wise man. He enjoys a
particular capacity of discernment in the measure in which he possesses the
interior moral dispositions that allow him to formulate an adequate ethical
judgment. A discernment of this kind should characterize both the moralist,
when he endeavours to concretize the precepts of the natural law, as well as
every autonomous subject charged with making a judgment of conscience and with
formulating the immediate and concrete norm for his action.
56. Morality cannot, therefore, be content with producing norms. It should
also favour the formation of the subject so that, engaged in action, he may be
capable of adapting the universal precepts of the natural law to the concrete
conditions of existence in diverse cultural contexts. This capacity is ensured
by the moral virtues, in particular by prudence that masters the particulars of
a situation in order to direct concrete action. The prudent man must possess
not only the knowledge of the universal but also knowledge of the particular.
In order to indicate well the proper character of this virtue, St. Thomas Aquinas is not afraid to say: “If he should happen to have only one of the two
kinds of knowledge, it is preferable that it be
knowledge of the particular realities that more closely affect the action”(58). With prudence it is a matter of: penetrating a contingency that always remains
mysterious to reason; modelling itself on reality in as exact a manner as
possible; assimilating the multiplicity of circumstances; and, taking as
accurate an account as possible of a situation that is original and ineffable. Such an objective necessitates the numerous operations and abilities that
prudence must put in place.
57. The subject, however, must not lose himself in the concrete and the
particular, a fault for which “situation ethics” was criticized. He must
discover the “right rule of acting” and establish an adequate norm of action. This right rule follows from preliminary principles. Here one thinks of the
first principles of practical reason, but it also falls to the moral virtues to
open and connaturalize both the will and the sensitive affectivity with regard
to different human goods, and so to indicate to the prudent person the ends to
be pursued in the midst of the flux of everyday events. It is only then that he
will be able to formulate the concrete norm that applies and to imbue the given
action with a ray of justice, of fortitude or of temperance. It would not be
incorrect to speak here of the exercise of an “emotional intelligence”; the
rational powers, without losing their specific character, are at work within the
affective field, in such a way that the totality of the person is engaged in the
moral action.
58. Prudence is indispensable to the moral subject because of the flexibility
required to adapt universal moral principles to the diversity of situations.
But this flexibility does not authorize one to see prudence as a way of easy
compromise with regard to moral values. On the contrary, it is through the
decisions of prudence that the concrete requirements of moral truth are
expressed for a subject. Prudence is a necessary element in the exercise of
one’s authentic moral obligation.
59. This is an approach which, within a pluralist society like our own, takes
on an importance that cannot be underestimated without considerable harm. Indeed, it takes account of the fact that moral science cannot furnish an acting
subject with a norm to be applied adequately and almost automatically to
concrete situations; only the conscience of the subject, the judgment of his
practical reason, can formulate the immediate norm of action. But at the same
time, this approach does not abandon conscience to mere subjectivity: it aims at
having the subject acquire the intellectual and affective dispositions which
allow him to be open to moral truth, so that his judgment may be adequate. Natural law could not, therefore, be presented as an already established set of
rules that impose themselves a priori on the moral subject; rather, it is a
source of objective inspiration for the deeply personal process of making a
decision.
Chapter 3:
The Theoretical Foundations of
the Natural Law
3.1. From experience to theory
60. The spontaneous grasp of fundamental ethical values, which are expressed in
the precepts of the natural law, constitutes the point of departure of the
process that then leads the moral subject to the judgment of conscience, in
which he formulates the moral requirements that impose themselves on him in his
concrete situation. It is the task of the theologian and of the philosopher to
reflect on this experience of grasping the first principles of ethics, in order
to test its value and base it on reason. The recognition of these philosophical
or theological foundations does not, however, condition the spontaneous
adherence to common values. In fact, the moral subject can put into practice
the orientations of natural law without being capable – by reason of his
particular intellectual formation
– of explicitly discerning their ultimate theoretical foundations.
61. The philosophical justification of natural law presents two levels of
coherence and depth. The idea of a natural law is justified first of all on the
level of the reflective observation of the anthropological constants that
characterize a successful humanization of the person and a harmonious social
life. Thoughtful experience, conveyed by the wisdom traditions, by philosophies
or by human sciences, allows us to determine some of the conditions required so
that each one may best display his human capacities in his personal and communal
life(59). In this way, certain behaviours are recognized as expressing an
exemplary excellence in the manner of living and of realizing one’s humanity. They define the main lines of a properly
moral ideal of a virtuous life “according to nature”, that is to say, in
conformity with the profound nature of the human subject(60).
62. Nevertheless, only the recognition of the metaphysical dimension of the
real can give to natural law its full and complete philosophical justification.
In fact metaphysics allows for understanding that the universe does not have in
itself its own ultimate reason for being, and manifests the fundamental
structure of the real: the distinction between God, subsistent being himself,
and the other beings placed by him in existence. God is the Creator, the free
and transcendent source of all other beings. From him, these beings receive,
“with measure, number and weight” (Wis 11:20), existence according to a nature
that defines them. Creatures are therefore the epiphany of a personal creative
wisdom, of an originating Logos who expresses and manifests himself in them.
“Every creature is a divine word, because it speaks of God”, writes St.
Bonaventure(61).
63. The Creator is not only the principle of creatures but also the
transcendent end towards which they tend by nature. Thus creatures are animated
by a dynamism that carries them to fulfil themselves, each in its own way, in
the union with God. This dynamism is transcendent, to the extent to which it
proceeds from the eternal law, i.e., from the plan
of divine providence that exists in the mind of the Creator(62). But it is also
immanent, because it is not imposed on creatures from without, but is inscribed
in their very nature. Purely material creatures realize spontaneously the law
of their being, while spiritual creatures realize it in a personal manner. In fact, they interiorize the dynamisms that define them and freely orient them
towards their own complete realization. They formulate them to themselves, as
fundamental norms of their moral action – this is the natural law properly
stated – and they strive to realize them freely. The natural law is therefore
defined as a participation in the eternal law(63). It is mediated, on the one
hand, by the inclinations of nature, expressions of the creative wisdom, and, on
the other hand, by the light of human reason which interprets them and is itself
a created participation in the light of the divine intelligence. Ethics is thus
presented as a “participated theonomy”(64).
3.2. Nature, person and freedom
64. The notion of nature is particularly complex and is not at all univocal.
In philosophy, the Greek thought of physis enjoys a role as a matrix. In it,
nature refers to the principle of the specific ontological identity of a
subject, i.e., its essence which is defined by an ensemble of stable,
intelligible characteristics. This essence takes the name of nature above all
when it is envisaged as the internal principle of movement that orients the
subject towards its fulfilment. Far from referring to a static given, the
notion of nature signifies the real dynamic principle of the homogeneous
development of the subject and of its specific activities. The notion of nature
was formed at first to think about material and perceptible realities, but it is
not limited to this “physical” domain and it applies analogically to spiritual
realities.
65. The idea that beings possess a nature is convincing as an explanation of
the immanent finality of beings and of the regularity that is perceived in their
way of acting and reacting(65). To consider beings as natures, therefore, amounts
to recognizing in them a proper consistency and affirming that they are
relatively autonomous centres in the order of being and of acting, and not
simply illusions or temporary constructions of the consciousness. These
“natures” are, however, not closed ontological unities, locked in themselves and
simply placed one alongside the other. They act upon each other, and have
complex relations of causality among themselves. In the spiritual order,
persons weave intersubjective relations. Natures therefore form a network, and
in the last analysis, an order, i.e., a series unified by reference to a
principle(66).
66. With Christianity, the physis of the ancients is rethought and integrated
into a broader and more profound vision of reality. On the one hand, the God of
Christian revelation is not a simple component of the universe, an element of
the great All of nature. On the contrary, he is the transcendent and free
Creator of the universe. In fact the finite universe cannot be its own
foundation, but points to the mystery of an infinite God, who out of pure love
created it ex nihilo and remains free to intervene in the course of nature
whenever he wills. On the other hand, the transcendent mystery of God is
reflected in the mystery of the human person as an image of God. The human
person is capable of knowledge and of love; he is endowed with freedom, capable
of entering into communion with others and called by God to a destiny that
transcends the finalities of physical nature. He fulfils himself in a free and
gratuitous relationship of love with God that is realized in a history.
67. By its insistence on freedom as the condition of man’s response to the
initiative of God’s love, Christianity has contributed in a decisive way towards
giving the notion of person its rightful place in philosophical discourse, in a
manner which has had a decisive influence on ethical teachings. Moreover, the
theological exploration of the Christian mystery has led to a very significant
deepening of the philosophical theme of the person. On the one hand, the notion
of person serves to designate, in their distinction, the Father, the Son, and
the Spirit, within the infinite mystery of the one divine nature. On the other
hand, the person is the point in which, with respect to the distinction and
distance between the two natures, divine and human, the ontological unity of the
God-man, Jesus Christ, is established. In the Christian theological tradition,
the person presents two complementary aspects. On the one hand, according to
the definition of Boethius, taken up again by scholastic theology, the person is
an “individual substance (subsistent) of a rational nature”(67). It refers to the
uniqueness of an ontological subject who, being of a spiritual nature, enjoys a
dignity and an autonomy that is manifested in self- consciousness and in free
dominion over his actions. Furthermore, the person is manifested in his
capacity to enter into relation: he displays his action in the order of
intersubjectivity and of communion in love.
68. Person is not opposed to nature. On the contrary, nature and person are
two notions that complement one another. On the one hand, every human person is
a unique realization of human nature understood in a metaphysical sense. On the other hand, the human person, in the free choices by which he responds in the
concrete of his “here and now” to his unique and transcendent vocation, assumes
the orientations given by his nature. In fact, nature puts in place the
conditions for the exercise of freedom and indicates an orientation for the
choices that the person must make. Examining the intelligibility of his nature,
the person thus discovers the ways of his own fulfilment.
3.3. Nature, man and
God: from harmony to conflict
69. The concept of natural law presupposes the idea that nature is for man the
bearer of an ethical message and is an implicit moral norm that human reason
actualizes. The vision of the world within which the doctrine of natural law
developed and still finds its meaning today, implies therefore the reasoned
conviction that there exists a harmony among the three realities: God, man, and
nature. In this perspective, the world is perceived as an intelligible whole,
unified by the common reference of the beings that compose it to a divine
originating principle, to a Logos. Beyond the impersonal and immanent Logos
discovered by stoicism and presupposed by the modern sciences of nature,
Christianity affirms that there is a Logos who is personal, transcendent and
creator. “It is not the elements of the universe, the laws of matter, which
ultimately govern the world and mankind, but a personal God who governs the
stars, that is, the universe; it is not the laws of matter and of evolution that
have the final say, but reason, will, love – a Person”(68). The personal divine
Logos, the Wisdom and Word of God, is not only the origin and transcendent,
intelligible exemplar of the universe, but also the one who maintains it in a
harmonious unity and leads it to its end(69). By the dynamisms that the
creator Word has inscribed in the innermost part of beings, he orients them to
their full realization. This dynamic orientation is none other than the divine
government that realizes within time the plan of divine providence, i.e., the eternal law.
70. Every creature, in its own manner, participates in the Logos. Man, since
he is defined by reason or logos, participates in it in an eminent manner. In fact, by his reason, he is capable of freely interiorizing the divine intentions
manifested in the nature of things. He formulates them for himself under the
form of a moral law that inspires and orients his action. In this perspective,
man is not “the other” in relation to nature. On the contrary, he maintains
with the cosmos a bond of familiarity founded on a common participation in the
divine Logos.
71. For various historical and cultural reasons, which are linked in particular
to the evolution of ideas during the late Middle Ages, this vision of the world
has lost its cultural supremacy. The nature of things ceased being law for
modern man and is no longer a reference point for ethics. On the metaphysical
level, the change from thinking about the univocity of being to thinking about
the analogy of being, which was then followed by nominalism, have undermined the
foundations of the doctrine of creation as a participation in the Logos, a doctrine that gives an explanation of a certain unity between man and nature.
The nominalist universe of William of Ockham is thus reduced to a juxtaposition
of individual realities without depth, since every real universal, i.e., every
principle of communion among beings, is denounced as a linguistic illusion. On
the anthropological level, the development of voluntarism and the correlative
exaltation of subjectivity, defined by the freedom of indifference with respect
to every natural inclination, have created a gulf between the human subject and
nature. From that point on, some people deemed that human freedom is
essentially the power to count as nothing what man is by nature. The subject
should therefore not attribute any meaning to that which he has not personally
chosen and should decide for himself what it is to be a human being. Man, therefore, comes to understand himself more and more as a “denatured animal”, an
anti-natural being who affirms himself to the extent to which he opposes himself
to nature. Culture, proper to man, is then defined not as a humanization or a
transfiguration of nature by the spirit, but as a pure and simple negation of
nature. The
principal result of these developments has been the split of the real into three
separate, indeed opposed spheres: nature, human subjectivity, and God.
72. With the eclipse of the metaphysics of being, which alone is able to give
the foundation of reason to the differentiated unity of spirit and of material
reality, and with the rise of voluntarism, the realm of spirit has been
radically opposed to the realm of nature. Nature is no longer considered as an
epiphany of the Logos, but as “the other” of the spirit. It is reduced to the
sphere of corporality and of strict necessity, and of a corporality without
depth, since the world of bodies is identified with extension, certainly
regulated by intelligible mathematical laws, but stripped of every immanent
teleology or finality. Cartesian physics, then Newtonian physics, have spread
the image of an inert matter, which passively obeys the laws of universal
determinism that the Divine Spirit imposes on it and which human reason can
perfectly know and master(70). Only man can infuse sense and design into this
amorphous and meaningless mass that he manipulates for his own ends with
technical skill. Nature ceases being a teacher of life and of wisdom, in order
to become the place where the Promethean power of man is asserted. This vision
seems to place great value on human freedom, but, in fact, by opposing freedom
and nature, it deprives human freedom of every objective norm for its exercise. It leads to the idea of an entirely arbitrary human creation of values, indeed
to nihilism, pure and simple.
73. In this context, in which nature no longer contains any immanent
teleological rationality and seems to have lost all affinity or kinship with the
world of spirit, the passage from knowledge of the structures of being to moral
duty which seems to derive from it becomes effectively impossible and falls
under the criticism of “naturalistic fallacy” denounced by David Hume and then
by George Edward Moore in his Principia Ethica (1903). The good is actually
disconnected from being and from truth. Ethics is separated from metaphysics.
74. The evolution of the understanding of the relationship of man to nature
also finds expression in the resurgence of a radical anthropological dualism
that opposes spirit and body, since the body is in some way the “nature” in each
of us(71). This dualism is manifested in the refusal to recognize any human and
ethical meaning in the natural inclinations that precede the choices of the
individual reason. The body, judged a reality external to subjectivity, becomes
a pure “having” or “possession”, an object manipulated by technical skill
according to the interests of the individual subjectivity(72).
75. Furthermore, on account of the emergence of a metaphysical conception in
which human and divine action are in competition with each another – since they
are conceived in a univocal fashion and placed, wrongly, on the same level – the
legitimate affirmation of the autonomy of the human subject leads to the
exclusion of God from the sphere of human subjectivity. Every reference to
something normative coming from God or from nature as an expression of God’s
wisdom, that is to say, every “heteronomy” is perceived as a threat to the
subject’s autonomy. The notion of natural law thus appears as incompatible with
the authentic dignity of the subject.
3.4. Ways towards a reconciliation
76. To give the notion of the natural law all its meaning and strength as the
foundation of a universal ethic, a perspective of wisdom needs to be promoted,
belonging properly to the metaphysical order, and capable of simultaneously
including God, the cosmos and the human person, in order to reconcile them in
the analogical unity of being, thanks to the idea of creation as participation.
77. It is above all essential to develop a non-competitive conception of the
connection between divine causality and the free activity of the human subject.
The human subject achieves fulfilment by inserting himself freely into the
providential action of God and not by opposing himself to this action. It is
his prerogative to discover with his reason the profound dynamisms that define
his nature, and then to accept and direct these dynamisms freely to their
fulfilment. In fact, human nature is defined by an entire ensemble of
dynamisms, tendencies and internal orientations within which freedom arises. Freedom actually presupposes that the human will is “activated” by the natural
desire for the good and for the last end. Free will is exercised then in the
choice of the finite objects that allow the attainment of this end. As regards
these goods, which exercise an attraction that does not determine the will, the
person retains mastery of his choice by reason of an innate openness to the
absolute Good. Freedom is therefore not an absolute creator of itself, but is
rather an eminent property of every human subject.
78. A philosophy of nature, which takes note of the intelligible depth of the
sensible world, and especially a metaphysics of creation, allow then for the
surmounting of the dualistic and Gnostic temptation of abandoning nature to
moral insignificance. From this point of view, it is important to go beyond the
reductionist perspective on nature which is inculcated by the dominant technical
culture, in order to rediscover the moral message borne in nature, as a work of
the Logos.
79. The rehabilitation of nature and of corporality in ethics, however, could
not be the equivalent of any kind of “physicalism”. In fact, some modern
presentations of natural law have seriously failed to recognize the necessary
integration of natural inclinations into the unity of the person.
Neglecting to consider the unity of the human person, they absolutize the
natural inclinations of the different “parts” of human nature, juxtaposing these
inclinations without placing them in a hierarchy and omitting to integrate them
into the unity of the overall, personal plan of the subject. As John Paul II
explains, “natural inclinations take on moral relevance only insofar as they
refer to the human person and to his authentic fulfilment”(73). Today, therefore,
it is important to hold fast to two things simultaneously. On the one hand, the
human subject is not a collection or juxtaposition of diverse and autonomous
natural inclinations, but a substantial and personal whole, who has the vocation
to respond to the love of God and to unify himself by accepting his orientation
towards a last end that places in hierarchical order the partial goods
manifested by the various natural tendencies. This unification of natural
tendencies in accordance with the higher ends of the spirit, i.e., this
humanization of the dynamisms inscribed in human nature, does not in any way
represent a violence done to them. On the contrary, it is the fulfilment of a
promise already inscribed in them(74). For example, the high spiritual value that
the gift of self in mutual spousal love represents is already inscribed in the
very nature of the sexual body, which finds its ultimate reason for being in
this spiritual fulfilment. On the other hand, in this organic whole, each part
preserves a proper and irreducible meaning, which must be taken into account by
reason in the elaboration of the overall mission of the human person. The doctrine of the natural moral law must, therefore, maintain at the same time
both the central role of reason in the actualization of a
properly human plan of life, and the consistency and the proper meaning of
pre-rational natural dynamisms(75).
80. The moral significance of the pre-rational natural dynamisms appears in
full light in the teaching concerning sins against nature. Certainly, every sin
is against nature insofar as it is opposed to right reason and hinders the
authentic development of the human person. However, some behaviours are
described in a special way as sins against nature to the extent that they
contradict more directly the objective meaning of the natural dynamisms that the
person must take up into the unity of his moral life(76). So, deliberately chosen
suicide goes against the natural inclination to preserve and make fruitful one’s
own existence. Thus some sexual practices are directly opposed to the
reproductive finalities inscribed in the sexual body of man. By this very fact,
they also contradict the interpersonal values that a responsible and fully human
sexual life must promote.
81. The risk of absolutizing nature, reduced to its purely physical or
biological component, and of neglecting its intrinsic vocation to be integrated
into a spiritual project, is a threat in some radical tendencies of the
ecological movement today. The irresponsible exploitation of nature by human
agents who seek only economic profit and the dangers that this exploitation
poses to the biosphere rightly cry out to consciences. However, “deep ecology” represents an excessive reaction. It extols a supposed equality of living
species, to the point that it no longer recognizes any particular role for man,
paradoxically undermining the responsibility of man for the biosphere of which
he is a part. In a still more radical
manner, some have come to consider man as a destructive virus that would
supposedly strike a blow at the integrity of nature, and they refuse him any
meaning and value in the biosphere. And so one arrives at a new type of
totalitarianism that excludes human existence in its specificity and condemns
legitimate human progress.
82. There cannot be an adequate response to the complex questions of ecology
except within the framework of a deeper understanding of the natural law, which
places value on the connection between the human person, society, culture, and
the equilibrium of the bio-physical sphere in which the human person is
incarnate. An integral ecology must promote what is specifically human, all the
while valuing the world of nature in its physical and biological integrity. In fact, even if man, as a moral being who searches for the ultimate truth and the
ultimate good, transcends his own immediate environment, he does so by accepting
the special mission of keeping watch over the natural world, living in harmony
with it, and defending vital values without which neither human life nor the
biosphere of this planet can be maintained(77). This integral ecology summons
every human being and every community to a new responsibility. It is
inseparable from a global political orientation respectful of the requirements
of the natural law.
Chapter 4: Natural Law and the City [πóλις]
4.1. The person and the common good
83. Turning to the political order of society, we enter into the space
regulated by norms or laws. In fact, such norms appear from the moment in which
persons enter in relation. The passage from person to society sheds light on the
essential distinction between natural law and the norm of natural justice.
84. The person is at the centre of the political and social order because he is
an end and not a means. The person is a social being by nature, not by choice
or in virtue of a pure contractual convention. In order to flourish as a
person, he needs the structure of relations that he forms with other persons.
He thus finds himself at the centre of a network formed by concentric circles:
the family, the sphere of life and work, the neighbourhood community, the
nation, and finally humanity(78). The person draws from each of these circles the
elements necessary for his own growth, and at the same time he contributes to
their perfection.
85. By the fact that human beings have the vocation to live in society with
others, they have in common an ensemble of goods to pursue and values to defend. This is what is called the “common good”. If the person is an end in himself,
the end of society is to promote, consolidate and develop its common good. The
search for the common good allows the city to mobilize the energies of all its
members. At a first level, the common good can be understood as the ensemble of
conditions that allow a person to be a more human person(79). While being
articulated in its external aspects – the economy, security, social justice,
education, access to employment, spiritual searching, and other things – the
common good is always a human good(80). At a second level, the common good is
that which assigns an end to the political order and to the city itself. The
good of all and of
each one in particular, it expresses the communal dimension of the human good.
Societies can be defined by the type of common good that they intend to promote.
In fact, if it concerns the essential requirements of the common good of every
society, the vision of the common good evolves with the societies themselves,
according to conceptions of the person, justice, and the role of public power.
4.2. The natural law, measure of the political order
86. The organization of society in view of the common good of its members
responds to the requirements of the social nature of the person. The natural
law then appears as the normative horizon in which the political order is called
to move. It defines the ensemble of values that appear as humanizing for a
society. As soon as we are in the social and political sphere, values can no
longer be of a private, ideological or confessional nature: they concern all
citizens. They do not express a vague consensus among citizens, but instead are
based on the requirements of their common humanity. So that society may
correctly fulfil its own mission of serving the person, it must promote the
realization of the person’s natural inclinations. The person is therefore
prior to society, and society is humanizing only if it responds to the
expectations inscribed in the person insofar as he is a social being.
87. This natural order of society at the service of the person is indicated,
according to the social doctrine of the Church, by four values that follow from
the natural inclinations of the human being and which delineate the contours of
the common good that society must pursue, namely: freedom, truth, justice, and
solidarity81. These four values correspond to the requirements of an ethical
order in conformity with the natural law. If one of these is lacking, the city
will tend towards anarchy or the rule of the strongest. Freedom is the first
condition of a humanly acceptable political order. Without the liberty to
follow one’s conscience, express one’s own opinions and pursue one’s own plans,
there is no human city, even if the pursuit of private goods must always be
related to the promotion of the common good of the city. Without the search and
respect for truth, there is not a society but a dictatorship of the strongest.
Truth, which is not the
property of anyone, is alone capable of bringing all human beings together in
view of pursuing common objectives. If it is not truth that imposes itself, it
is the most clever who imposes “his” truth. Without justice there is no
society, but the reign of violence. Justice is the highest good that the city
can procure. It means that what is just is always sought, and that the law is
applied with attention to the particular case, since equity is the highest part
of justice. Finally, it is necessary for society to be regulated by a kind of
solidarity which assures mutual assistance and responsibility for others, as
well as the use of society’s goods in response to the needs of all.
4.3. From natural law to the norm of natural justice
88. Natural law (lex naturalis) becomes the norm of natural justice (ius
naturale) when one considers the relations of justice among human beings:
relations among physical and moral persons, relations between persons and the
public authority, relations of everyone with the positive law. We pass from the
anthropological category of the natural law to the juridical and political
category of the organization of the city. The norm of natural justice is the
inherent standard of the right interaction among members of society. It is the
rule and immanent measure of interpersonal and social human relations.
89. This norm is not arbitrary: the requirements of justice, which flow from
the natural law, are prior to the formulation and enactment of the norm. It is
not the norm which determines what is just. Nor is politics arbitrary: the
norms of justice do not result only from a contract established among men, but
arise first from the very nature of the human being. The norm of natural
justice anchors human law in the natural law. It is the horizon from which the
human legislator must take his bearings when he issues rules in his mission to
serve the common good. In this sense, it honours the natural law, inherent in
the human person’s humanity. By contrast, when the norm of natural justice is
denied, it is the mere will of the legislator that is the basis of law. Then,
the legislator is no longer the interpreter of what is just and good, but has
arrogated to himself the prerogative of being the ultimate criterion of what is
just.
90. The norm of natural justice is never a standard that is fixed once and for
all. It results from an appreciation of the changing situations in which people
live. It articulates the judgment of practical reason in its estimation of what
is just. Such a norm, as the juridical expression of the natural law in the
political order, thus appears as the measure of the just relations among the
members of the community.
4.4. The norm of natural justice and positive law
91. Positive law must strive to carry out the norm of natural justice. It does
this either by way of conclusions (natural justice forbids homicide, positive
law prohibits abortion), or by way of determination (natural justice prescribes
that the guilty be punished, positive penal law determines the punishments to be
applied in each category of crime)(82). Inasmuch as they truly derive from the
norm of natural justice and therefore from the eternal law, positive human laws
are binding in conscience. In the opposite case, they are not binding. “If the
law is not just, it is not even a law”(83). Positive laws can and even must
change to remain faithful to their purpose. In fact, on the one hand, human
reason makes progress little by little, becoming more aware of what is most
suitable to the good of the community, and on the other hand, the historical
conditions of the life of societies change
(for better or for worse) and the laws must adapt to this(84). Thus the legislator
must determine what is just in concrete historical situations(85).
92. The norms of natural justice are thus the measures of human relationships
prior to the will of the legislator. They are given from the moment that human
beings live in society. They express what is naturally just, prior to any legal
formulation. The norms of natural justice are expressed in a particular way in
the subjective rights of the human person, such as the right to respect for
one’s own life, the right to the integrity of one’s person, the right to
religious liberty, the right to freedom of thought, the right to start a family
and to educate one’s children according to one’s convictions, the right to
associate with others, the right to participate in the life of the community,
etc. These rights, to which contemporary thought attributes great importance,
do not have their source in the fluctuating desires of individuals, but rather
in the very structure of human beings and their humanizing relations. The
rights of the human person emerge therefore from the order of justice that must
reign in relations among human beings. To acknowledge these natural rights of
man means to acknowledge the objective order of human relations based on the
natural law.
4.5. The political order is not the eschatological order
93. In the history of human societies, the political order has often been
understood as the reflection of a transcendent and divine order. Thus the
ancient cosmologies provided the foundation and justification for political
theologies in which the sovereign ensured the link between the cosmos and the
human universe. It was a question of bringing the universe of men into the
pre-established harmony of the world. With the appearance of biblical
monotheism, the universe was understood as obedient to the
laws which the Creator gave it. The order of the city is achieved when the laws
of God are respected, laws which moreover are inscribed in the human heart. For
a long time, forms of theocracy were able to prevail in societies organized
according to principles and values drawn from their holy books. There was no
distinction between the sphere of religious revelation and the sphere of the
organization of the city. But the Bible desacralized human authority, even if
centuries of theocratic osmosis – in Christian contexts as well – obscured the
essential distinction between the political order and the religious order. In
this regard, one must carefully distinguish the situation of the first covenant,
in which the divine law given by God was also the law of the people of Israel,
from that of the new covenant, which introduces the distinction and the relative
autonomy of the religious and political orders.
94. The biblical revelation invites humanity to consider that the order of
creation is a universal order in which all of humanity participates, and that
this order is accessible to reason. When we speak of natural law, it is a
question of this order willed by God and grasped by human reason. The Bible
formulates the distinction between the order of creation and the order of grace,
to which faith in Christ gives access. The order of the city is not this
definitive or eschatological order. The domain of politics is not that of the
heavenly city, a gratuitous gift of God. It concerns the imperfect and
transitory order in which human beings live, all the while advancing towards
their fulfilment in what lies beyond history. According to St. Augustine, the
distinctive characteristic of the earthly city is to be mixed: the just and
unjust, believers and unbelievers rub shoulders together(86). They must
temporarily live together according to the requirements of their nature and the
capacity of their reason.
95. The state, therefore, cannot set itself up as the bearer of ultimate
meaning. It cannot impose a global ideology, nor a religion (even secular), nor
one way of thinking. In civil society religious organizations, philosophies and
spiritualities take charge of the domain of ultimate meaning; they must
contribute to the common good, strengthen the social bond and promote the
universal values that are the foundation of the political order itself. The
political order is not called to transpose onto
earth the kingdom of God that is to come. It can anticipate the kingdom by
advances in the area of justice, solidarity, and peace. It cannot seek to
establish it by force.
4.6. The political order is a temporal and rational order
96. If the political order is not the sphere of ultimate truth, it must,
nevertheless, be open to the perpetual search for God, truth, and justice. The
“legitimate and sound secularity of the state”(87) consists in the distinction
between the supernatural order of theological faith and the political order.
This latter order can never be confused with the order of grace to which all
persons are called to freely adhere. It is, rather, linked to the universal
human ethics inscribed in human nature. The city must thus procure for the
people who compose it what is necessary for the full realization of their human
life, which includes certain spiritual and religious values, as well as freedom
for the citizens to make up their mind with respect to the Absolute and the
highest goods. But the city, whose common good is temporal in nature, cannot
procure strictly supernatural goods, which are of another order.
97. If God and all transcendence were to be excluded from the political
horizon, only the power of man over man would remain. In fact, the political
order has sometimes presented itself as the ultimate horizon of meaning for
humanity. Totalitarian ideologies and regimes have demonstrated that such a
political order, without a transcendent horizon, is not humanly acceptable. This
transcendence is linked to what we call natural law.
98. The politico-religious osmosis of the past as well as the totalitarian
experiences of the twentieth century have led to a healthy reaction in which the
value of reason in politics is today once again valued, thus conferring a new
relevance to the Aristotelian-Thomistic discourse on natural law. Politics, that
is, the organization of the city and the elaboration of its collective projects,
pertains to the natural order and must undertake a rational debate open to
transcendence.
99. The natural law which is the basis of the social and political order does
not demand the adherence of faith, but of reason. Certainly, reason itself is
often obscured by passions, by contradictory interests, and prejudices. But
constant reference to natural law presses for a continual purification of reason. Only in this way does the political order avoid the trap of the arbitrary, of
particular interests, organized lying, and manipulation of minds. The reference
to natural law keeps the state from yielding to the temptation to absorb civil
society and to subject human beings to an ideology. It also avoids the
development of the paternalistic state that deprives persons and communities of
every initiative and takes responsibility away from them. Natural law contains
the idea of the state, based on law, structured according to the principle of
subsidiarity, respecting persons and intermediate bodies, and regulating their
interactions(88).
100. The great political myths were only able to be unmasked with the
introduction of the rule of rationality and the acknowledgment of the
transcendence of the God of love, who forbids the worship of the earthly
political order. The God of the Bible willed the order of creation so that all
people, conforming themselves to the law inherent in creation, can freely search
for this order, and having found it, may project onto the world the light of
grace, which is its fulfilment.
Chapter 5: Jesus Christ, the
Fulfilment of
the Natural Law
101. Grace does not destroy nature but heals, strengthens, and leads it to its
full realization. As a consequence, while the natural law is an expression of
the reason common to all human beings and can be presented in a coherent and
true manner on the philosophical level, it is not foreign to the order of grace.
The demands of the natural law remain present and active in the various
theological stages of salvation history through which humanity passes.
102. The plan of salvation initiated by the eternal Father is realized by the
mission of the Son who gives humanity the new law, the law of the Gospel, which
consists principally in the grace of the Holy Spirit actingin the hearts of
believers to sanctify them. The new law aims above all to procure for human
beings a participation in the Trinitarian communion of the divine persons, but
at the same time takes up and realizes the natural law in an eminent manner. On
the one hand, the new law recalls clearly the demands of the natural law that
can be obscured by sin and by ignorance. On the other hand, by emancipating us
from the law of sin, on account of which “I can will what is right, but I cannot
do it” (Rom 7:18), the new law gives human beings the effective capacity to
overcome their self-centredness in order to put fully into action the
humanizing requirements of the natural law.
5.1. The incarnate Logos, the living
Law
103. Thanks to the natural light of reason, which is a participation in the
divine light, human beings are capable of scrutinizing the intelligible order of
the universe so as to discover there the expression of the wisdom, beauty and
goodness of the Creator. On the basis of this knowledge, they are to enter into
this order by their moral action. Now, in virtue of a deeper perspective on
God’s plan, of which the creative act is the prelude, Scripture teaches
believers that this world has been created in, by and for the Logos, the Word of
God, the beloved Son of the Father, uncreated Wisdom, and that the world has
life and subsistence in him. In fact the Son is “the image of the invisible
God, the firstborn of all creation, for in him [en auto] all things were
created, in heaven and on earth, visible and
invisible ….All things were created through him [di’auton] and for him [eis
auton]. He is before all things, and in him [en auto] all things hold together”
(Col 1:15-17)(89). The Logos is therefore the key of creation. The human person,
created in the image of God, bears in himself a very special imprint of this
personal Logos. Consequently, he has the vocation to be conformed and
assimilated to the Son, “the firstborn of many brethren” (Rom 8:29).
104. But by sin man has made bad use of his freedom and has turned away from
the source of wisdom. By doing so, he has distorted the perception that he was
able to have of the objective order of things, even on the natural level. Human
beings, knowing that their works are bad, hate the light and elaborate false
theories to justify their sins(90). Thus the image of God in man is seriously
obscured. Even if their nature still refers them to a fulfilment in God beyond
themselves (the creature cannot pervert himself to this point of no longer
perceiving the testimony that the Creator offers of himself in creation), men,
in fact, are so gravely affected by sin that they do not recognize the profound
meaning of the world and interpret it in terms of pleasure, money or power.
105. By his salvific incarnation, the Logos, assuming a human nature, restored
the image of God and gave man back to himself. Thus Jesus Christ, the new Adam,
brings the original plan of the Father for humanity to fulfilment and by this
very fact reveals man to himself: “In reality, only in the mystery of the
Incarnate Word does the mystery of man become clear. For Adam, the first man,
was a figure of him who was to come, namely, Christ the Lord. Christ, the new
Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and his love, fully
reveals man to man himself and makes known to him the sublimity of his vocation
.… ‘The image of the invisible God’ (Col 1:15), he is the perfect man, who has
restored to the sons of Adam the divine likeness deformed from the first sin
onward. Because the human nature in him was assumed, not destroyed, by that
very fact it has also been raised up to a sublime dignity
in us too”(91). In his person Jesus Christ, therefore, manifests an exemplary
human life, fully conformed to the natural law. He is thus the ultimate
criterion for correctly discerning the authentic natural desires of man, when
these are not concealed by the distortions introduced by sin and disordered
passions.
106. The Incarnation of the Son was prepared by the economy of the old law, a
sign of God’s love for his people Israel. For some of the Fathers of the
Church, one of the reasons why God gave Moses a written law was to remind human
beings of the requirements of the law naturally written in their hearts, but
which sin had partially obscured and erased(92). This law, which Judaism
identified with the pre-existing Wisdom that presides over the destinies of the
universe(93), thus placed within the reach of human beings marked by sin the
concrete practice of true wisdom,
which consists in the love of God and neighbour. It contained positive
liturgical and juridical precepts, but also moral prescriptions, summarized in
the Decalogue, which corresponded to the essential implications of the natural
law. That is why the Christian tradition has seen in the Decalogue a privileged
and always valid expression of the natural law(94).
107. Jesus Christ did not “come to abolish but to fulfil” the law (Mt
5:17)(95). As is evident from the gospel texts, Jesus “taught as one who had
authority, and not as the scribes” (Mk 1:22) and he did not hesitate to
relativize, indeed to abrogate, certain particular and temporary dispositions of
the law. But he also confirmed the essential content of them and, in his
person, brought the practice of the law to its perfection, taking up by love the
different types of precepts – moral, cultural and judicial – of the Mosaic law,
which correspond to the three functions of prophet, priest, and king. St. Paul
affirms that Christ is the end (telos) of the law (Rom
10:4). Telos has here a twofold sense. Christ is the “goal” of the law, in
the sense in which the law is a pedagogical means with the calling to lead
people to Christ. But also, for all those who by faith live in him from the
Spirit of love, Christ “puts an end” to the positive obligations of the law
added on to the requirements of the natural law(96).
108. Jesus, in effect, has highlighted in different ways the ethical primacy of
charity, which inseparably unites love of God and love of neighbour(97). Charity is the “new commandment” (Jn 13:34) that recapitulates the whole law and gives
the key to its interpretation: “On these two commandments depend all the law and
the prophets” (Mt 22:40). Charity also reveals the profound meaning of the
golden rule. “And what you hate, do not do
to anyone” (Tob 4:15) becomes with Christ the commandment to love without limit. The context in which Jesus cites the golden rule determines its comprehension
in depth. It is found at the centre of a section that begins with the
commandment: “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you” and culminates
in the exhortation “Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful”(98). Beyond a
rule of commutative justice, the golden rule takes on the form of a challenge:
it invites one to take the initiative in a love that is a gift of self. The
parable of the Good Samaritan is characteristic of this Christian application of
the golden rule: the centre of interest passes from care of self to care for the
other(99). The beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount make explicit the manner in
which one must live the commandment of love, in the spirit of gratuity and sense
of the other, elements proper to the new perspective assumed by Christian love.
Thus the practice of love overcomes every closure and every limitation. It
acquires a universal dimension and a matchless strength, because it renders the
person capable of doing what would be impossible without love.
109. But it is especially in the mystery of his holy passion that Jesus fulfils
the law of love. There, as Love incarnate, he reveals in a fully human manner
what love is and what it entails: to give one’s life for those whom one loves(100). “Having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end” (Jn
13:1). Through loving obedience to the Father, and through the desire for the
Father’s glory which consists in the salvation of human beings, Jesus accepts
the suffering and death of the Cross on behalf of sinners. The very person of
Christ, Logos and Wisdom incarnate, thus became the living law, the supreme norm
for all Christian ethics. The sequela Christi, the imitatio Christi
are the
concrete ways of carrying out the law in all its dimensions.
5.2. The Holy Spirit and the new law of freedom
110. Jesus Christ is not only an ethical model to imitate, but by and in his
paschal mystery, he is the Saviour who gives us the real possibility of putting
the law of love into action. In fact, the paschal mystery culminates in the
gift of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of love common to the Father and
the Son, who unites the disciples among themselves, to Christ and finally to the
Father. By “pouring the love of God into our hearts” (Rom 5:5), the Holy Spirit
becomes the interior principle and the supreme rule of the action of believers.
It makes them accomplish spontaneously and with discernment all the requirements
of love. “Walk by the Spirit, and do not gratify the desires of the flesh” (Gal
5:16). Thus the promise is fulfilled: “A new heart I will give you, and a new
spirit I will put within you; and I will take out of your flesh the heart of
stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit within you, and
cause you to walk in my statutes and be careful to observe my ordinances” (Ezek
36: 26-27)(101).
111. The grace of the Holy Spirit constitutes the principal element of the new
law or law of the Gospel(102). The preaching of the Church, the celebration of
the sacraments, the measures taken by the Church to promote in her members the
development of life in the Spirit are totally referred to the personal growth of
every believer in the holiness of love. With the new law, which is an
essentially interior law, “the perfect law, the law of liberty” (Jas 1:25), the
desire for autonomy and freedom in the truth that is present in the human heart
attains here below its most perfect realization. It is from the very core of
the person inhabited by
Christ and transformed by the Spirit, that his moral action springs forth(103).
But this freedom is entirely at the service of love: “For you were called to
freedom, brethren; only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh,
but through love be servants of one another” (Gal 5:13).
112. The new law of the Gospel includes, assumes and fulfils the requirements
of the natural law. The orientations of the natural law are not therefore
external normative demands with respect to the new law. They are a constitutive
part of it, even if they are secondary and completely ordered to the principal
element, which is the grace of Christ(104). Therefore, it is in the light of
reason enlightened henceforth by living faith that man best grasps the
orientations of natural law, which indicate to him the way to the full
development of his humanity. Thus, the natural law, on the one hand, has “a
fundamental link with the new law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, and on
the other hand, offers a broad basis for dialogue with persons who come from
another cultural orientation or formation in the search for the common good”(105).
Conclusion
113. The Catholic Church, aware of the need for human beings to seek in common
the rules for living together in justice and peace, desires to share with the
religions, wisdoms and philosophies of our time the resources of the concept of
natural law. We call natural law the foundation of a universal ethic which we
seek to draw from the observation of and reflection on our common human nature.
It is the moral law inscribed in the heart of human beings and of which humanity
becomes ever more aware as it advances in history. This natural law is not at
all static in its expression. It does not consist of a list of definitive and
immutable precepts. It is a spring of inspiration always flowing forth for the
search for an objective foundation for a universal ethic.
114. Our conviction of faith is that Christ reveals the fullness of what is
human by realizing it in his person. But this revelation, specific as it may
be, brings together and confirms elements already present in the rational
thought of the wisdom traditions of humanity. The concept of natural law is
first of all philosophical, and as such, it allows a dialog that, always
respecting the religious convictions of each, appeals to what is universally
human in every human being. An exchange on the level of reason is possible when
it is a question of experiencing and expressing what is common to all persons
endowed with reason, and of setting out the requirements of life in society.
115. The discovery of natural law responds to the quest of a humanity that from
time immemorial always seeks to give itself rules for moral life and life in
society. This life in society regards a whole spectrum of relations that reach
from the family unit to international relations, passing through economic life,
civil society, and the political community. To be able to be recognized by all
persons and in all cultures, the norms of behaviour in society should have their
source in the human person himself, in his needs, in his inclinations. These
norms, elaborated by reflection and upheld by law, can thus be interiorized by
all. After the Second World War, the nations of the entire world were able to
create a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which implicitly suggests that
the source of inalienable human rights is found in the dignity of every human
person. The present contribution has no other aim than that of helping to
reflect on this source of personal and collective morality.
116. In offering our own contribution to the search for a universal ethic and
in proposing a rationally justifiable basis for it, we want to invite the
experts and proponents of the great religious, sapiential and philosophical
traditions of humanity to undertake an analogous work, beginning from their own
sources, in order to reach a common recognition of universal moral norms based
on a rational approach to reality. This work is necessary and urgent. Beyond the
differences of our religious convictions and the diversity of our cultural
presuppositions, we must be capable of expressing the fundamental values of our
common humanity, in order to work together for understanding, mutual recognition
and peaceful cooperation among all the members of the human family.
NOTES
* PRELIMINARY NOTE. The topic “In Search of a
Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law” was submitted to the study of
the International Theological Commission To undertake this study a Subcommittee
was formed, composed of Archbishop Roland Minnerath, the Reverend Professors: P
Serge-Thomas Bonino OP (Chairman of the Subcommittee), Geraldo Luis Borges
Hackmann, Pierre Gaudette, Tony Kelly CSSR, Jean Liesen, John Michael McDermott
SJ; Professors Dr Johannes Reiter and Dr Barbara Hallensleben, with the
collaboration of Archbishop Luis Ladaria S.J., Secretary General, and with the
contributions of other members The general discussion took place on the occasion
of the plenary sessions of the International Theological Commission, which took
place in Rome in October 2006 and 2007 and in December 2008 The document was
approved unanimously by the Commission and was then submitted to its president,
Cardinal William J Levada, who has given his approval for publication.
* * *
(1) Vatican Council II, Pastoral constitution Gaudium et spes,
preface, n 1
(2) Cf Ezek. 36:26
(3) John Paul II, Address of October 5, 1995 to the General
Assembly of the United Nations for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of
its founding (Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II 18,2 [1995], p 732).
(4) Cf Benedict XVI, Address of April 18, 2008 before the
General Assembly of the United Nations Organization in New York in (AAS 100
[2008], p. 335): “The merit of the Universal Declaration is that it has
enabled different cultures, juridical expressions and institutional models to
converge around a fundamental nucleus of values, and hence of rights. Today,
though, efforts need to be redoubled in the face of pressure to reinterpret the
foundations of the Declaration and to compromise its inner unity so as to
facilitate a move away from the protection of human dignity towards the
satisfaction of simple interests, often particular interests … Experience shows
that legality often prevails over justice when the insistence upon rights makes
them appear as the exclusive result of legislative enactments or normative
decisions taken by the various agencies of those in power. When presented purely
in terms of legality, rights risk becoming weak propositions divorced from the
ethical and rational dimension which is their foundation and their goal. The
Universal Declaration, rather, has reinforced the conviction that respect
for human rights is principally rooted in unchanging justice, on which the
binding force of international proclamations is also based. This aspect is often
overlooked when the attempt is made to deprive rights of their true function in
the name of a narrowly utilitarian perspective”.
(5) In 1993, some representatives of the Parliament of the
World’s Religions published a Declaration Toward a Global Ethic which
states that “there already exists among religions a consensus capable of
founding a global ethic, a minimum consensus concerning binding values,
irrevocable norms, and essential moral attitudes”. This Declaration
contains four principles (1) “There is no new global order without a new global
ethic” (2) “Every human being must be treated humanely” Taking human dignity
into account is considered as an end in itself This principle takes up the
“golden rule” that is found in many religious traditions (3) The Declaration
enunciates four irrevocable moral directives: non-violence and respect for life;
solidarity; tolerance and truth; equality between men and women (4). Regarding
the problems of humanity, a change of mentality is necessary, so that each one
becomes aware of his urgent responsibility. It is a duty of the religions to
cultivate this responsibility, to deepen it, and to hand it on to future
generations.
(6) BENEDICT XVI, Address of February 12, 2007 to the
International Congress on Natural Moral Law organized by the Pontifical Lateran
University (AAS 99 [2007], p 244).
(7) Cf St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, III, xiv, 22
(Corpus christianorum, series latina, 32, p. 91): “The precept: “what you
do not want done to yourself, do not do to another” cannot in any way differ
according to the diversity of peoples (“Quod tibi fieri non vis, alii ne feceris”,
nullo modo posse ulla eorum gentili diversitate variari)” Cf. L. J. Philippidis,
Die “Goldene Rege” religionsgeschichtlich Untersucht (Leipzig, 1929); A. Dihle, Die Goldene Regel. Eine Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der antiken und
fruhchristlichen Vulgarethik (Gottingen, 1962); J. Wattles, The Golden Rule
(New York: Oxford, 1996).
(8) Mānava dharmaśāthtra, 1, 108 (G.C. Haughton, Mānava
Dharma śāstra or The Institutes of Manu, Comprising the Indian System of
Duties, Religious and Civil, ed. By P. Percival, New Delhi, 1982(4), 14.
(9) Mahābhārata, Anusasana parva, 113, 3-9 (ed. Ishwar
Chundra Sharma and O.N. Bimali; translation according to M. N. Dutt [Parimal
Publications, Delhi], vol. IX, p 469).
(10) For example: “Let him say what is true, let him say what is
pleasing, let him declare no disagreeable truth, and let him utter no lie to
please someone; such is the eternal law” (Mānava dharmaśāstra, 4, 138, p.
101); “Let him always consider the action of striking a blow, reviling, and
harming the good of one’s neighbour, as the three most pernicious things in the
string of vices produced by wrath” (Mānava dharmaśāstra, 7, 51, p. 156).
(11) Confucius, Analects 15, 23.
(12) Koran, sura 35, 24; cf. sura 13, 7.
(13) Koran, sura 17, 22-38 (pp. 343-345): “Your Lord has decreed that you may
adore none but Him. He has prescribed kindness with respect to your father and
mother. If one of them or even both of them have attained old age near you,
don’t say to them: ‘Fie’! do not push them away, but address them with
respectful words. Take them kindly under your wing and say: ‘My Lord! Be
merciful towards them, as they were towards me at the time they raised me when I
was an infant.’ Your Lord knows perfectly what is in you. If you are just, he
then is the one who pardons those who come back repentant to him. Give to your
near of kin what is their due as well as to the poor and the traveler, but do
not be wasteful. The wasteful are brothers of demons, and the Devil is very
ungrateful towards his Lord. If, being in search of mercy that you hope from
your Lord, you are obliged to go away, speak a benevolent word to them. Do not
hold your hand closed at your neck, and neither extend it too generously;
otherwise you would find yourself held in contempt and miserable. Yes, your
Lord gives his gifts generously or sparingly to whom he wishes. He knows his
servants quite well and he sees them perfectly. Do not kill your children for
fear of poverty. He will provide for their subsistence along with your own. To
kill them would be an enormous sin. Avoid fornication: it is an abomination!
What a detestable path! Do not kill the man whom God has forbidden you to kill,
except for a just reason. […]. Do not touch the fortune of the orphan until he
has come of age, except for its better use. Fulfill your commitments, for men
will be interrogated on their commitments. Give a just measure when you
measure; weigh with the most exact balance. This is something good and the
result is excellent. Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge. There
will surely be an accounting for all things: whatever is heard, seen or in the
heart. Do not walk the earth with insolence. You cannot rip the earth apart or
attain the height of mountains. What is evil in all this is detestable before
the Lord”.
(14) Sophocles, Antigone, v. 449-460.
(15) Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, XIII, 2 (1373 b 4-1l): “Particular law is that
which each group of men determines in relation to its members and these sorts of
laws are divided into unwritten law and written law. Common law (nomos koinos)
is that which is according to nature (kata physin). In fact there is, as
everyone recognizes by a kind of divination, a just and an unjust, common to all
by nature, even though there is no communication or mutual covenant among
peoples. Thus, one sees the Antigone of Sophocles declare that it is just to
bury Polyneices, whose burial was forbidden, affirming that this burial is just,
as being in accord with nature”. Cf. also Nichomachean Ethics V, ch. 10.
(16) Cf. Plato, Gorgias (483c – 484b) [Speech of Callicles]: “Nature herself
shows that it is just for the best to have more than the weakest, and the most
powerful than the most helpless. She shows in many circumstances, that it works
out well this way, as much in other living beings as in all the cities and races
of men, and that the just is thus determined, by the fact that the most powerful
commands the weakest and possesses a greater share. For on what conception of
justice did Xerxes base his campaign against Greece, or his father against the
Scythians? And one could cite innumerable other examples. But, it seems to me
that these men did what they did according to the nature of the just and by
Zeus, according to the law of nature, and, thus, probably not according to what
was instituted by us, shaping the best and strongest among us, taking them from
their youngest age, as one would do with lions, bewitching them with our spells
and incantations, we enslave them by repeating that each one is equal to the
others, and that this is the beautiful and the just. But if a man were born,
endowed with a sufficiently strong nature, then, getting rid of all hindrances
with a jolt, reducing them to pieces and fleeing them, stomping on our writings,
our spells, our incantations and our laws, all without exception against and
raising himself above us, behold, the slave thus reveals himself as our master,
and then the just according to nature shines forth in full light”.
(17) In the Theaetetus (172 a-b) Plato’s Socrates displays the harmful political
consequences of the relativistic thesis attributed to Protagoras according to
which each man is the measure of truth: “Therefore, in politics, also, beautiful
and ugly, just and unjust, pious and impious, all that each city believes as
such and declares legally such for itself, all of this, in truth, is such for
each one […] In questions of just and unjust, of piety and impiety, one agrees
to sustain rigorously that nothing of this is from nature and nothing possesses
its essence exclusively; but simply what seems true to the group becomes true
from the moment it seems such and for as long as it seems so”. (18) Cf. for example, Seneca, De vita beata, VIII, 1: “It is nature that one must
take as one’s guide; it is nature that reason observes, and what it consults. To live happily or according to nature is, therefore, the same (natura enim duce
utendum est: hanc ratio observat, hanc consulit. Idem ergo beate vivere et
secundum naturam)”. (19) Cicero, De legibus, I, VI, 18: “Lex est ratio summa insita in natura quae
iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria”. (20) Cf.
Amos
1-2. (21) Rabbinic Judaism refers to the seven moral imperatives that God gave to Noah
for all men. They are enumerated in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 56): 1) You shall not
commit idolatry; 2) You shall not kill; 3) You shall not steal; 4) You shall not
commit adultery; 5) You shall not blaspheme; 6) You shall not eat the flesh of a
living animal; 7) You shall establish tribunals of justice to enforce respect
for the preceding six commandments. If the 613 mitzot of the written Torah and
their interpretation in the oral Torah only concern the Jews, the laws of Noah
are addressed to all human beings. (22) Wisdom literature is interested in history especially insofar as it shows
forth certain constants in relation to the way that leads man towards God. The sages do not underestimate the lessons of history and their value as divine
revelation (cf. Sir 44-51), but they have a vivid awareness that the
connections among events depend on a coherence that is not itself an historical
event. In order to comprehend this identity at the heart of mutability and to
act in a responsible manner according to it, wisdom searches for principles and
structural laws rather than precise historical perspectives. In so doing,
wisdom literature concentrates on protology, namely, on creation at the
beginning along with what it implies. In fact, protology attempts to describe
the coherence that is found behind historical events. It is an a priori
condition that permits the ordering of all possible historical events. Wisdom
literature tries, therefore, to highlight the value of the conditions that make
everyday life possible. History describes these elements in a successive
manner; wisdom goes beyond history towards an a-temporal description of what
constitutes reality at the time of creation, “in the beginning”, when human
beings were created in the image of God. (23) Cf. Prov 6:6-9: “Go to the ant, O sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise. Without having any chief, officer or ruler, she prepares her food in summer, and
gathers her sustenance in harvest. How long will you lie there, O sluggard?
When will you arise from your sleep?” (24) Cf. also Lk 6:31: “And as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them”.
(25) Cf. St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae, c. 6, n. 76 (Opera
omnia, VII, ed. Quaraechi, p. 156): “In hoc mandato [Lk 6:31] est consummatio
legis naturalis, cuius una pars negativa ponitur Tobiae quarto et implicatur
hic: ‘Quod ab alio oderis tibi fieri, vide ne tu aliquando alteri facias’”;
(Pseudo-) Bonaventura, Expositio in Psalterium, Ps 57,2 (Opera onmia, 1X, ed. Vivès, p. 227); “Duo sunt mandata naturalia: unum prohibitivum, unde hoc ‘Quod
tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris’; aliud affirmativum, unde in Evangelio
‘Omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, eadem facite illis’. Primum
de malis removendis, secundum de bonis adipiscendis”. (26) Cf. Vatican
Council
I, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, c. 2. Cf. also
Acts 14:16-17: “In past generations he allowed all the nations to walk in their
own ways; yet he did not leave himself without witness, for he did good and gave
you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with food and
gladness”. (27) In Philo of Alexandria, one finds the idea according to which Abraham,
without the written law, was already leading “by nature” a life in conformity
with the law. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, De Abrahamo, § 275-276 (translation by
C.D. Yonge, The Works of Philo Judaeus, vol. 2 [London: Bohn, 1854], p.
452): “Moses says: ‘This man [Abraham] fulfilled the divine law and all the
commandments of God’ (Gen 26:5), not having been taught to do so by written
books, but in accordance with the unwritten law of his nature, being anxious to
obey all healthful and salutary impulses”. (28) Cf. Rom 7:22-23: “I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see
in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive
to the law of sin which dwells in my members”. (29) Clement of Alexandria,
Stromata, I, c. 29, 182, 1 (Sources chrétiennes, 30,
p.176). (30) St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, xxii, c. 27 (PL 42, col. 418): “Lex vero aeterna est, ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari iubens,
perturbari vetans”. For example, St. Augustine condemns lying because it goes
directly against the nature of language and its calling to be the sign of
thought; cf. Enchiridion, VII, 22 (Corpus christianorum, series latina, 46, p.
62): “Speech has not been given to men mutually to deceive each other, but
rather to bring their thoughts to the knowledge of others. To make use of
speech to deceive and not for its normal end is, therefore, a sin (Et utique
verba propterea sunt institua non per quae invicem se homines fallant sed per
quae in alterius quisque notitiam cogitationes suas perferat. Verbis ergo uti
ad fallaciam, non ad quod instituta sunt, peccatum est)”. (31) St.
Augustine, De trinitate, XIV, xv, 21 (Corpus christianorum, series latina, 50A, p.
451): “Where are these rules written? Where does the man, even an unjust one,
recognize what is just? Where does he see that he must have what he himself does
not have? Where are these written, except in the book of this light that one
calls the Truth? It is that every just law is written; from there it passes into
the heart of the man who practices justice, not that it migrates into him but
places its imprint there, as the seal of a ring passes into the wax without
leaving the ring (Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae, ubi quid sit justum et
iniustus agnoscit, ubi cernit habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Ubi ergo
scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur unde omnis lex
iusta describitur et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam non migrando sed
tamquam imprimendo transfertur, sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit et anulum non relinquit?)”.
(32) Cf. Gaius, Institutes, 1. 1 (Second century A.D.) (ed. Julien Reinach,
Collection des universités de France [Paris, 1950], p. 1): “Quod vero naturalis
ratio inter onmes homines constituit, id apud onmes populos peraeque custoditur
vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque
romanus partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur”.
(33) St. Thomas Aquinas clearly distinguishes the natural political order founded
on reason and the supernatural religious order founded on the grace of
revelation. He opposes the medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers who
attributed an essentially political role to religious revelation. Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 11: “The society of men
insofar as it is ordered to the end which is eternal life can only be conserved
by the justice of the faith, whose principle is prophecy […] But since this end
is supernatural, both the justice ordered toward this end, and prophecy, which
is its principle, will be supernatural. In truth, the justice by which human
society is governed and ordered towards the good of the city, can be
sufficiently achieved by means of the principles of the ius naturale implanted
in men”. (Societas hominum secundum quod ordinatur ad finem vitae aeternae, non
potest conservari nisi per iustitiam fidei, cuius principium est prophetia […]
Sed cum hic finis sit supernaturalis, et iustitia ad hunc finem ordinata, et
prophetia, quae est eius principium, erit supernaturalis. Iustitia vero per
quam gubernatur societas humana in ordine ad bonum civile, sufficienter potest
haberi per principia iuris naturalis homini indita)”. (34) Cf. Benedict XVI,
Discourse at Regensburg on the occasion of the meeting
with the representatives of the world of science. (September 12, 2006), in AAS
98 [2006] 733): “In the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would
sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose
with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the
claim that we can only know God’s voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm
of God’s freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of
everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which […] might
even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and
goodness. God’s transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our
sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose
deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual
decisions”. (35) This phrase appears in the Latin version of Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan (see
François Tricaud, Léviathan [Paris: Sirey, 1971], p. 295, note 81). The
English text states: “The interpretation of the laws of nature in a commonwealth
dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers,
without the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be
they never so true… it is by the sovereign power that it is law.”
(36) The attitude of the Reformers with respect to the natural law was not
monolithic. Basing himself on St. Paul, John Calvin – more than Martin Luther –
recognized the existence of the natural law as an ethical norm even if it is
radically incapable of justifying man. “It is a common thing, that man is
sufficiently instructed in the correct rule of living well by this natural law
of which the Apostle speaks […]. The end of the natural law is to render man
inexcusable; this, therefore, allows us to define it properly: it is an
awareness of the conscience by which it discerns sufficiently between good and
evil in order to remove man from the cover of ignorance, so that he is
reproached by his very own testimony” (Institutes of the Christian Religion,
book II, ch. 2, 22). During the three centuries that follow the Reformation,
the natural law served as a foundation for jurisprudence among Protestants. Only with the secularization of the natural law did Protestant theology, in the
19th century, distance itself from it. Only then does an opposition between
Protestant and Catholic opinions on the natural law becomes apparent. In our
own time, however, Protestant ethics seems to be showing renewed interest in
this notion [of the natural law]. (37) This expression finds its origin in Hugo Grotius,
De jure belli et pacis,
Prolegomena: “Haec quidem quae iam diximus locum aliquem haberent, etsi daremus,
quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, non esse Deum”. (38) Gratian,
Concordantia discordantium canonum, pars 1, dist. 1 (PL 187, col.
29): “Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet iure et moribus. Ius
naturale est quod in lege et Evangelio continetur, quo quisque iubetur alii
facere quod sibi vult fieri, et prohibetur alii inferre quod sibi nolit fieri.
[...] Omnes leges aut divinae sunt aut humanae. Divinae natura, humanae
moribus constant, ideoque hae discrepant, quoniam aliae aliis gentibus placent”.
(39) Cf. Paul VI, Encyclical Humanae vitae, n. 4 (AAS 60 [1968], p. 483).
(40) Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 1954-1960; John Paul II,
Encyclical Veritatis splendor, n. 40-53.
(41) Benedict XVI, Speech of February 12, 2007 to the International Congress on
Natural
Moral Law organized by the Pontifical Lateran University (AAS 99 [2007], p.
243). (42) Cf. Benedict XVI, Address of April 18, 2008 before the General Assembly of
the United Nations: “These rights [the rights of man] are based on the natural
law inscribed on the heart of man and present in the different cultures and
civilizations. To detach human rights from this context would mean restricting
their range and yielding to a relativistic conception, according to which the
meaning and interpretation of rights could vary and their universality could be
denied in the name of different cultural, political, and social conceptions and
even religious outlooks”.
(43) Cf. John Paul II, Encyclical Evangelium vitae, n. 73-74.
(44) Cf. John Paul II., Encyclical Veritatis splendor, n. 44: “The Church has
often made reference to the Thomistic doctrine of natural law, including it in
her own teaching on morality”. (45) St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “The first precept
of the law is that the good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. And upon this precept all the other precepts of the law of nature are based:
namely that all those things to be done or avoided pertain to the precepts of
the law of nature, which practical reason naturally apprehends to be human goods
(Hoc est […] primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum,
et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia legis naturae, ut
scililicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis
naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana)”.
(46) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 12: Catechism of
the Catholic
Church, n. 1780. (47) Cf. Romano Guardini, Freedom, Grace, and Destiny:
Three Chapters on the
Interpretation of Existence (translation by John Murray, S.J., [New York:
Pantheon, 1961, p. 48): “Good action also signifies action that fructifies and
enriches being. Good preserves life and completes it, but only when it is done
for its own sake”. (48) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 91, a. 2: “But among
all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more
excellent way than all beings, insofar as it partakes of a share of providence,
providing both for itself and for others. Thus it has a share of the Eternal
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. (Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae
providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi
et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quarn habet
naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis
aetemae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur)”. This text is cited in
John Paul II, Encyclical Veritatis splendor, n. 43. Cf. also Vatican Council II, Declaration Dignitatis humanae, n. 3: “The highest norm of human life is
the divine law – eternal, objective and universal – whereby God orders, directs
and governs the entire universe and all the ways of the human community, by a
plan conceived in wisdom and love. Man has been made by God to participate in
this law, with the result that, under the gentle disposition of divine
Providence, he can come to perceive ever increasingly the unchanging truth”.
(49) Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes, n. 36.
(50) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
(51) Cf. Ibid., Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 6.
(52) Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles. 3,5,17,22.
(53) Cf. Ibid., article 16.
(54) Cf. Aristotle, Politics, I, 2 (1253 a 2-3); Vatican Council II, Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et spes, n. 12, § 4.
(55) St. Jerome, Epistola 121, 8 (PL 22, col. 1025).
(56) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 6: “But as
regards the other secondary precepts, the natural law can be destroyed from
men’s hearts, either on account of evil persuasions—just as also in speculative
matters errors may arise concerning necessary conclusions—or on account of
depraved customs and corrupt habits, as some men did not consider stealing a
sin, or even the vices against nature, as the Apostle says in Rom 1:24).
(Quantum vero ad alia praecepta secundaria, potest lex naturalis deleri de
cordibus hominum, vel propter malas persuasiones, eo modo quo etiam in
speculativis errores contingunt circa conclusiones necessarias; vel etiam
propter pravas consuetudines et habitus corruptos; sicut apud quosdam non
reputabantur latrocinia peccata, vel etiam vitia contra naturam, ut etiam
apostolus dicit, ad Rom 1)”.
(57) St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 4: (Ratio
practica negotiatur circa contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes humanae, et
ideo, etsi in communibus sit aliqua necessitas, quanto magis ad propria
descenditur, tanto magis invenitur defectus […] In operativis autern non est
eadem veritas vel rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum al propria, sed solum
quantum ad communia, et apud illos apud quod est eadem rectitudo in propriis,
non est aequaliter omnibus nota. […] Et hoc tanto magis invenitur deficere,
quanto magis ad particularia descenditur)”.
(58) Cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, Lib. VI, 6 (ed. Leonine, t. XLVII,
353-354): “Prudence considers not only universals, a domain in which there is no
action, but must also know singulars, since it is active, i.e., a principle of
acting. Action, however, regards singulars. Hence some who do not have
knowledge of universals are more active regarding some particular things than
those who have universal knowledge because they have experience of particular
realities […] Therefore since prudence is active reason, the prudent man must
have each kind of knowledge, namely of universals and of particulars; or if he
happens to have only one, it should rather be knowledge of particulars, which
are closer to operation. (Prudentia enim non considerat solum universalia, in
quibus non est actio; sed oportet quod cognoscat singularia, eo quod est activa,
idest principium agendi. Actio autem est circa singularia. Et inde est, quod
quidam non habentes scientiam universalium sunt magis activi circa aliqua
particularia, quam illi qui habent universalem scientiam, eo quod sunt in aliis
particularibus experti. […] Quia igitur prudentia est ratio activa, oportet
quod prudens habeat utramque notitiam, scilicet et universalium et
particularium; vel, si alteram solum contingat ipsum habere, magis debet habere
hanc, scilicet notitiam particularium quae sunt propinquiora operationi)”.
(59) For example, experimental psychology emphasizes the importance of the active
presence of the parents of both sexes for the harmonious development of the
child’s personality, and the decisive role of paternal authority for the
construction of the child’s identity. Political history suggests that the
participation of all in decisions that regard the totality of the community is
generally a factor of social peace and political stability.
(60) At this first level, the expression of the natural law sometimes abstracts
from an explicit reference to God. Certainly the openness to transcendence is
part of the virtuous behaviour that one rightly expects from a fully developed
human being, but God is not yet necessarily recognized as the foundation and the
source of the natural law, nor as the last end that mobilizes and arranges in a
hierarchy the different kinds of virtuous behaviour. This lack of an explicit
recognition of God as the ultimate moral norm seems to prevent the “empirical”
approach to the natural law from being constituted as properly moral doctrine.
(61) St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in Ecclesiasten, cap. 1 (Opera
omnia, VI, ed. Quaracchi, 1893, p 16): “Verbum divinum est omnis creatura,
quia Deum loquitur”.
(62) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 91, a. 1: “Law is
nothing other than a certain dictate of practical reason in the leader who
governs some perfect community. Now it is evident, supposing that the world is
ruled by divine providence, […] that the whole community of the universe is
governed by the divine reason. Hence the very idea […] of the governing of
things in God the ruler of the universe, has the aspect of law. And since the
divine reason’s conception of things is not subject to time, but is eternal […]
therefore it is necessary to call this kind of law eternal. (Nihil est aliud
lex quam quoddam dictamen practicae rationis in principe qui gubernat aliquam
communitatem perfectam. Manifestum est autem, supposito quod mundus divina
providentia regatur […], quod tota communitas universi gubernatur ratione
divina. Et ideo ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe universitatis
existens, legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio nihil concipit ex tempore,
sed habet aeternum conceptum […] ; inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere
aeternam).
(63) Cf Ibid., Ia-IIae, q. 91, a. 2: “Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud
est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura”.
(64) John
Paul II, Encyclical Veritatis splendor, n. 41.
(65) Does not the theory of evolution, which tends to reduce species to a
precarious and provisory equilibrium in the flux of becoming, put radically into
question the very concept of nature? In fact, whatever its value on the level of
empirical biological description, the notion of species responds to a permanent
requirement of the philosophical explanation of living beings. Only recourse to
a formal specificity, irreducible to the sum of the material properties, allows
one to give an account of the intelligibility of the internal functioning of a
living organism considered as a coherent whole.
(66) The theological doctrine of original sin strongly underlines the real unity
of human nature. This cannot be reduced to a simple abstraction, nor to a sum
of individual realities. It indicates rather a totality that embraces all human
beings who share the same destiny. The simple fact of being born (nasci) puts
us in enduring relations of solidarity with all other human beings.
(67) Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, c. 3 (PL 64, col. 1344): “Persona
est rationalis naturae individua substantia”. Cf. St. Bonaventure, Commentaria
in librum I Sententiarum, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 29, a. 1.
(68) Benedict XVI, Encyclical Spe salvi, n. 5.
(69) Cf. also St. Athanasius of Alexandria, Traité contre les paiens, 42 (Sources
chrétiennes,
18, p.195): “As a musician who has just tuned his lyre, puts together by his
art the low notes with the high notes, the middle notes with the others, in
order to execute a single melody, so the Wisdom of God, the Word, holding the
whole universe like a lyre, unites the beings of the air with those of the
earth, the beings of heaven with those of the air; combines the whole with the
parts; leads all by his command and his will; thus he produces, in beauty and
harmony, a single world and a single order of the world”.
(70) The physis of the ancients, taking note of the existence of a certain
non-being (matter), preserved the contingency of earthly realities and put up a
resistance to the pretensions of human reason to impose on the totality of
reality a purely rational deterministic order. Thus, it left open the
possibility of an effective action of human freedom in the world.
(71) Cf. John Paul II, Letter to Families, n. 19: “The philosopher who
enunciated the principle of ‘Cogito, ergo sum’, ‘I think, therefore I am’, also
impressed on the modern concept of man its distinctive dualistic character. It
is the distinctive feature of rationalism to draw a radical opposition in man
between spirit and body, and between body and spirit. On the contrary, man is a
person in the unity of his body and his spirit. The body can never be reduced
to mere matter: it is a spiritualized body, just as man’s spirit is so closely
united to the body that he can be described as an embodied spirit”.
(72) The ideology of gender, which denies all anthropological or moral
significance to the natural difference of the sexes, is inscribed in this
dualistic perspective. Cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter
to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in
the Church and in the World, n. 2: “In order to avoid the domination of one sex
or the other, their differences tend to be denied, viewed as mere effects of
historical and cultural conditioning. In this leveling, physical difference,
termed sex, is minimized, while the purely cultural element, termed gender, is
emphasized to the maximum and held to be primary. [...] While the immediate
roots of this second tendency are found in the context of the question of woman,
its deeper motivation must be sought in the attempt of the human person to be
freed from one’s biological conditioning. According to this anthropological
perspective, human nature itself does not possess characteristics that impose
themselves in an absolute manner: all persons can and ought to constitute
themselves as they like, since they are free from every predetermination linked
to their essential constitution.
(73) John Paul II, Encyclical Veritatis splendor, n. 50.
(74) The duty to humanize the nature in man is inseparable from the duty to
humanize external nature. This morally justifies the immense effort of human
beings to emancipate themselves from the constraints of physical nature to the
degree to which these hinder the development of properly human values. The struggle against disease, the prevention of hostile natural phenomena, the
improvement of living conditions are in themselves works that attest to the
greatness of man called to fill the earth and to subdue it (cf. Gen 1:28). Cf. Pastoral Constitution
Gaudium et spes, n.
57.
(75) Reacting to the danger of physicalism and rightly insisting on the decisive
role of reason in the elaboration of the natural law, some contemporary theories
of natural law neglect, indeed reject, the moral significance of the
pre-rational natural dynamisms. The natural law would be called “natural” only
in reference to reason, which would define the whole nature of man. To obey the
natural law would therefore be reduced to acting in a rational manner, i.e., to applying to the totality of behaviours a univocal ideal of rationality
generated by practical reason alone. This amounts to wrongly identifying the
rationality of the natural law with the rationality of human reason alone,
without taking into account the rationality immanent in nature.
(76) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 154, a. 11. The moral evaluation of sins against nature should take into account not only their
objective gravity but also the subjective dispositions – often attenuating – of
those who commit them.
(77) Cf. Gen 2:15.
(78) Cf. Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes, n. 73-74.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 1882, clarifies that “certain societies,
such as the family and the civic community, correspond more immediately to the
nature of man”.
(79) Cf. John XXIII, Encyclical Mater et magistra, n. 65; Vatican Council II,
Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et spes, n. 26 § 1; Declaration Dignitatis humanae, n. 6.
(80) Cf. John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in terris, n. 55.
(81) Cf. Ibid., n. 37; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace Compendium of
the Social
Doctrine of the Church, n. 192-203.
(82) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 95, a. 2.
(83) St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I, V, 11 (Corpus christianorum, series
latina, 29, 217): “In fact a law that is not just does not seem to me to be a
law”; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2: “Human
law has the nature of law insofar as it in accord with right reason, and in this
respect it is evident that it derives from the eternal law. But insofar as it
departs from reason, it is called an unjust law, and does not have the nature of
law, but rather of a certain violence. (Lex humana intantum habet rationem
legis, inquantum est secundum rationem rectam, et secundum hoc manifestum est
quod a lege aetera derivatur. Inquantum vero a ratione recedit, sic dicitur lex
iniqua, et sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis violentiae cuiusdam)”;
Ia-IIae, q. 95, a. 2: “Consequently every law made by men has just so much of
the nature of law to the extent that it is derived from the natural law. But if
in some matter it deflects from the natural law, then it will not be law, but a
perversion of law.(Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione
legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali
discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis corruptio).
(84) Cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 97, a. 1.
(85) For Saint Augustine, the legislator, to do a good work, must consult the
eternal law;
cf. St. Augustine, De vera religione, XXXI, 58 (Corpus christianorum, series
latina, 32,
225): “The legislator of temporal laws, if he is a good and wise man, consults
that eternal law, about which it is given to no soul to judge, so that,
according to its immutable rules, he may discern what should be commanded and
what should be forbidden at a given time”. In a secularized society, in
which everyone does not recognize the mark of this eternal law, it is the search
for, the safeguarding of, and the expression of the norm of natural justice by
means of positive law that guarantee its legitimacy.
(86) Cf St. Augustine, De civitate dei, I, 35 (Corpus christianorum, series
latina, 47, p. 34-35).
(87) Cf. Pius XII, Address given on March 23, 1958 (AAS 25 [1958], p. 220).
(88) Cf Pius XI, Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, n. 79-80.
(89) Cf. also Jn 1:3-4; 1 Cor 8:6; Heb 1:2-3.
(90) Cf. Jn 3:19-20; Rom 1:24-25.
(91) Vatican II, Pastoral constitution Gaudium et spes, n. 22; Cf. St. Irenaeus
of Lyon, Contre les hérésies, V, 16, 2 (“Sources chrétiennes, 153” pp. 216-217:
“In times past, one properly said that man had been made in the image of God,
but this did not appear, for the Word was still invisible, he in whose image man
had been made: it is moreover for this reason that the likeness was easily lost.
But when the Word of God became flesh, he confirmed the one and the other: he
made the image appear in all its truth, by becoming himself what was his image,
and he re-established the likeness in a stable manner, by making man completely
like the invisible Father by means of the Word, henceforth visible”.
(92) Cf. St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, l vii, 1 (Corpus christianorum,
series latina,
39, p. 708): “By the hand of our Creator, the Truth, has written these words in
our very hearts: ‘Do not do to others what you would not want done to you’.
Before the law was given no one was permitted to be ignorant of this principle,
so that they could be judged to whom the law was not given. But in order to
prevent men from complaining that they lacked something, it was written on the
tablets what they were not reading in their hearts. It is not that they did not
have something written; it is that they did not want to read it. One placed,
therefore, before their eyes what they would be compelled to see in their
conscience. As if moved by the voice of God from without, man was compelled to
look inside himself (Quandoquidem manu formatoris nostri in ipsis cordibus
nostris veritas scripsit: ‘Quod tibi non vis fieri, ne facias alteri’. Hoc et
antequam lex daretur nemo ignorare permissus est, ut esset unde iudicarentur et
quibus lex non esset data. Sed ne sibi homines aliquid defuisse quaererentur,
scriptum est et in tabulis quod in cordibus non legebant. Non enim scriptum non
habebant, sed legere nolebant. Oppositum est oculis eorum quod in conscientia
videre cogerentur ; et quasi forinsecus admota voce Dei, ad interiora sua homo
compulsus est)”. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1:
“Necessarium fuit ea quae naturalis ratio dictat, quae dicuntur ad legem naturae
pertinere, populo in praeceptum dari, et in scriptum redigi […] quia per
contrariam consuetudinem, qua multi in peccato praecipitabantur, jam apud multos
ratio naturalis, in qua scripta erant, obtenebrata erat”; Summa theologiae,
I-II, q. 98, a. 6.
(93) Cf. Sir 24:23 (Vulgate: 24:32-33).
(94) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 100.
(95) Byzantine liturgy of St. John Chrysostom expresses well the Christian
conviction when it puts in the mouth of the priest who blesses the deacon in
thanksgiving after the communion: “Christ our God, who are yourself the
fulfilment of the Law and the Prophets, and have fulfilled the whole mission
received from the Father, fill our hearts with joy and gladness, at all times,
now and always, forever and ever. Amen”.
(96) Cf. Gal 3,24-26: “Thus the law served as a pedagogue leading us to Christ,
so that we might obtain our justification by faith. But now that faith has
come, we are no longer under a pedagogue; for in Christ Jesus you are all sons
of God, through faith”. On the theological notion of fulfilment, cf.
Pontifical Biblical commission, The Jewish People and Their Sacred Scriptures in
the Christian Bible, especially n. 21.
(97) Cf. Mt 22: 37-40; Mk 12:29-31; Lk 10:27.
(98) Cf. Lk 6:27-36. (99) Cf. Lk 10:25-37. (100) Cf.
Jn 15:13. (101) Cf. also Jer 3 1:33-34. (102) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 106, a. 1: “That
which is most prominent in the law of the New Testament, and in which its whole
power consists, is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given through the
faith in Christ. And therefore the new law is principally the grace of the Holy
Spirit, which is given to the Christian faithful. (Id autem quod est potissimum
in lege novi testamenti, et in quo tota virtus eius consistit, est gratia
Spiritus sancti, quae datur per fidem Christi. Et ideo principaliter lex nova
est ipsa gratia Spiritus sancti, quae datur Christi fidelibus)”.
(103) Cf. Ibid., Ia-IIae, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2: “Therefore since the grace of
the Holy Spirit is like an interior habit infused into us, inclining us to act
rightly, it makes us do freely the things becoming to grace, and avoid the
things opposed to grace. Thus the new law is called the law of freedom in two
ways. In one way, because it does not compel us to do or avoid certain things
unless they are of themselves necessary for or opposed to salvation, which are
commanded or forbidden by the law. Second, because it makes us fulfil precepts
or prohibitions of this kind freely, insofar as we fulfil them from the interior
impulse of grace. And on account of these two things the new law is called the
“law of perfect freedom” in Jas 1:25. (Quia igitur gratia Spiritus sancti est
sicut habitus nobis infusus inclinans nos ad recte operandum, facit nos libere
operari ea quae conveniunt gratiae, et vitare ea quae gratiae repugnant. Sic
igitur lex nova dicitur lex libertatis dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non arctat
nos ad facienda vel vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se sunt vel necessaria vel
repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub praecepto vel prohibitione legis. Secundo,
quia huiusmodi etiam praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere implere,
inquantum ex interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus. Et propter haec duo lex
nova dicitur lex perfectae libertatis, Ja 1)”. (104) St. Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibeta, IV, q. 8, a.
2: “The new law, which is the law of freedom, is constituted by the moral
precepts of the natural law, by the articles of faith, and by the sacraments of
grace (Lex nova, quae est lex libertatis, est contenta praeceptis moralibus
naturalis legis, et articulis fidei, et sacramentis gratiae)”. (105) John Paul
II, Address of January 18, 2002 (AAS 94 [2002], p. 334).
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