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THIRD SESSION

*The Impact of Globalization
on Poverty/Cultural Identities*

HANNA SUCHOCKA

Mr. President, I can say at the beginning that it is a very difficult task for me to make a comment on this very impressive paper which is far from my own experience as a lawyer and as a Member of Parliament for many years. But, to some extent, some very crucial points were mentioned which are really very familiar to me, notably the problem of corruption, with the openness of societies and the market. I think that this is one of the most important issues that, as members of the Academy, we should analyse at a deeper level: it is one of the negative symbols, symptoms, of the globalised world. We have discussed since yesterday different faces of globalisation. And in fact the discussion of globalisation is not a completely new one. But, if there has been an important development over the last couple of years, it is the change in the nature of the debate. Now it is the street whose voice is heard. By this I mean that globalisation has entered popular consciousness, not through our learned papers and erudite discussions, but through the public, I can use the word 'hooligans' as a street word, and because of violent demonstrations. Any event at all now seems a target for those who portray themselves anti-globalists. In a way, it is fitting that this session deals with the impact of globalisation on institutions, since the institutions of the state seem increasingly challenged, not only by globalisation itself, but also by those who claim to be its opponents.

The paper of Professor Braga de Macedo focused our attention in particular on the relationship between globalisation and institutions, and especially on the role of globalisation in reducing corruption. By underlining the effects of trade policy competition between foreign producers and international investors, and their impact on institution building, Professor de Macedo was able to show that there is a clear link between

this phenomenon and the limitation of corruption levels in specific countries. I think the debate about openness and corruption is an interesting one, but I would like to develop more closely the implication that open trade and law will necessarily lead to a decline in corruption. I would like to go a step farther and suggest that even if it were the case that globalisation, broadly understood, led to a decline of corruption, it cannot be said that it alone can perform this task.

The main point that emerged from the paper was that free trade and economic openness are the key perspectives on globalisation. Yet the theme of globalisation is one that has emerged only in the last decade while free trade has been a global development since the Second World War. The first broad point to make is that when we talk about globalisation, we surely mean something qualitatively different from merely the growth of free trade. Yesterday's discussions showed this very clearly. This was pointed out in the papers prepared by Professor Crocker and Professor Dembinski on 'The Different Faces of Globalization'. I will now quote Professor Dembinski who sees globalisation as a 'fundamental reconfiguration of inter-dependencies among persons, enterprises, political entities, capital and space'. But the opponents and proponents of globalisation recognise that there is also an economic base as well as an ideological superstructure which challenge traditional ways of understanding the relationships between the individual and the state, and between the individual and morality, as well as the classical ways of understanding the relationships between States and between States and international institutions. So, if we are to understand the impact of free trade on corruption, we should be careful not to take too much of a one-dimensional view.

Let me give a simple example of the complications that I see. On the one hand, the development of free trade, the growth in communications, and the internationalisation of business corporations have undoubtedly led to a decline in the importance of many national institutions of government. But at the same time as national institutions are disappearing, so new international institutions now seem to be developing. The last twenty years have seen a significant strengthening of transnational institutions, such as the European Union and its different bodies. There has been an internationalisation of jurisprudence with the establishment of the World Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. This is the latest example of this development, but as we know the agreement has not yet been ratified.

Apart from these institutions, which claim legitimacy from the governments that established them, other international bodies have gained

significant power with only a minimum of direct national political control, for example the World Health Organisation. And there are several international NGOs which increasingly demand to be the partners of national governments and international institutions in determining practical policies, such as in the field of environment. I make this point to show that globalisation is often thought of as challenging institutions as such. What in fact is happening is the weakening of some institutions at the national level and the strengthening of other institutions at the international level. And, in this perspective I am not sure if we can simply say that globalisation and openness of trade can bring a reduction in corruption or increase the transparency of institutions. The hard truth is that the individuals of the new international institutions that have arisen alongside globalisation, and which have an increasing impact on the daily lives of ordinary people, are themselves highly corrupt. I do not want to point a finger at this or that international institution, since I am more interested in the phenomenon as such. But there have been too many public examples of such corruption to pretend that this problem does not exist, or that it is not growing. The fact is that corruption in institutions is the outcome of two broad elements: the power of officials to transfer or allocate their scarce resources, and a lack of accountability and transparency in the allocation process. It does not matter whether the institutions are at the national or the international level. In fact, they are more likely to face the challenges if they are international in scope. The other key point is that these conditions can exist even in broadly understood free trade or free market contexts, much like pockets of disease can survive in an otherwise healthy environment.

Let me give you the example of the country I know best, my own, Poland. Prior to the collapse of Communism, it could reasonably be said that the entire political, economic arena was a giant corrupt enterprise. The combination of the autarkic socialist shortage economy combined with the total arbitrary power of unelected bureaucrats resulted in the entire economy essentially being run by corruption. Some of this existed at the highest political levels, but often this corruption involved political clientelism and quasi-financial favouritism at the middle and the lower levels. The period, since 1989, has of course been the story of rapid economic transformation, the introduction of the free market, large-scale privatisation, and the incorporation of Poland into the global economy. Not only in terms of free trade, but the progressive cooperation of Polish institutions with the organs of the European Union and other interna-

tional organisations. Yet, if one were to examine the development of corruption, during the same period, I would find it difficult to see any very clear situation other than one opposite to the one described in the paper. This economic change seems merely to have changed the nature of corruption rather than the phenomenon itself. Of course, the picture is never so simple. There are broad areas of the Polish economy that are free from corruption, and there is a growing sense among Polish politicians and officials that in the long run corruption damages the national interest, and that action needs to be taken now to eliminate it. Yesterday, we had in the Polish Parliament a very vigorous discussion on the issue.

Part of the solution to corruption, indeed, lies in the areas outlined in the paper that we have heard, namely the increased area in which interpersonal relations are governed by the market and not by individuals: to open up the economy to free trade, which by definition will punish the companies who owe their market position not to inherent efficiencies but to political protection, and to privatise economic sectors so as to remove them from the interference of bureaucracies. But that cannot be the entire solution. What is clear is that corruption also depends on a lack of the rule of law, on a lack of democratic accountability and responsibility, and on the lack of an overarching political culture promoting the entrenchment of moral virtues. Criminals will seek to corrupt officials and politicians if they sense that the law or judiciary will not be able to punish them. Officials and politicians will feel that they can be corrupted and take imprudent decisions if they sense that they will remain far from accountability or punishment, if only electoral. And ordinary citizens may tolerate the phenomenon of corruption unless there is an overarching moral order that encourages them to reject it.

My point is that these three elements: the rule of law, political accountability and a more or less coherent public morality, can only exist within the framework of institutions at the national level. The key is legitimacy. Yesterday, we heard about different aspects of legitimacy in the paper presented by Professor Dembinski. But ultimately I think the rule of law can only operate if citizens feel that the institutions which make that law are legitimate and have the authority to decide the rules and framework within which they run their lives. And there are various sources of such legitimacy. Democracy itself can successfully work within an arena where pre-political loyalties are important, and where there exists a set of institutions toward which citizens feel a sense of belonging and a requirement to care for them through participating in periodic

renewal through elections. The political culture also depends on a set of popularly held values, of public virtues, which make public discourse possible. It also means a social acceptance of some forms of behaviour by those in power, and a rejection of other forms of behaviour.

I must confess that I have doubts whether the process of globalisation can be entirely successful when we take into account the problem of accountability, of responsibility. As I indicated, the question of legitimacy can be resolved at the national level but great problems remain at the international level. There is a limit to which disparate cultures can agree on common legal norms and procedures, and a geographical barrier beyond which it becomes dysfunctional to hold elections to common institutions. We will never be able to overcome the deep historical and cultural differences that produce irreconcilable differences in the understanding of morality, virtues and political practice. So, what should be done? As globalisation grows and new international institutions develop, the latter should be carefully observed to ensure that they install the correct mechanisms of accountability and do not give to themselves powers that can easily be transformed into uncontrolled arbitrariness. The more loyalties to these institutions can be developed the better, so that they will become perceived by people as being worthy of care. If that happens, then globalisation will contain within itself mechanisms of self-control. At the same time, however, during the process of globalisation, we must seek to prevent its effects from undermining the loyalties, institutions and similar elements that are to be found at the local level, and which are so necessary to limiting the corruption of institutions, whatever the strength of the market. We need free markets and free trade to be sure, but we also need that surrounding order of law, democracy and culture upon which social order truly depends. The truth is that globalisation can bring true benefits to mankind when it is not perceived as a good in itself which ought to replace local and national institutions and loyalties, or as something which requires nothing more for its survival than self-sufficient mechanisms of trade and markets. This must go hand in hand with the historical process of globalisation. Only then will that process be secure, and only then will it bring the benefits that in the long run will show to peoples that it is something worthy of loyalty and protection.

GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE: THE FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN

JUAN J. LLACH

This comment is divided into two parts. The first one is devoted to analyzing some of the very valuable contributions made by the author on the important relationship between globalization and governance. In the second part I will allow myself to briefly elaborate on the issues raised not only in the paper but in the topic of the session per se.

I

The globalization and governance nexus

The paper deals with two related issues, i.e., the relationship between economic openness and corruption, and the role of governance institutional building in the process of domesticating the forces of globalization. In the first part (sections 2 and 3), the analysis is quantitative and focuses on finding out the relationship between corruption and quality of government as abridged indicators of governance and, on the other hand, trade and financial openness, as indicators of globalization.¹

¹ The first part of the paper is based on Federico Bonaglia, Jorge Braga de Macedo and Maurizio Bussolo, 'How globalisation improves governance', OECD, Paris, March 2001.

STYLIZED FACTS AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Stylized facts

1. *Circular causation in economic development.* Arrows included in Figure 1 show us very clearly the complexity of the process of economic development. All of them but one are double-sided arrows, suggesting the widespread sources of circular causation (virtuous or vicious) in the process of economic development, as Gunnar Myrdal pointed out forty years ago. Even the only one-sided arrow, from endowments to economic performance, alerts us about the pervasive presence of circular causation. This is clearly illustrated by the author: 'well-endowed countries may evolve towards democratic forms of government more easily or, at least, they may afford investing more resources to build well-functioning institutions'. Besides, the whole figure suggests a 'follow me' approach and looks much more similar to Fukuyama's Hegelian hypothesis about 'the end of history' than the author recognizes. The 'follow me' approach could be stated like this: 'If you do what I did, your future will be as bright as my present is'.

2. *Government size, economic development and trade openness: some misleading links.* The first two histograms in Figure 2 suggest links between government size and the level of development (first histogram) and between government size and trade openness (second histogram). However, these suggested links could be misleading. As usual, government size is measured here by central government expenditures. This procedure could be right if all the relevant countries had unitary political systems, but this is not the case. Twenty eight out of the one hundred and ninety two countries of the world (15 %) have federal or federal-like political systems.

3. *Big, close (and federal): a particular type of countries.* Furthermore, federalism appears closely related to countries' size and openness.² We can identify 23 big countries in the world, defining as 'big' those countries who fulfill at least two of the three following criteria: a) *area*: 1 million square kilometers or more; b) *population*: 25 million people or more; c) *economic size*: GNP (gross national product) rank, 20 or less. Almost half of these countries³ are federal (ten or 43 %). More than half are relatively closed

² The correlation between size and openness is analyzed in Braga de Macedo's paper as it is shown below.

³ Big countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Congo R.D, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, United Kingdom and United States.

(exports plus imports / GDP ratio: 50 % or lower) and only five of them are open (ratio: 65 % or higher). If we consider only the eight biggest countries of the world, i.e., those that fulfill the three criteria, we find that all of them are federal, six are closed and only two are open.⁴

4. *The most open and the most closed countries: size (and political organization) as critical differences.* Doing now the exercise of considering the twelve more closed and the twelve more open economies we can also reach interesting conclusions.⁵ Regarding the average size of government, as the author says, open economies appear as having bigger governments; its public expenditures to GDP ratio is 30 %, compared to 20 % of the closed economies. However, if we correct this measure including subnational governments expenditures, the difference drops to 33 % to 28 %; and if we also take into account GDP per capita levels, the gap almost vanishes. The most important differences between open and closed countries are, instead, size and political organization. Regarding size, eleven of the closed countries, compared to only four of the open ones, are highly populated; and ten of the closed countries, but only one of the open ones, have big areas. Finally, seven of the closed countries are federal, compared to four in the case of the open countries.

As a concluding remark, it could be said that because of historical, geographical, political and economic factors what we have is a constellation of countries that are, at the same time, big, federal and relatively closed to international trade. Big countries tend to be naturally federal, and this is only logical because of scale diseconomies of centralized government there. This historical institutional building process was prior to current globalization and conditioned its future developments, among other things, because of the fact that size is also naturally associated with *factual*, not legal, closeness to international trade. As a consequence, the association established in the paper – following Rodrik (1999) – between openness and the size of government could be spurious since the size of government is not properly measured.

⁴ The biggest countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Mexico, Russian Federation and the United States.

⁵ The twelve most open countries are the following (exports plus imports to GDP ratio in brackets): Hong Kong (263), Singapur (254), Taiwan (200), Ireland (193), Malaysia (163), Belgium (143), The Netherlands (109), Phillipines (97), Austria (89), Thailand (87), Sweden (85) and Canada (84).

The twelve more closed countries are: Brazil (17), Japan (20), Pakistan (21), Argentina (24), India (25), USA (26), Iran (30), Peru (30), Colombia (31), Australia (39), China (40) and Algeria (43).

5. *Small, rich and open: another particular type of countries.* If we have a look at the twelve more open economies we can see that all of them are relatively rich and that some of them were open from their very constitution as independent states, which was the result of merchants' or industrialists' movements to get political autonomy from other powers. This was the case, at least, in Hong Kong, Singapur, Taiwan, Malaysia, Belgium, The Netherlands, Phillipines and Thailand.

6. *Economic development, openness and quality of government.* The link shown in Figure 2 (third histogram) between openness and GDP per capita looks clear. Regarding governance, the perceived quality of bureaucracy appears strongly linked to GDP per capita but much more independent from trade openness (Figure 3). Perceived corruption, on the other hand, appears only slightly linked to the imports to GDP ratio, since the level of corruption is roughly the same in groups with very different degrees of openness. A more clearer (inverse) association appears between corruption levels and openness to private capital flows. Completely disappointing, on the contrary, is the almost null relationship between the IMF trade liberalization index and perceived corruption. This is critical for the thesis of the paper, because this index is a better indicator of foreign economic policies than the factual openness as measured by imports and exports ratios to GDP.

7. *Conclusions.* At the end of the section the author recognizes the problems of causality, identification and omitted variables involved. More than that, the 'stylized facts' presented are so stylized that could be misleading.

Quantitative analysis. The following section of the paper looks more precise in the analysis even when their final conclusions are not clear-cut either.

Corruption. A common problem to both sections is the choice of *perceived* corruption as the central indicator of governance. Corruption is, of course, a very important issue. But its indicators in the paper are confined to corruption as it is perceived by businessmen. It is impossible not to agree with Klitgaard's definitions presented in the paper. Corruption is seen as a function of monopoly power combined with discretion and low accountability.⁶ In a competitive framework, on the contrary, incentives to bribe tend to decrease because neither prices nor quantities can be changed by the authorities. Furthermore, the statement: 'in more open economic contexts

⁶ A bit ashamed I must say that, incredibly, neither accountability nor law enforcement have exact translations into Spanish.

there is less corruption' could even be considered a tautology. Nobody bribes to get something when it is possible to obtain the same paying the free market price. Alternatively, when the legal ways are closed, illegal ones will very probably be used.

According to the author, economic development tends to reduce corruption not only because it carries adequate changes in culture but also because more resources can be allocated to fight against it. The shadow of a vicious circle, ethical and on governance this time, appears again.

Instrumental variables. The use of these variables, in order to find explanations of GDP and openness not related to corruption is timely, but not always clear. Remoteness and population look theoretically sound, but English as official language not. According to this specification, the degree of corruption-independent openness a country has increases with its proximity to the largest world traders, or if the country's official language is English. Conversely, the larger is the size of a country's domestic market, measured by its population, the lower its openness.

Regarding the other independent variable, GDP per capita, a very simple equation with the absolute value of latitude and a dummy for tropical countries tries to get a valid corruption-independent GDP estimate. Before analyzing the results of this exercise, it's convenient to emphasize that this proliferation of cultural and geographical variables results in a very deterministic vision of economic development. The results obtained, on the other hand, are far from being satisfactory. The instrumental variables explain only the 45 % of the variance of import openness and only the 30 % of the variance of financial openness. In the case of GDP per capita, the instrumental variables explain just 44 % of the variance.

Looking at the simple correlations⁷ we have the same impression obtained in the previous section. Variables strongly associated with perceived corruption are GDP per capita, political rights and openness of the capital account. Correlations between imports' openness and perceived corruption are not so high. And they are still lower with the more important measure of trade liberalization. The negative association between perceived corruption and the size of government, as we mentioned, suffers from a measurement bias.

⁷ Not shown in the paper but in Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo y Bussolo (2001). In spite of the limitations of this statistical measure the author says: 'Openness, measured as a ratio of imports or capital flows on GDP, has a positive effect on corruption...'. This is an example of the very frequent mistake of confusing statistical association with causality.

Even in the complete model, the relationships found are not convincing enough. Not more than 60 % of the variation of the corruption indices can be explained, even including GDP per capita, political rights, government size, resources exports and other variables. Regarding the extent of government intervention, approximated by government consumption as a share of GDP, the author draws different conclusions according to the corruption index used. Using the TI sample (with many developing countries lacking) the effect of openness on corruption remains significant and sizeable; conversely, with ICRG index, introducing government size among the regressors makes the effect of openness' on corruption much smaller and statistically insignificant. This could be the result of correlations between the independent variables. On the other hand, the theory behind the inverse relationship between government size and perceived corruption is far from being clear. Besides, it is perfectly possible to build a theory establishing exactly the opposite relationship, since behavioral constraints in the public sector tend to be looser than in the private one.

Even more disappointing for the paper's goals, again, is the fact that the impact of trade liberalization policies per se on perceived corruption is not significantly different from zero.

Countries that have never been colonies, where Protestantism is the largest confession, where democracy has been uninterrupted for the last 50 years and that belong to the OECD have lower levels of corruption. The author rightly points out that these variables, by lowering the explanatory power of the GDP and political rights coefficients, are in fact taking into account deep institutional and social cross-country differences.

Notwithstanding my previous critical comments I do agree with the author's conclusions of the quantitative analysis, presented at the end of the paper. i) It was not possible to find a direct effect from trade policy on corruption. ii) The addition of government size weakened the results, especially in the larger sample. iii) The analysis of financial openness is incomplete for measurement problems. iv) The positive G&G interaction was based on a cross-section study, with all its problems.⁸ It is possible to consider many local characteristics, yet to compare China with the USA, or India with Argentina, will always be a bit stretched. The author states that

⁸ As the author states, cross-country differences in the levels of the independent variables are the central explanation for the variations in the dependent variable, and, no matter how many controls are added, it will always be possible that some additional relevant variable is missed or wrongly measured and that results are thus distorted.

future research should be focused on in-depth country specific case studies. I would add that a historical approach could have been more appropriate to deal with the issues posed here.

On the contrary, the main goal pursued by the author, to measure the sign and magnitude of the marginal effect of openness on corruption, is perhaps impossible to get at all. It does not result from the paper what the author claims: 'we found robust empirical support for the fact that increases in openness do indeed cause (statistically?) reductions in corruption', and the word *cause* is particularly misleading here.

Finally, as the author clearly says at the end of the paper, a lot of caution should be taken when drawing economic policy implications. In fact, reducing trade barriers may not bring immediate positive corruption reductions. It is true that in the long run, more open economies, enjoying more foreign competition and investing abundantly in institution building, will register lower corruption levels; however, in the short run, domestic policies may be more valuable than pursuing globalization at all costs. This may be especially important for poorer countries that may face serious trade-offs between complying with international agreements and investing in basic development infrastructures such as education, health, and social security.

Corruption and governance

The second thematic section of the paper, comprising numerals 4 and 5, deals with different aspects and examples of the institutional building process that should accompany economic openness. The author considers that the fundamental ambiguity of the G&G interaction could lead policymakers to retract from international exchange when structural reforms face resistance from citizens. He adds, and I fully agree with him, that the temptation cannot be overcome through defensive measures against globalization but through an improvement in governance. This governance building process, a societies' role, is rightly seen by Braga de Macedo as something very different from Fukuyama's 'end of history', but very close to the vision developed by John Paul II in *Centesimus Annus*.⁹ According to the author, the governance building process has a national

⁹ Although, as we mentioned before, the implicit approach of the paper is very deterministic, plain of circular causation and, on that count, close to Fukuyama's Hegelian approach.

side, fighting against corruption, and an international one, regional integration and multilateral institutions as a way of introducing peer pressure for better policies.¹⁰

I will briefly summarize the important points raised by the author in this section in most of which I do agree with him.

1. *Fighting against corruption* is a common task of governments, private (economic) sectors and NGOs but the key to success remains a durable engagement on the part of political leaders.

2. After the restoration of political and financial freedom, an anti-corruption momentum becomes possible; but the quest for transparency has nothing automatic.

3. *The case of Argentina*, that the author roughly describes, is very timely in this context.¹¹ It shows, first, that when citizens enjoy both political and financial freedom, they are more likely to mobilize against practices of mismanagement and corruption. At the same time, the Argentine case confirms that establishing democratic institutions and liberalizing the economy are not enough to eradicate corruption. However, part of the problem identified in the Argentine case is due to the narrow definition of corruption adopted in the paper, i.e., perceived *and* business-relevant corruption. Other forms of corruption, like drugs' and weapons' traffic or money laundering and, what is worse, their utilization as a way of financing the political system, are not well measured by indices like the ones used in the paper. However, these are the ones that became more relevant in Argentina after the economic liberalization.

4. *Opportunities arising from globalization*. If developing countries do not take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization, they risk having all or a part of their population fall behind, increasing social exclusion within their country and widening global inequality across countries. Such adverse developments could threaten democratic institutions and slow necessary reforms, which amounts to a deterioration in governance.

5. *Public and private governance structures* are crucial for maintaining social cohesion after opening the economy. There is a sort of virtuous circle from transparency and accountability to participatory development, to

¹⁰ Even when the author says that this approach has always had shared by economists, I think that this was not always the case. It is true, however, that for the last two decades a very healthy trend to introduce institutional analysis has been growing in economics.

¹¹ By the way, the Public Ethic Law was sent and passed by the Congress at the end of Menem's administration, not at the beginning of De la Rúa's one, as it is suggested in the paper.

empowering people and to poverty reduction. But, ironically, just as the citizens of developing countries are being encouraged to demand a voice in decisions that affect their lives, they are also being told that in the arena most central to their concerns they really have no choices.

6. *Regional economic associations (and the EU)*. It seems clear that regional economic associations, not closed to international trade, can be a good device for domesticating the forces of globalization better. I do agree with the author that the European experience has an unusual richness and could be very helpful for other regions looking for governance structures in the framework of regional economic associations. However, the perspective of the paper tends to be eurocentric, suggesting an almost mimetic process for other regions.

7. *Economic volatility, the international public good and international frameworks and institutions*. It is evident that since the Asian crisis in 1997 we have been having an increased volatility in the world economy whose amendment will require better multilateral agreements and institutions. These international frameworks should be designed with more participation of developing countries but, at the same time, taking into account what the author rightly points out about the risk of free riding. I would add that moral hazard is another typical risk of these institutional frameworks. Devices to enhance fiscal correspondence (JJLL), peer pressure and yardstick competition, as the author refers, could be critical to put both risks under a more reasonable control.

8. *The danger of procrastination*. In the case of Europe, national governments have used the Euro as an excuse for procrastinating on unpopular but essential structural reforms. Monetary and financial arrangements, however, cannot replace the reform in labor markets, social security, education and training, etcetera.

9. *The dangers of protectionism*. While it is essential to empower people to face the challenges of globalization, the changes in governance that are called for cannot become protectionist without threatening the basic benefits of open trade in goods, services and assets and of the free movement of people.

10. *Conclusions*. Conclusions from this second part of the paper are far from categorical. But this is not negative, since the process of institutional building is something open by definition, as it is suggested by the two extreme alternatives described in the paper, pure contractualism-flexibility vs. a unified state-integration.

II

The flip side of the coin

Despite its very interesting analysis and conclusions, the narrowness of the indicators chosen to mean globalization and governance remains as one of the main problems of Braga de Macedo's paper. In the case of globalization, the study is basically restricted to trade and financial openness. In the case of governance, although the conceptual analysis is much more encompassing, the econometric tests are limited to the size of government and corruption as perceived by businessmen.

The lack of globalization

Braga de Macedo describes some of the broader conflicts that frequently arise against globalization, and the resulting backlash. These conflicts have different aspects in developed and developing countries, but in all of them they are associated with a more complex set of issues. I will devote the rest of my comment to briefly analyze some of them, particularly those which negatively affect the economic and social performance of developing countries. To begin with, those conflicts are very frequently a consequence of the insufficiency of globalization more than of an excess of it.

1. *Agricultural protectionism and subsidies.* Because of agricultural protectionism and subsidies, which amount to the incredible figure of 400 USD billion per year in the OECD countries, millions of farmers and food producers of the developing countries can not have access to developed countries' markets. This is completely against fairness in international trade. A lot of developing countries are not allowed to play the games in which they are the best. Even when we cannot say that this is corruption, it seems evident that the maintenance of this policy almost since the postwar period was possible because of an intense, opaque and permanent lobbying. The emergence of the mad cow syndrome and the growing awareness of the environmental and health problems carried by artificial agriculture are symptoms that this policy has begun to reach its limits. However, we don't have clear signals that it will come to an end in the foreseeable future.

In the meantime, we cannot ignore that this policy has an evident and very negative relation with drug production and dealing and narcotraffic. I will mention this issue later, but I want to emphasize here that when farmers of the poor countries have their markets for legal products closed, they will more probably use their land to crop drugs.

2. *Limitations to the free movement of people.* A second very clear example of lack of globalization is the restrictions imposed to international migrations. This is, at the same time, one of the main differences between the current wave of globalization and the one that took place a century and a half ago. On that occasion, together with the opening of the economies to world trade and finance, dozens of million people – from Europe, and from very populated countries like China, India or Japan – left their countries and went to America, Asia, Africa and Oceania to find a better way of life, and most of them found it. Perhaps nobody is thinking now of such an intense and widespread process, but the barriers set by most developed countries to immigration are nowadays too strict.

Among the negative outcomes of this process we can mention higher unemployment and poverty in developing countries and marginalization of illegal immigrants in developed countries. But also problems for the global economy arise. For the last three years we have been living in a very volatile world economy, and very sensitive to the reactions of Mr. Greenspan with the Federal Funds interest rates in the USA. These reactions, in turn, were dictated by the unemployment level, with the sad result, by the way, that good news (low unemployment) were seen as bad news (because of its inflationary potential). It seems clear that a more open immigration policy would have helped to fix this problem, and the same can be said of Europe. In other words, the whole world economy is paying a high price in terms of economic growth because of the necessity to establish higher interest rates than the ones that will be needed with more international migrations.

3. *Global warming.* Almost ninety percent of the carbon emissions that pollute our planet come from developed countries, particularly the United States. The emissions have a negative impact all around the world. But, why do people from developing countries should pay the costs of phenomena not caused by them? Why are the poor specially damaged by processes like soil erosion or floods? The Kyoto agreement was an important step in the control of global warming, but the probabilities of its fulfillment, particularly by developed countries, are really very low. Again, this is a case of unfair rules of globalization, of too little globalization, because we cannot speak of fair trade in the presence of such huge negative externalities.

4. *Barriers to knowledge access.* The fourth issue I want to raise is the limitations imposed to the free access to knowledge. We all agree that we are leaving in a 'knowledge society' and that the access to education, information, technology and science is the key not only to economic growth, but

also to the building of more integrated societies. Perhaps, most of us do also agree on the necessity of a prudential property right protection in the case of intellectual goods and services, in order to have the right incentives to induce their production. At the same time, the way these rights are enforced in the real world allows the emergence of different kinds of monopoly. This has very negative consequences not only on economic development but also, when health issues are involved, on life expectancy of million people, particularly in developing countries. It is true that the fast development of internet is contributing to an important democratization of knowledge. Anyway, it seems evident that, in order to get fair play in the globalization process, we need a new international framework for a non-monopolic protection of intellectual property rights.

A typology of governments

The outcomes of the flip side of the coin of globalization are not limited to the economy or to social life, but they also reach the field of politics. On the macro side, the emergence and, particularly, the probability of success of nationalistic ideologies and movements are very frequently associated with bad economic or social performance. On the micro side, when people cannot have access to legal ways of life, the probability of illegal behavior is really higher, either regarding international activities like drug production, narcotraffic and weapon traffic, or regarding national activities, like creating opportunities of rent-seeking and different kinds of bribery. As the vicepresident of Bolivia Jorge Quiroga said: 'The key of the question is that developed nations should open their markets in order to allow the profitability of economic activities different from coca crops'.

Perhaps the following typology will help us for a better understanding of the issue of globalization and governance, and particularly corruption. My own hypothesis is that the place a country has in this typology is critical to understand the prevalence and the kind of corruption it has and its future developments.¹²

Countries in the NW quadrant not only have been the most successful regarding economic development, but also have had their regulations enforced by governments long ago established from the civil society

¹² The variables of our typology are partially taken into account by the author when introducing colonial past, religious traditions, and democratic institutions as important explanatory variables for the level of corruption.

TIPOLOGY OF GOVERNMENTS

KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS	ESTABLISHED 'FROM THE BOTTOM'	ESTABLISHED 'FROM THE TOP'
REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE	Constitutional monarchies/ New countries (North America and Oceania)/ Commercial republics	Absolutist monarchies and successor states
REGARDED AS ILLEGITIMATE	Paralell governments: maffias, guerrillas, bandoleers	Dictatorships (Africa, Asia, Latin America in the past)

upwards. Those regulations are, for that reason, legitimate or, as Max Weber said, people in those societies tend to act *as if* those were legitimate. This legitimacy is the matrix that gives birth, simultaneously, to accountability and law enforcement. At the same time, the principle of fiscal correspondence, clearly stated in sentences like 'no taxation without representation', was one of the bases of that legitimacy. This was typically the case of constitutional monarchies in Northern Europe, their offsprings in North America and Oceania and commercial cities or republics. In these countries, and for the same reasons, local governments have been traditionally very important. The possibility of corruption is always open, but societies' control imposes stricter limits to bribery.

In countries of the eastern quadrants, on the other hand, the presence of absolutists or very powerful monarchies or dictatorships was much more pervasive and, as a consequence, people got used to perceiving much of their regulations as illegitimate.¹³ Moreover, the idea of legitimacy itself originally became from top to bottom and an anthropomorphic idea of the

¹³ By the way, this typology could also lead us to a better understanding of the relationship between religion, economics and politics. Even when protestantism is positively associated with less corruption and more economic development – as Braga de Macedo says following a very long tradition – is probable that the efficient cause of this association is the type of government as suggested in the typology.

State, with capital letters, still tends to prevail. Local governments, on the other hand, tend to be weaker.

Let me remember in this context the Italian saying: 'Se piove, governo ladro; e se non piove, governo ladro'.¹⁴ Illegal activities have tended to be frequently seen as legitimate, because they were considered as a reaction against a government perceived as illegitimate. A very clear and widespread example of illegal behavior is tax evasion. And a typical situation in which it arises, as can be read from the Gospel onwards, is the imperial or colonial domination. Of course, if because international economic conditions or otherwise, legal ways of winning the bread are scarce, different kinds of rent-seeking and bribery are going to be much more frequent. The other side of the coin of this 'legitimate' bribery of the citizens is the equally 'legitimate' corruption of governments that comes from the fact that their control from society is very weak.

Under extreme conditions, a complete parallel government is created through guerrillas, mafias or bandolerism (SW quadrant). One of the most interesting cases we can quote in this context is Sicily. Its capital, Palermo, was the most populated European city at the eve of the second millenium (Shleifer and Vishny).¹⁵ Precisely from those times onwards a never ending succession of foreign princes invaded and dominated the island, as Lampedusa in *Il Gattopardo* so wonderfully tells us. The most striking outcomes of this incredibly long historical process were the economic stagnation of Sicily and the development of a powerful mafia, so pervasivse that have even been exported to other countries.

'Quality of government' has historically meant: legitimate and deep rooted origin, fiscal correspondence, rule of law, accountability, societal control and law enforcement. On the other hand, once behaviors like rent-seeking and bribery become widespread in society, they tend to survive far beyond the removal of its original causes.

It seems clear that deep changes in the political decision making process, along the lines just mentioned, are critical either to significantly reduce corruption, at the national level, as well as to build adequate institutional frameworks at the regional and international levels. The reconstruction of fiscal correspondence, i.e., the unification of the roles of citizens, tax payers and beneficiaries of public expenditure, can also play a cru-

¹⁴ If it rains, thievish government; if it does not rain, thievish government.

¹⁵ Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, *The Grabbing Hand*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, esp. chapters 1 and 11.

cial role in this institutional building process. However, looking at the widespread disenchantment towards politics and politicians that is going on in many countries we have mixed feelings. On the one hand, this is putting strong pressures to improve the performance of political systems. On the other hand, they can lead to anti-democratic governments. In this context, I agree with the author that the outward orientation, either regional or international, can play a very important role as a quality enhancer for domestic institutions and growth.

PAULUS M. ZULU

1. Implied Postulates

The paper makes implied postulates, first is that the benefits of globalisation in development i.e. 'empowering people to take advantage of globalisation' are realised when the process brings about both efficiency and effectiveness particularly to the recipients of globalisation, and in this context, developing societies. The second postulate flows from the first and it is that sustainable development in a globalising economy requires good governance at both the international and national levels. The first postulate necessitates a change especially in those institutions of governance which might be or are not compatible with efficiency and consequently with effectiveness. The second entails regional organisation of participating states and an application of peer pressure by peers on non complying members. I shall deal with these postulates in turn.

2. Responses

2.1 National Level Responses

Macedo identifies corruption as the main measurable indicator of bad governance, among others and recommends that good governance entails getting rid of corruption which in turn will not only maximise available resources but will also attract investment. I shall not go into detail to comment on excellently researched facts about the causal factors of corruption together with the available data demonstrating correlations between good governance and the processes of mobilising against corruption and the problematics these create for developing countries confronted with pover-

ty, low levels of political and economic participation and international aid contracts. In a sense poor societies are caught in a vicious cycle as long as globalization is mediated through nation states and governments. First corruption drains resources thereby reducing the necessary preconditions for efficiency. Conditions for a reduction in corruption by state officials are:

- increased intellectual resources as skills; and
- increased national and financial resources for policing.

Changes in governmental institutions are generated by intellectual qualities in participation. It is not just participation per se that generates change but the quality of that participation. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that while the World bank's conditional aid in some countries in Sub-Sahara Africa has brought about democratic participation in national elections, there has been very little change in institutions with the consequence that changes in the daily lives of citizens have been minimal.

Secondly, even where conditions for institutional change have been optimal, the scarcity of intellectual capacity to manage the changed institutions has meant that the intended objectives have not been attained. For instance South Africa is probably the most endowed country in Africa in terms of material resources, constitutional arrangements and the level of development. Yet problems of transformation in institutions such as the police services render the variable of institutional change problematic. Macedo introduces the indicator of the level of development as a critical variable in good governance. It is this variable that globalisation has to confront directly if it is to benefit the underprivileged masses.

2.2 Regional Responses

The issue of regional responses presents even greater problems than is the case with national responses. In the first instance the European Union is not an appropriate prototype for regional unions in developing societies. The European Union is constituted by strong national states with a specific mandate. Regional Unions in developing states are a) constituted by weak and fragmented states; and b) because of the weakness and fragmentation lack strong mandates and an effective capacity to enforce peer compliance.

Secondly, regional associations in developing countries lack in evenness and tempo as well as in the direction of development. While under development is common to all, the areas of under development are not necessarily uniform or similar. Worse still, the ethics of development are not necessar-

ily in continuum with the ethics of globalization. Hence peer pressure at the regional level is:

- a) uneven and possibly fragmented and,
- b) incapable of bringing about changes in national institutions especially given the tumultuous conditions in some of the developing polities.

The situation in Zimbabwe is a case in point. While Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) the occupation of white farmlands, a situation which brought about huge international condemnation could not be resolved at the SADC level. Similarly, SADC could not adopt a unified stand on the war in the Congo, and was at worst divided within itself with Zimbabwe sending in troops to aid Laurent Kabila while at the same time South Africa, the strongest member in the regional cooperation, both militarily and economically, was busy sending in a peace corp to the troubled state.

The disparate positions taken by regional associations in developing countries signify the disparate ethical and ideological positions – a situation which does not augur well for a constitutional and creative regional response to globalization.

Finally, at an empirical level, the concept of democracy creates tensions. The tension between the essence and the practice of democracy in developing societies is problematic. This makes good governance problematic to implement at a practical level. Empirically, international or global negotiations are with ruling elites who, in spite of claims of democratic mandates, pursue interests contrary to the welfare of the poor who supposedly put them in office. Macedo's paper suggests development as a necessary variable to enhance performance and effectiveness by reducing and eliminating corruption. The challenge for the world is to find mechanisms for ascertaining that policies and practices pursued by regimes in office do, indeed, function to the benefits of the broader society. The extent to which this will be in conflict with democracy is a moral and not an ethical issue.

FIFTH SESSION

*The Impact of Global Financial Flows
on Developing Countries*

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE

STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES

A. WHAT PROGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM?

The recent wave of currency and banking crises that began in East Asia, then spread to many other emerging markets, and even threatened briefly to spill over to the US in the wake of Russia and LTCM – generated a broad consensus that fundamental reforms were required in the international financial system. Existing institutions and arrangements were widely seen as inadequate for dealing with very large and extremely volatile capital flows, in which an important part of the volatility was caused by large imperfections in the financial markets themselves.

The seriousness of the situation is underlined by the fact that in the 1990s, out of 120 months, during 40 (that is 33% of the time) there have been important crises. This is particularly problematic for two reasons. Firstly, currency and banking crises – which have recently occurred mainly in emerging markets – have extremely high development and social costs. Indeed, deep and frequent crises in developing countries could undermine achievement of the UN target to half world poverty by 2015. Secondly, there is always the very small – but totally unacceptable – risk that contagion and spillovers in an increasingly interdependent international financial system could lead to global problems. Both these problems implied that urgent action was required to overcome the risk that the important benefits that globalisation offers in other fields could be seriously undermined by international financial developments.

Three years after the Asian crisis, and a few weeks after the Annual IMF/World Bank Meetings in Prague it is a good time to evaluate progress achieved on reforming the international financial system.

Some progress has been made, but it is clearly insufficient. Important changes have been implemented. For example, IMF lending facilities for both crisis prevention and management have been quite usefully expanded and adapted and the Fund's total resources were increased. Adaptations are being continuously made. For example, a week before the Prague Annual Meetings, the Fund's Contingency Credit Line (CCL) a new facility that would help countries fight crises spilling over from other countries has been modified; the changes to the CCL crucially include greater automaticity in disbursing such loans once a country is in a crisis resulting from contagion and lower cost of the facility. Such modifications were clearly very necessary, since the CCL-created over a year ago – had not yet been used. This was like having new fire-fighting equipment, but not having made the crucial connections to the water supply!

Important institutional innovations have been introduced, such as the creation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), to identify vulnerabilities and sources of systemic risk, to fill gaps in regulations and to develop consistent financial regulations across all types of financial institutions. As capital and credit markets become increasingly integrated both amongst each other and between countries, it is essential for regulation to be efficient that the domain of the regulator is the same as the domain of the market that is regulated. Given that regulation is still national and sectoral, an institution like the FSF is valuable to help coordinate regulation globally and across sectors. The creation of the G-20, a body to discuss international financial reform, that includes both developed and developing countries – is also a positive development.

Developing countries have been asked to take a number of important measures to make their countries less vulnerable to crises; these include the introduction of a large number of codes and standards. Though introducing standards is very positive, there are however concerns in developing countries that the number of standards (at more than 60) is too large; developing countries also are worried that standards are too uniform, in the assumption that 'one size fits all'. At a recent conference held at the Commonwealth Secretariat, senior policymakers from developing countries called for greater selectivity and flexibility in the standards they are asked to implement. A more inclusive process is also necessary, whereby developing countries could participate in the development of these standards and codes, which at present they are asked to implement without having been involved in their design.

Even though there has been quite significant progress on reform of the financial architecture, it has suffered from two serious problems. Firstly, it

has been insufficient, given the magnitude of the changes required to create a financial system that supports – and does not undermine – growth and development in the dramatically changed context of the 21st Century, characterised by very large, but extremely volatile and highly concentrated private capital flows. It is essential to develop a clear vision of an appropriate financial architecture in the new circumstances; drawing parallels from the institutional mechanisms developed nationally as domestic credit and capital markets grew a new international architecture requires: a) appropriate transparency and regulation of international financial loan and capital markets, b) provision of sufficient international official liquidity in distress conditions and c) standstill and orderly debt workout procedures at an international level. The mechanisms that exist and the adaptations made till now, do not fully meet the new requirements.

Secondly, progress made has been asymmetrical in three key aspects, in which a more balanced approach is urgently needed.

A first asymmetry in the reform process is that far more progress has been made on important measures taken by developing countries, which are being asked to introduce a very large number of codes and standards, so as to make them less vulnerable to crises. However, far less progress is being made on equally important and complementary international measures. As many leading economists (such as Stiglitz, Sachs, Rodrik, Bhagwati and others have stressed), crises – such as in Asia – were not just caused by country problems but also by imperfections in international capital markets, such as herding, that lead to rapid surges and reversals of massive private flows. To deal with the problems in the international financial markets, it is essential that international measures both for crisis prevention and management are also taken.

As the G-24 – that represents developing countries – pointed out recently, standards in the area of transparency are being pressed upon developing countries to improve information for markets without equal corresponding obligations for disclosure by financial institutions, including highly leveraged ones, such as hedge funds, who have no reporting obligation. Better information on financial markets would be of great value to policy-makers, especially in developing countries. Transparency should not be a one way street. Furthermore, while valuable progress is being made on attempting to improve regulation of domestic financial systems in developing countries, there is painfully slow progress in filling important gaps in international regulation, of institutions such as mutual funds or hedge funds, or of modifying regulations, as of banks, where current regulations may have

contributed-rather than prevented-greater short-termism of flows (as discussed in more detail later). In the field of international regulation, valuable studies have been carried out particularly by the Financial Stability Forum Working Parties, but recommendations made are on the whole yet to be implemented.

Passing from crisis prevention to crisis management, it seems important that the IMF's own resources are large enough to meet the financing needs of a systemic crisis involving several economies simultaneously, while also retaining sufficient liquidity to meet normal demands on the Fund's resources. Michel Camdessus and others-including the influential US Council of Foreign Affairs - have suggested that this expansion of official emergency financing could be funded in part by temporary and self-liquidating issues of SDRs. Such a mechanism would not add to total world liquidity, except in a temporary manner during a crisis situation - when it would be compensating for reductions or reversal of private flows. This proposal deserves serious analysis and consideration and there seems to be considerable merit in the G-24's call for a study of this matter and discussion at the autumn 2001 meeting of the IMFC. More speedy progress on orderly debt work-outs is also urgent.

A second source of asymmetry in the reform process that needs to be urgently overcome is the insufficient participation of developing countries in the key fora and institutions. As regards the international financial institutions, more representative governance needs to be discussed in parallel with a redefinition of their functions. It is particularly urgent that developing countries (which are now only represented in a very limited way in the FSF Working parties) are fully represented in the Financial Stability Forum itself, as the issues discussed there have very profound effects on their economies and as their insights can make an important contribution to the Forum's valuable work. It is important to note that after their recent annual meeting Commonwealth Finance Meetings called for such developing country participation in the Forum. The inclusion of major developing countries in the G-20 is clearly a welcome step, but it might be of value to include also some smaller developing nations, to reflect their specific concerns. Above all, it would also be helpful if the agenda of the G-20 could be broadened, to include more explicitly the key issues of international financial reform.

A third asymmetry that has emerged in recent discussions on reform of the system is that we have all placed excessive focus on crisis prevention and management, mainly for middle-income countries. Important as this

is, it may have led us to neglect the equally – if not more important – issues of appropriate liquidity and development finance for low income countries. As regards liquidity, it is important that existing IMF facilities for low-income countries – such as the Compensatory Financing Facility and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility – should be made more flexible, in case the present level of oil prices are sustained or if other terms of trade shocks affect such countries. More generally, the role of the IMF in providing liquidity to low-income countries is crucial. As regards development finance, low income countries need sufficient multilateral lending and official flows, as well as speedy debt relief. It is a source of concern that multilateral lending to low-income countries, especially via IDA, has recently fallen sharply. Furthermore, in a world of rapidly increasing private flows, it is important that low-income countries, donors and international organisations collaborate to help attract more significant private flows to them. Mobilizing sufficient and stable development finance, both private and official to low-income countries is an essential pre-condition to help ensure growth and poverty reduction in the poorest countries.

It is important that significant further progress on reforming the international financial system is done quickly, as the risks and potential costs of not doing so are unacceptably large, especially for poor people in developing countries.

We must overcome any possible complacency on this matter, by remembering the man who neglected to fix his leaking roof in sunny times, and was then unable to do so when stormy weather came.

Given the complexity of the issues, I would like to focus the rest of my presentation on better international information on markets and financial regulation that is on international measures for crisis prevention. This is an area where though action is urgent, there has been very little action, and even relatively little analysis.

B. BETTER INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL REGULATION

1. *Additional information on markets to developing countries*

As pointed out above, better information to markets on developing countries has to be complemented by better information on international financial markets available to policy-makers, especially but not only in developing countries. Particularly during the crisis that started in Asia,

emerging country policy-makers have found important limitations in the essential information available on the functioning of international capital and banking markets. The type of information required is particularly on almost day to day changes in the functioning of markets – and their key actors – globally and regionally.

The IMF has led the way in improving information – and its dissemination – on emerging markets economies, which is of particular use to markets. A parallel symmetric effort needs to be done to gather and provide timely information on market evolution to emerging markets' policy-makers. This task should perhaps be led by the BIS, and co-ordinated by the newly created Financial Stability Forum. (FSF). Inputs from other institutions would be very valuable, for example, the IMF and the private sector (for example, the Institute of International Finance, IIF). Suggestions in the October 1998 G-22 Report of the Working Group on Transparency and Accountability did provide important elements for this task. These suggestions relate not just to better statistics on international banks' exposures, but also on 'compiling data on international exposures of investment banks, hedge funds and other institutional investors'. Furthermore, the growth of financial innovations, such as over-the-counter derivatives, while designed to facilitate the transfer of market risk and therefore enhance financial stability, have also made financial markets more complex and opaque. This has created difficulties in monitoring patterns of activity in these markets and the distribution of risks in the global financial system for market participants, regulators, central banks, and other authorities, including particularly those in developing countries. It would seem appropriate for major Central Banks and the BIS to attempt to improve registration of derivatives and institutions like hedge funds, by making it obligatory. Unfortunately, such initiatives to make reporting obligatory have until now been blocked, especially in the US Congress.

Given the speed with which markets move, it seems particularly important that the frequency with which relevant data is produced is very high (and possibly higher in times of market turbulence, when it becomes particularly crucial), and that dissemination is instant to all countries' Central Banks. Indeed, a special additional service could be provided by the BIS in which it would play the role of clearing house of information. For this purpose, it could draw not just on information it can gather directly from markets, but by collecting and centralising information on their markets that individual Central Banks have, and where the aggregate picture is not easily available to any individual Central Bank. This could possibly include

both quantitative and qualitative information. Via the internet, the BIS could standardise the information requirements, collect the information, aggregate it, and disseminate it rapidly to all central banks, as well as to other relevant institutions. Such a service would be of the greatest usefulness to developing country policy-makers, especially immediately before and during crises; however, it would naturally also be very valuable to developed country policy-makers and international institutions (including the BIS itself) in handling crisis prevention and management.

2. Improved international financial regulation

2.1 The case for regulation

A strong case can be made that international financial regulation is welfare increasing. This is particularly true, if – as we discuss below – such regulation has explicit counter-cyclical elements, to compensate for inherent pro-cyclical behaviour by financial actors, that can also partly characterise traditional financial regulation.

Indeed, there is growing support for a view that the process of international financial intermediation has a second-best element, in which welfare for both source and recipient countries can be increased by regulatory changes (through measures in source and/or recipient countries), which would reduce excessive lending or investing. It is noteworthy that Chairman Alan Greenspan proposed – for the case of interbank lending – that it could be appropriate for either borrowing countries or lending ones to impose reserve requirements to ‘deter aberrant borrowing: sovereigns could charge an explicit premium, or could impose reserve requirements, earning low or even zero interest rates, on interbank liabilities. Increasing the capital charge on lending banks, instead of on borrowing banks, might also be effective’.¹

There is growing recognition that it may often be desirable to regulate excessive surges of potentially reversible capital flows in recipient countries. Indeed, an important part of the responsibility with discouraging excessive reversible inflows – as well as managing them – lies with the recipient countries. However, the experience of the 1990s, with very large scale of international funds – compared to the small size of developing

¹ Remarks by Alan Greenspan before the 34th Annual Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 7th, 1998.

country markets – leads to the question whether measures to discourage excessive short-term flows by recipient countries are sufficient to deal with capital surges and the risk of their reversal.

Aizenman and Turnovsky (1999) have formalised such analysis, by developing a rigorous model that analyses the impact via externalities of reserve requirements on international loans (both in lending and recipient countries) on the welfare of both categories of countries. Aizenman and Turnovsky *op. cit.* thus evaluate the macro-economic impact of reserve requirements in a second-best world, where there is moral hazard due to likely bail-outs on the lender's side and sovereign risk on the borrower's side; both generate large negative externalities on welfare. The general conclusion of their model is that the introduction of a reserve requirement in either source or recipient country reduces the risk of default and raises the welfare in both countries.

The aim of such regulatory changes is to help smooth capital flows to emerging markets, without discouraging them excessively. This is in contrast with views based on a belief that crises in emerging markets are due only to moral hazard, and that the appropriate way to combat such moral hazard is by scaling down the role of the IMF in providing financial packages before and during crises. The latter view has acquired some prominence in developed countries, particularly but not only in the US, in particular, the majority Meltzer Report to the US Congress took such views to the extreme. However, such reduction of the role of the IMF could either make crises even more costly and/or lead to a sharp reduction in private flows to developing countries. These are both highly undesirable effects which could significantly diminish welfare, particularly but not only in the developing economies, as well as undermine support for open economies and market-based economic policies in developing economies. Therefore, an approach based on better regulation is clearly better and more welfare-enhancing than one which cuts back the IMF.

2.2 *Filling Gaps*

The broad welfare case for applying reserve requirements in both source and recipient countries can also be applied to institutional investors and in particular to mutual funds, which became increasingly important in relation to banks in the 1990s. This growing importance occurred both within the developed countries, and particularly within the US – where mutual funds receive more than 50% of total deposits in the financial system – and in capital flows from developed to developing countries (see

d'Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2000). The narrowing of differences between banks and institutional investors like mutual funds, and the fact that securities markets and thus mutual funds also have access to the lender of last resort – nationally in the US but more importantly in our context also internationally, due to the frequent rescue packages put together by the IMF in recent serious currency crises, suggests the importance of improving prudential standards for institutional investors such as mutual funds.

As regards portfolio flows to emerging markets, there is an important regulatory gap, as at present there is no regulatory framework internationally, for taking account of market or credit risks on flows originating in institutional investors, such as mutual funds (and more broadly for flows originating in non-bank institutions). This important regulatory gap needs to be filled, both to protect retail investors in developed countries and protect developing countries from the negative effects of excessively large and potentially reversible portfolio flows.

Institutional investors, like mutual funds, given the very liquid nature of their investments can play an important role in contributing to developing country currency crises. (For recent evidence, see Kaminsky, Schmukler and Lyon, 2000). It seems important, therefore, to introduce some counter-cyclical regulation to discourage excessive surges of portfolio flows. This could perhaps best be achieved by a variable risk-weighted cash requirement for institutional investors, such as mutual funds. These cash requirements would be placed as interest-bearing deposits in commercial banks. Introducing a dynamic risk-weighted cash requirement for mutual funds (and perhaps other institutional investors) is in the mainstream of current regulatory thinking and would require that standards be provided by relevant regulatory authorities and/or agreed internationally. The guidelines for macro-economic risk, which would determine the cash requirement, would take into account vulnerability variables as defined by the IMF and BIS (for a more detailed discussion of this proposal, see d'Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2000).

The September 1998 Emerging Markets IOSCO Report on *Causes, Effects and Regulatory Implications of Financial and Economic Turbulence in Emerging Markets* has in fact described in some detail and evaluated rather positively the above proposal. This report emphasised that 'there appears to be scope – and an urgent need for further work. This is very likely to require a multilateral effort – i.e. by regulators from both source and recipient countries in collaboration with the industry'.

As regards HLIs, the FSF working group on HLIs rightly focussed on two problems: systemic risk linked to high leverage and reduction of mar-

ket and economic impact of collapse of unregulated HLIs. Particular emphasis was placed on HLI activities in small and medium sized open economies where the potential damage that can be caused by large and concentrated positions can seriously amplify market pressures.

As regards HLIS, the FSF Working Group considered formal direct regulation of currently unregulated institutions. This would include a licensing system, minimum capital and liquidity standards, large exposure limits, minimum standards for risk management, and even an enforcement.

Such regulation was seen to have several very desirable effects, (such as regular oversight over HLIS and reducing likelihood of disruptive market events), but due to what were seen as both philosophical and practical problems, the Working Group did not recommend applying a system of direct regulation to currently unregulated HLIS at this stage, though it did not reject the possibility of establishing such a regime at a later stage. It emphasised that the failure to carry through their recommended measures (see Report *op. cit.*), would prompt such reconsideration.

The philosophical objection relates to the fact that direct regulation would not be aimed at investor protection (as investors are sufficiently wealthy or sophisticated to do their own due diligence), but on the mitigation of systemic risk. However, it could be argued that mitigation of systemic risk is also an increasingly valid regulatory aim. There were also practical objections, including how to avoid leakage through offshore centres. However, current efforts to improve and complete regulation in off-shore centres should help overcome those problems (see discussion of FSF Working Group Report on Offshore Centres). Other practical issues are more technical and more valid, including the need to adapt capital adequacy and large exposure rules to the specific risk profile of HLIS. This should be done in ways that any regulatory capital requirement did not adversely affect the efficiency and liquidity of markets in which HLIs are significant participants. This seems particularly important in a context when several large hedge funds have been wound down, which may diminish some of the negative impacts they had in recent crises, but could according to some observers – deprive markets of contrarian actors, with some useful roles to play in stopping the deepening crises.

2.3 Removing regulatory distortions and dampening exuberance of bank lending

As regards bank lending, there has firstly been concern that the 1988 Basle capital accord contributed to the build up of short-term bank lending

and its reversal in East Asia and elsewhere, due to significantly lower capital adequacy requirements for short-term lending than for long-term lending. The new proposal published in June 1999 attempts to address this distortion by reducing somewhat (though perhaps not sufficiently) the differential between capital adequacy for short-term and other lending. However, the new Basle recommendations, though including many positive elements (see, for example, Caillous and Griffith-Jones, 1999), also have suggestions that were widely seen as problematic. These included increasing the role of rating agencies to determine country weightings for capital adequacy, which could aggravate the pro-cyclical nature of bank lending, thus encouraging larger surges and larger reversals, – clearly an undesirable outcome.

There is important evidence that rating agencies act in a volatile and, especially, pro cyclical fashion. If that were the case, the reliance on ratings in the new system would exacerbate boom-bust cycles and could undermine the stability of the financial system. Indeed, as pointed by various authors (see for example Turner 2000), rating agencies failed to downgrade the East Asian countries before the crisis but then worsened it because they brought down the ratings as the crisis unfolded. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) find that sovereign ratings lag rather than lead the market.

These problems should not, however, question the need for reforming the 1988 accord. The current system has fixed weightings which do not adjust with the cycle. In the event of a recession the increased amounts of bad loans (which are usually not fully covered by provisions) will impact upon the lending bank's capital and can lead to decreased lending if the bank is already facing a relatively low capital asset ratio, and – as is likely in a recession – the bank is unable to raise new capital. This reinforces banks' own unwillingness to lend in a downturn. Both elements lower bank lending, which – in aggregate – further deepen the recession, and make banks' financial situation even more fragile.

2.4 Counter-cyclical elements in regulation

The answer thus may lie in the implementation of an explicit counter-cyclical mechanism which would, in boom periods, and in contrast to ratings, dampen excess bank lending. Counter-cyclical elements can also be introduced in regulating other actors (see above, for mutual funds). On the contrary, in periods of slowdown and of scarcity of finance the new mechanism should not further accentuate the decline in lending as exemplified by the 1997-1998 Asian crisis but rather encourage it.

There would be two linked objectives for introducing elements of counter-cyclical regulation. One would be to help smooth capital flows and the other would be to smooth the domestic impact of volatile capital flows on the domestic financial system and therefore on the real economy. Introducing counter-cyclical elements into regulation would help build a link between the more micro-economic risks on which regulators have tended to focus till recently and the macro-economic risks which are becoming increasingly important, both nationally and internationally.² Counter-cyclical elements in regulation related to bank lending could be applied, either internationally, nationally or at both levels.

Several mechanisms could be used to introduce a counter-cyclical element into regulation of bank lending. One mechanism would be to get the required capital ratio higher in times of boom, and to allow banks to use the additional cushion provided by the higher capital ratio, so they could sustain lending in times of recession at a lower capital asset ratio (when increased bad loans are likely to be reducing their capital). Some practical difficulties may arise in implementing such a mechanism, of which the most serious one may be getting international agreement on a general formula for cyclically adjusted capital asset ratios.

A second mechanism for introducing counter-cyclical elements in bank lending regulation is for regulators to encourage that higher general provisions be made for possible loan losses (i.e. subtracted from equity ca bad times, without affecting reported capital. The way to ensure this would be to maintain higher general provisioning that applies to all loans. The main problem for this mechanism, according to Turner, *op. cit.*, may be that tax laws often limit the tax deductibility of precautionary provisioning; however, it is possible to change such tax laws, as indeed was done in the late eighties in the UK.

A third mechanism, relevant particularly for domestic bank lending, is for regulators to place caps on the value of assets (such as real estate or stocks and shares) to be acceptable as collateral, when the value of such assets has risen sharply in a boom and is at risk of declining sharply in a recession. Rules could be used such as averaging values for the last five years, or accepting only 50% of current prices in the peak period of a boom. The latter mechanism seems to have the least problems of implementation (indeed, reportedly it is already applied in some jurisdictions, e.g. Hong Kong).

A fourth possible counter-cyclical mechanism is that, as suggested by McKinnon and Pill, monetary authorities could monitor and try to limit or dis-

² I thank Andrew Crockett for his suggestive remarks on this point.

courage lending for property, construction and personal consumption, as these items tend to increase substantially – and often even be a major factor – in booms. A possible implementation problem would be that it may be difficult to verify final use of credit, and such measures could be partially evaded.

Furthermore, regulators should be flexible in the downturn, particularly to allow banks to easily use cushions (e.g. of capital or of provisioning) in times of recession; it may even be advisable, if a recession is very serious, to allow ratios to fall below normally required levels, (to help sustain lending), in the understanding that they will be rebuilt as soon as the economy starts recovering. A tension may arise here between the regulatory concerns about individual bank liquidity and solvency and the macro-economic externalities of their actions, particularly in recessions.

Specific issues seem to require further study. How best can the distinction between a temporary boom and a permanent increase in growth be made? After what period of 'boom', should regulatory changes be introduced? How large should such changes be? What are the best mechanisms through which counter-cyclical measures should be introduced (flexible capital adequacy ratios, higher provisioning against losses, more 'realistic' pricing of collateral)? Should such measures be introduced for both international and domestic lending, or preferably for one of them? This paper provides only initial thoughts on these important issues.

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KENNETH J. ARROW

Professor Griffith-Jones has given an erudite and careful presentation of the financial markets on which developing countries receive credits. She has especially emphasized the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its auxiliary agencies in this process. As she notes, these markets have been plagued by monetary and banking crises which have required rapid intervention that have frequently led to considerable drops in the real incomes of the borrowing countries.

Some developing countries have insulated themselves from world financial markets, by diverse channels. India and China have not had currency crises but have had strong controls on foreign exchange transactions. Chile has erected special barriers to short-term foreign borrowing, the kind thought to be most susceptible to quick changes of direction; though it has liberalized the economy and foreign trade, it has not had a currency crisis.

For the present discussion, I will not follow Professor Griffith-Jones into the institutional details of the monetary system of which the IMF is a basic part; they would not suit this audience and, to be frank, I am no expert in these matters and certainly defer to Professor Griffith-Jones's clearly superior knowledge. Instead, I will give the reactions of a general economist to the problem of liquidity crises for developing countries and to some aspects of professor Griffith-Jones's policy proposals.

Liquidity crises are akin to an economic problem historically more common in the United States than in Europe, bank runs. A bank borrows money from its depositors and lends to debtors, usually business in need of short-term credit. However, in principle, the depositors can retrieve their money or demand, while the banks' debtors have varying time periods to repay, measured in months or even years. If, for any reason, the depositors

believe that the bank may have difficulty repaying them, then each individual depositor will have an incentive to withdraw money before the bank fails. Since the bank has lent money, it certainly does not have enough on hand (in reserves) to repay all its depositors; hence it will fail when enough depositors withdraw their money. This means that it is in the interest of each depositor to withdraw money before the others do. It does not require any serious knowledge of game theory to understand that even a weak possibility of a bank failure believed by depositors will cause the bank to fail.

This possibility might arise even if in fact the bank's loans were all perfectly sound, provided a false rumor started. But obviously the run is even more probable if there is some hard evidence that some loans are likely to go bad. To get higher returns, banks do lend to firms where there is some risk of failure; indeed, it is socially desirable to encourage some risky investments. If overall economic conditions turn bad, depositors may have good reason to believe that many of the bank loans will not be repaid, and so start a bank run.

Government policies can be and has been directed towards meeting this problem. One is regulation, to require that banks maintain adequate reserves and to recognize loans that are unlikely to be repaid. In recent times, there have been attempts at more sophisticated rating of the risks of debt default, and the Basle accords, to which Professor Griffith-Jones referred, extend this risk-rating to an international level. Another policy is deposit insurance, by which depositors will be guaranteed the value of their deposits in event of bank failure, so that they will have no incentive to withdraw their money to protect themselves. Then many bank runs will be avoided altogether.

The drawback to insurance measures is that the banks will be able to take more risks in their loans without suffering the consequences of deposit withdrawals. There is a general principle that any form of insurance, desirable in itself, will lead to excessive risk-taking in one way or another; this principle is known in the insurance literature as *moral hazard*, and the term has entered into general economic analysis.

The lesson of this lengthy exposition is that the principle of the bank run is much the same as that of a run on a country's currency. There are many financial institutions and individual investors who lend to a developing country, say, Indonesia. A good portion of this lending is for fairly short periods. It is normally expected that when due, the notes are renewed, but this is at the option of the lender (who is here like a depositor). The obligation to repay is usually denominated in dollars. The country ordinarily tries

to keep its currency more or less fixed in dollars, so that its business will know what they must earn to repay. Suppose that the creditors know or even believe that there will be a fall in the currency (the rupiah, say). They fear that their Indonesian debtors may have some difficulty repaying. As the loans fall due, they insist on repayment in dollars. The demand for dollars by Indonesians leads to pressure on the exchange rate, and it starts falling. This leads to increased difficulty in repayment, more insistence by creditors on repayment, and so on in downward spiral. To stop the spiral, interest rates in Indonesia have to increase to make it more attractive to hold money there. But this increase has an adverse effect on business in Indonesia, leading to a fall in income produced there and frequently some unemployment (However, this fall is partly offset by the fact that Indonesian products are now cheaper in dollar terms, because of the fall in the foreign exchange rate, and therefore exports may be increased).

The equivalent of deposit insurance is the possibility of Indonesia's borrowing from the International Monetary Fund. However, the Fund, to insure the success of its rescue operation, insists on conditions which reduce the outflow of money, in particular, the higher interest rates and other measures which reduce the demand for imports. These measures will reduce income in the borrowing country. It is sometimes argued that they will therefore make foreign investment less profitable and therefore interfere with the necessary return of the country to a successful borrowing relation. As Professor Griffith-Jones points out, a number of economists, including Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist for the World Bank, and Jeffrey Sachs, of Harvard, objected to the Fund's restrictionist policies in the Asian crisis on those grounds.

I was sympathetic to the Stiglitz-Sachs position at the time, but the quite rapid recovery of the Asian nations since then has given me more respect for the so-called 'Washington consensus' position. In any case, the Fund in application took a much more moderate position than it had first announced.

There has developed a position that the Fund should be abolished completely. This position, curiously enough, is held both by those on the Right, who think that the developing countries should depend solely on private capital markets (e.g. Allen Meltzer or the former Secretary of State, George Shultz), and the protesters at Seattle and Prague, who hold that the Fund is an instrument by which advanced country capitalism controls the developing world. The logic of the Right is better; the protesters do not seem to understand that abolishing the Fund leaves only

private sources of capitalism. I am glad to see that Professor Griffith-Jones does not accept this alternative.

Clearly, giving the IMF enough funds to take care of a liquidity crisis is one component of a sound policy for dealing with crises. The knowledge that this remedy exists, like deposit insurance, will prevent crises from occurring and end those that happen earlier. It is also clear that another component is greater knowledge, 'transparency', as the current popular expression has it. Seeing that the foreign exchange reserves of a country are declining will caution foreign investors to curb their investments and therefore mitigate the subsequent panic which leads to a currency crisis.

Professor Griffith-Jones's recommendations embody these components. I will not comment on her program in too much detail, in view of my own limited knowledge of the field, but I will make some remarks. I must emphasize one of her remarks, 'it is important that low-income countries, donors, and international organizations collaborate to help attract more significant private flows to them'. A reaction against currency crises cannot take the form of cutting off foreign investment, a key to economic development, especially for smaller and therefore more open economies.

I certainly agree that regulation in some form is essential to regularize foreign capital movements and to prevent them from being a source of instability. That is accepted as true for domestic capital markets, and it is equally true for foreign markets. Of course, international regulation differs in one very important way from domestic regulation; there is no sovereign entity. Hence, the regulations have to be developed by negotiation, with all the problems of differential power that Professor Griffith-Jones calls attention to.

I am not sure I understand all the proposals made. The author wants to impose restrictions on lenders as well as borrowers, in particular, on institutional investors like mutual funds. Restrictions on banks have usually arisen to protect their customers, not their lenders. Since mutual funds have no fixed obligations, they do not need reserve requirements for the same purpose. The author seems to think that such requirements will protect the borrowers; but I am afraid I do not see why they will. In any case, a very large portion of the lending has been by individual investors, including to a very considerable extent nationals of the borrowing country. They buy dollars and then lend them to other business in their own country; they are among the first to take their money out of the country. Indeed, as Professor Griffith-Jones points out with regard to highly leveraged institutions (so-called hedge funds), institutional

investors may well have longer horizons and therefore hold fast in a panic, because they can anticipate a recovery.

The market itself has generated one informational device, credit rating by private agencies. The author suggests, evidently with good evidence, that the credit ratings rarely anticipate a downturn but instead follow it, adding to the problem. But this observation raises questions about a proposal for contra-cyclical regulation; is it all likely that the regulators will be any better at the needed forecasting than the private rating agencies? A general provision for higher allowances for possible losses, as she suggests, would be a sound idea.

These questions are part of a more general and well-known policy problem: how much discretion should a regulatory authority have? The objection to discretion is that the authority is very apt to be wrong and therefore exacerbate the problem rather than reduce it.

Finally, I observe the proposal of international governance, that the borrowing countries have more role in setting regulations. To be blunt about it, the question is one of governance, as Dr. Braga de Macedo has brought to our attention in another session of this meeting. The principle that the rules of the international capital markets be set by all participants is one that is hard to resist, and I for one find it very attractive. The question I must leave is the degree to which the national governments of many of the developing countries, particularly those most in need, represent the interests of their peoples.

WAYS TO IMPROVE THE FUNCTIONING OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

HANS TIETMEYER

1. For their economic progress, developing countries are particularly dependent on regular inflows of capital. Since official assistance (whether bilateral or multilateral) is always available only on a strictly limited scale, developing countries depend primarily on inflows of private funds. This is why it is of crucial importance to them that:

- international financial markets function properly and lastingly, and
- individual countries have proper and lasting access to such markets.

2. Professor Griffith-Jones' paper mentions the headway made in the past few years in the area of international financial reform. Quite rightly, she highlights the following points:

- the further development and restructuring of some activities of the IMF and World Bank,
- the establishment of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in Basle,
- the supplementing of the ongoing cooperation between the G-10 countries by the new G-20 grouping, and
- the intermediate evolution of many codes and standards for the financial markets and for the supervision of financial systems.

Unlike Professor Griffith-Jones, however, I regard the new facility set up by the IMF -Contingency Credit Lines (CCL) - as not unproblematic. Any country seeking to avail itself of such a facility signals to the markets that it is susceptible to crises, and may well therefore do itself harm.

3. But I agree with the general statement that the reform measures taken to date do not suffice, and must be continued. That goes particularly for the implementation of greater transparency in the international financial markets, and for the further development of systems of supervision over financial institutions. It would also be highly desirable for

standstill and orderly workout procedures to be devised at an international level in the foreseeable future. In view of the substantial differences between the prevailing national legal systems and legal traditions, however, progress in the internationalisation of such legal regulation is likely to be very slow (if possible at all).

4. I have substantial reservations, though, about the proposal to enlarge IMF resources in cases of emergency by means of temporary and self-liquidating issues of SDRs. In the first place, if only because of the current practice of the IMF, I have my doubts as to whether it actually needs more resources for its role as a catalyst in overcoming crises. The danger of moral-hazard effects for borrowers and lenders alike would, if anything, increase if IMF loans were even larger. Secondly, in the event of a major crisis, the IMF can draw on the resources of the biggest central banks in the context of the enlarged General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), which act as a kind of reserve for crises. Any 'lender-of-last-resort' function of the IMF going beyond that is, I think, neither necessary nor appropriate. In the light of experience to date, it can hardly be asserted, incidentally, that there is any global shortage of liquidity.

5. By contrast, I regard the criticism of the asymmetry of the present reforms, as mentioned in the paper, as being partly warranted. That applies, for instance, to official membership of the FSF, which (contrary to my original idea) was initially confined to G-7 countries, mainly on grounds of efficiency, in response to US pressure. In the meantime, however, FSF composition has been changed, at least in part, by the inclusion of some emerging economies. Moreover, there are nowadays a number of informal participations, by individual experts in working parties, – a form of participation which, anyhow, is more important for the work of the FSF than official membership.

6. The third asymmetry mentioned in the paper, according to which too, little account is taken in the IMF reforms to date, and in the work of the FSF, of the low-income countries, to the detriment of the middle-income countries, is in my view right and wrong at the same time. What is right is unquestionably the fact that the IMF and the FSF must concern themselves, in the light of their mandates, primarily with the middle-income countries and the emerging economies. Support of the low-income countries is, first and foremost, a task for the World Bank (as a development institution) and the regional development banks. This division of responsibilities is a consequence of their differing mandates, and it should not be blurred any further.

7. As the paper rightly says, all future efforts should focus above all on improvements in the information on the functioning of the markets and on statistical data. To that end, both sides (both the developing countries as borrowers and the private financial institutions as lenders) must contribute by supplying up-to-date figures and by actually using them for market assessments. Thanks especially to the activities of the BIS in Basle, the FSF and the Institute for International Finance, considerable progress has meanwhile been made on the lender side. Not only are all loans by the major financial institutions classified by country and by maturity and published promptly; nowadays, there are also regular exploratory talks between many borrower countries and private financial institutions. After all, it is vital that the developing countries, too, recognise in their own interests the growing importance of unambiguous and up-to-date information. Enhancement of the flow of information, and its exploitation, must be a two-way road.

Furthermore, the actual application of the standards and codes meanwhile devised for the supervision of national financial systems is an issue of major significance. Although the number of such standards and codes has currently risen to over 60, the FSF has singled out only twelve of them as being essential to the functionality of financial systems and markets. In my view, it cannot be said, on closer inspection, that there is any asymmetry in those standards and codes to the detriment of developing countries.

8. The chapter 'Improved international financial regulation' contains many detailed proposals, which, however, are designated only as 'initial thoughts' in the final sentence. Quite apart from the fact that, in matters of detail, these proposals raise quite a number of unresolved questions, and that their political prospects of realisation must be rated very low, a question of principle is presented here which the paper answers, in my view, one-sidedly, without addressing details. This is the diagnostic question as to whether the crises in the past were caused primarily by imperfections in the financial markets themselves or predominantly by mistakes in the policies pursued by the countries affected. The paper apparently concludes that the main cause of crises is the failure of the international markets, and less the failure of the national policies of the countries concerned.

In the light of my own practical experience, I am able to agree with such a verdict to only a very limited extent. In my estimation, the causes of crises have almost always been problematic policy decisions by the countries concerned, sometimes actually fostered by problematic policy recommendations by the IMF or by other countries.

Alongside domestic structural and macroeconomic unwelcome developments in the policies of the countries affected, most of the crises of recent decades have also owed something to the overly rapid decontrol of capital movements and/or unrealistic exchange-rate ties. Although these policy errors have mostly yielded short-term benefits in terms of capital inflows and the relevant conditions, in the medium and longer term they have often given rise to serious economic disequilibria and distortions in financial flows, which have engendered extreme turnarounds if market expectations have changed.

Happily, at least a number of countries have meanwhile learned from such mistakes, and modified their policies. The IMF, too, has largely adjusted its recommendations accordingly. Nowadays, it attaches greater importance to correct sequencing in the decontrol of capital movements, and, in the normal case, it advocates greater exchange-rate flexibility than it used to.

10. Generally speaking, the objective of preserving the lasting functionality of the markets should form the focus of all efforts to further develop the global financial system. Judging by past experience, markets are more easily able than political institutions to fruitfully reconcile the divergent interests of borrowers and lenders.

Given the dominance of national interests and of thinking in terms of national prestige, international institutions can exercise an effective compensatory and regulatory function to only a limited degree, as the practical experience of most international organisations shows. 'Grand design' drafts of a new global financial architecture spark off countless controversial debates, on past experience; but such political discussions of principle not infrequently obstruct potential concrete progress. Economic practice shows that informal bodies, such as the FSF and the other talking shops (especially those under the wing of the BIS), are most likely to make actual progress possible.

SIXTH SESSION

Globalization and the Church's New Challenges

EUROPA UND DIE GLOBALISIERUNG – DER BEITRAG DER KIRCHE –

JOSEF HOMEYER

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE FRAGESTELLUNG: EUROPA INNERHALB EINER DIFFERENZIIERTEN GLOBALISIERUNG

Jede Gesellschaft ist Teil der Weltgesellschaft. Diese ernüchternd einfache Feststellung folgt heute indes nicht nur einer begrifflich universalistischen Deduktion wie zur Zeit der Aufklärung etwa. Sie ist heute vielmehr die Kurzformel der Erfahrung einer sich durch Technologien, Märkte, Finanzen und Kulturen immer mehr vernetzenden und wechselseitig interdependenten Welt der Globalisierung.

Dieser Prozeß ist irreversibel und fundamental. Wie auch immer eine Gesellschaft sich zu sich selbst verhält, worin sie ihre soziale und ökonomische Ordnung formiert, ihre Institutionen ausprägt, Wertmaßstäbe setzt und kulturelle Ressourcen tradiert – sie tut dies faktisch im Referenzrahmen der einen Welt. Dies ist am deutlichsten und sehr früh schon identifizierbar in der ökologischen Krise. Partikulares gesellschaftliches Handeln und Verstehen ist deshalb Teilhabe und Teilgabe an globalem Handeln und Verständigungen.

Die Form der Teilhabe und Teilgabe partikularer Gesellschaften an diesem Prozeß der Globalisierung ist indes höchst differenziert. Zwar sind unter der Bedingung der Globalität Bedrohungen wie Chancen, Solidaritäten wie Konflikte unteilbar, zwar gibt es, zumal unter den Herausforderungen ökonomischer und damit sozialsystemischer Konkurrenz, erhebliche Tendenzen der Homogenisierung gesellschaftlicher Strukturen weltweit, aber es gibt gleichzeitig innerhalb transnationaler, internationaler und globaler sozialer Räume ebenso einschneidende Differenzierungen der Ausgestaltung der Teilhabe und Teilgabe einzelner

Gesellschaften am Prozeß der Globalisierung. Gesellschaften und Lebenswelten rezipieren und interpretieren den Referenzrahmen Globalisierung kulturell höchst unterschiedlich. Ich lasse hier die Frage beiseite, ob dieser Prozeß der kulturellen Differenzierung innerhalb der Globalisierung auch von einer universalen Kultur der Anerkennung von Differenzen ethisch geprägt ist oder ob nicht vielmehr diese Anerkennung des Anderen durch wirtschaftliche Hegemonie unterspült ist. Vielmehr möchte ich hier zunächst die leitende Fragestellung meines Beitrags formulieren. Sie lautet: *Gibt es eine spezifisch europäische Rezeption und Mitgestaltung der Globalisierung, und wie läßt sich eine europäische Identität als Projekt des politisch-gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Handelns im globalen Referenzrahmen fassen?*

Die Frage möchte ich in folgenden Schritten beantworten. Es sollen zunächst die Implikationen der Gestaltwerdung Europas hinsichtlich eines positiven Zusammenhangs von europäischer Entwicklung und Globalisierung so wie hinsichtlich der hierfür grundlegenden Transformation der Nationalstaatsstruktur erläutert werden (I); sodann soll die Gestaltwerdung Europas als Ost-West-Projekt dargestellt werden (II), indem 1. die politische Identität der EU erhellt wird, die dann im Blick auf ihre sogenannte "Osterweiterung" als chancenreich unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung ausgewiesen wird (II. 2). In einem weiteren Schritt (III) sollen der Beitrag der Kirchen zu dieser Gestaltwerdung Europas und damit die Leitlinien der Bemühungen der ComECE umrissen werden. Schließlich möchte ich zusammenfassend die spezifische Rezeption der Globalisierung durch Europa von seiner Gestaltwerdung her zu beantworten suchen (IV).

I. IMPLIKATIONEN UND DIMENSIONEN DER FRAGE NACH DER EUROPÄISCHEN MITGESTALTUNG DER GLOBALISIERUNG

Diese Fragestellung enthält eine Reihe von Implikationen, Dimensionen und Perspektiven, die benannt werden müssen:

(1) Es wird impliziert, daß es einen produktiven Zusammenhang der Gestaltwerdung Europas und der ökonomischen, sozialen, politischen und kulturellen Prozesse der Globalisierung gibt. Dies wiederum setzt voraus, daß die vielschichtigen Prozesse der Globalisierung keineswegs notwendig die gleichsam posthistorische Auflösung eines Projektes "Europa" bedeuten. Vielmehr ist der europäische Integrationsprozeß die ökonomische *und* kulturelle Antwort auf den Prozeß der Globalisierung.

(2) Wesentliches politisches, aber auch soziales Merkmal dieser Transformation – das ist die zweite Implikation – ist die global-ökonomisch erzwungene und, wie ich meine, historisch plausible Weiterentwicklung eines dominant nationalstaatlich formierten Europa. Das bisherige Prinzip nationalstaatlicher ökonomischer, sozialer und kultureller Struktur – und Identitätsbildung wird u.a. auch durch einen von der Globalisierung induzierten Regionalismus ergänzt, der natürlich die Gestalt des Nationalstaats verändert und depotenziert. Der deutsche Soziologe Hermann *Schwengel* analysiert: *Der globale Regionalismus wird auf drei Niveaus verwirklicht, einem Mikroregionalismus der Städte und Orte, einem Mesoregionalismus der wirtschaftskulturellen und politisch-historischen Regionen und einem Makroregionalismus der Kontinente.*

Unter diesen beiden Implikationen, eines produktiven Zusammenhangs von Globalisierung und neuer Gestaltwerdung Europas (1) und einer damit einhergehenden Transformation von der nationalstaatlichen zur regionalen Struktur Europas (2), sind die Dimensionen der Frage nach den spezifisch europäischen Mitgestaltungen und Rezeptionen der Globalisierung bzw. einer europäischen Identitätsbildung zu benennen. Diese Dimensionen haben sowohl vom Prozeß zunehmender globaler Vernetzungen und Interdependenzen her wie auch vom Anspruch einer Gestaltwerdung Europas ökonomische, politische, soziale und kulturelle Aspekte. Und in diesen Dimensionen müssen jeweils Vereinheitlichungen und Differenzierungen, Chancen und Gefahren, Maßstäbe und Möglichkeiten gesehen werden. Dies ist dann klar, wenn man nicht von vornherein mit ökonomistisch verengtem Blick an den Gestaltwandel herangeht und sich so dann auch der eigentlichen Möglichkeit der Mitgestaltung begibt.

Ich möchte diese verschiedenen und zusammenhängenden Dimensionen aber an einer für Europa fundamentalen Frage exemplifizieren, um darin auch gleichzeitig die Ambivalenzen zu verdeutlichen. Natürlich klingt es relativ einfach zu sagen, daß der Nationalstaat bisheriger Art in Europa unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung ein Anachronismus ist. So wie der Nationalstaat unter den Bedingungen der politisch-militärischen Bipolarität immer mehr seine äußere Souveränität abgetreten hat, also seine Kompetenz zu einer eigenen Außen – oder Verteidigungspolitik, so büßt er, unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung extrem beschleunigt, seine innere Souveränität ein, also seine Kompetenz der Rechts, Finanz, Sicherheits – oder Sozialpolitik. Um wenigstens ein Beispiel, das für alle diese Bereiche äußerst folgenreich ist, anzuführen: Im Zuge der Verdichtung der internationalen Finanzströme hat sich das Verhältnis von Bruttoinlandsprodukt und

grenzüberschreitendem Handel mit Anleihen und Aktien dramatisch verschoben. Nach Angaben der Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich sprang diese Relation zwischen 1975 und 1993 in der Bundesrepublik von 5% auf 170%. Der Kapitalfluß durch Anlage übersteigt also mittlerweile um ein Mehrfaches das Bruttosozialprodukt. Die Fähigkeit von Kapitalanlegern, grenzüberschreitend Geld anzulegen, schränkt die nationalstaatlich-politischen Handlungsmöglichkeiten im internationalen Wettbewerb um Kapital bis in die sozialpolitischen Gestaltungsspielräume (Lohnnebenkosten, Flexibilisierungen) immer mehr ein. Die politische Krise der Nationalstaaten in Europa stellt uns damit vor Probleme in der Gestaltwerdung Europas, für die uns derzeit Institutionen und Instrumente nicht oder nicht ausreichend gegeben sind. Die Defizite und Herausforderungen betreffen die rechtlich-institutionelle Durchsetzung eines Ausgleichs von Marktfähigkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit (Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit), sie betreffen die institutionelle Gewährleistung demokratischer Partizipation (gewaltenteilige Repräsentanz), sie betreffen die Fähigkeit gesellschaftlicher Integration und die Angebote kultureller Identifikation und sie betreffen schließlich und drängend die Kompetenz zur ethischen Steuerung der technologisch-wissenschaftlichen Revolution (z.B. im Genomprojekt). Kurz: Die gegenwärtige Gestaltwerdung Europas in allen seinen Dimensionen bedeutet, das positive *republikanische* Erbe des Nationalstaats unter veränderten, nämlich globalen Bedingungen und als Kontinentalregion fortzuführen. Die Plausibilität nationalstaatlicher Strukturen ist gegenwärtig wohl deshalb noch so hoch, weil die Bürger, zumal die nationalen Eliten, die regionale Alternative als normatives Niemandsland fürchten.

II. DIE GESTALTWERDUNG EUROPAS IM PROZESS DER GLOBALISIERUNG ALS OST-WEST-PROJEKT

Das Projekt einer spezifisch europäischen Rezeption und Mitgestaltung der Globalisierung steht in der ökonomisch-sozialen und politisch-kulturellen Perspektive europäischer Identitätsbildung.

Für diesen Prozeß der Europäisierung Europas sind nach meiner Auffassung folgende Faktoren unhintergebar: (1) Die Auseinandersetzung mit globalen, teilweise auch hegemonialen ökonomischen und technologischen Rationalitäten des Marktes; (2) damit zusammenhängend die Bewahrung, also auch Erneuerung eines spezifisch europäischen (demokratischen) Ordnungsmodells der Marktwirtschaft, bekannt als *Rheinischer*

Kapitalismus oder *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*; (3) die beschleunigte Modernisierung aller europäischen Gesellschaften; (4) in diesem Prozeß der Modernisierung die produktiv-kritische Aufnahme geschichtlicher, ethischer, religiöser, philosophischer, ästhetischer Traditionen in Europa, also die Ausprägung eines gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts durch kommunikatives Gedächtnis; (5) eine diese Faktoren noch einmal einschließende, gleichsam querverlaufende Dichotomie von West- und Osteuropa.

Diesen Faktoren könnten gewiß noch weitere aus der globalen Diskussion um Globalisierung und der europäischen Verständigung, wie etwa die Frage der Amerikanisierung lokaler und regionaler Kulturen, hinzugefügt werden. Auch müßten an einzelnen Faktoren vertiefte Erörterungen ansetzen: So wäre im Zusammenhang der *Sozialen Marktwirtschaft* (2) der Umbau von einer Arbeitsgesellschaft zu einer Vermögens- und Wissensgesellschaft unter dem Kriterium der Beteiligungsgerechtigkeit zu analysieren. Es wäre im Zusammenhang der Rezeption europäischer Traditionen (4) das Profil von Bildung und Bildungsgesellschaften einschließlich der Herausforderungen kulturellen Austausches zu diskutieren. Oder es wäre im Blick auf gesellschaftliche Modernisierung (3) das Problem der Universalisierbarkeit westlicher Werte zu erörtern. – Dies alles ist in diesem Rahmen nicht abzuarbeiten, sondern kann im Folgenden nur *en passant* in Auswahl und hinweisend aufgenommen werden. Ich möchte die Frage der Gestaltwerdung Europas im gegenwärtigen Globalisierungsprozeß unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Ost-West Dichotomie in den Blick nehmen und damit einschlußweise auch Perspektiven der Arbeit der ComECE in Brüssel nachzeichnen.

Dies soll in zwei Schritten geschehen: In der Analyse der Herausforderung einer Identität der *Europäischen Union (EU)* (1) und in einer Erörterung der Herausforderung einer Erweiterung dieser Union (2).

1. Zur Identität der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EU)

1946 hielt der Kriegspremier *Winston Churchill* in Zürich ein bewegendes Plädoyer für Europa. In ihm forderte er eine *Neuschöpfung der europäischen Völkerfamilie* und eine Art *Vereinigte Staaten von Europa*. Dieses Plädoyer war hauptsächlich von zwei Interessen geleitet: dem Aufbau einer europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur und der Herstellung von Wohlstand. Diese Idee fand ihren institutionellen Ausdruck – über Zwischenschritte vertiefter Integration und Erweiterung (Großbritannien, Südeuropa, Skandinavien) – in der *Europäischen Gemeinschaft*. Zwar war unter dem

Vorzeichen der militärisch-politischen Konfrontation des Kalten Krieges nur eine *kleineuropäische* Institutionalisierung möglich, so daß der Frieden durch den Preis der Spaltung des Kontinents teuer erkaufte war und der Wohlstand sich nur als Club der Reichen organisiert hatte – aber dennoch sind die politischen und ökonomischen Leistungen dieser kleineuropäischen Union auch und gerade im weltweiten Maßstab überragend: Es wurde über Jahrzehnte stetig steigend und umfassend Wohlstand gesichert (Marktwirtschaft): Es wurden innerstaatlich und zwischenstaatlich sozialstaatliche Standards realisiert, die zu den höchsten der Welt zählen; diese die Prinzipien der Effizienz und der Gerechtigkeit (Verteilungs – und Beteiligungsgerechtigkeit) vermittelnde Architektur der *Sozialen Marktwirtschaft* ruht, und dies läßt sich aus den Konzeptionen ihrer Gründungsväter belegen, auf den Prinzipien der katholischen Soziallehre und evangelischen Sozialethik und der darin über Jahrhunderte in Europa tradierten christlichen Anschauung der Personalität und Sozialität des Menschen. Die marktwirtschaftliche Sozialstaatsarchitektur verknüpfte sich notwendig, eine weitere überragende Leistung der Union, mit der konsequenten Ausprägung und Sicherung von Rechtsstaat und Demokratie, hier also in Anknüpfung an einen weiteren großen europäischen Traditionsstrang, der Aufklärung und den auf sie gegründeten Schulen des Liberalismus des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts. Schließlich hat die Union, trotz aller Probleme der Bürokratisierung, die kulturelle Vielfalt in ihrem Territorium unangetastet gelassen, gesichert und den Austausch dieser Vielfalt gefördert. Sichtbar ist diese kulturelle Stärke beispielsweise an der höchst differenzierten Ausgestaltung des Staatskirchenrechts.

Diese Erfolgsgeschichte hatte und hat weitreichende Wirkungen in die Lebenswelt der Bürger. Die Standards der Gesundheitsversorgung, der Sicherung gegen die großen Risiken – Alter, Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit –, die Bildungsmöglichkeiten wie die Standards kultureller und politischer Partizipation überhaupt wurden außerordentlich nach oben getrieben. Angesichts dieser „lebensweltlichen“ Erfahrungen und ihrer fortschreitenden Kommunikation über die Grenzen der *EU* hinaus hatte übrigens der Staatssozialismus schon längst vor 1989 verloren. Er hatte nicht einfach wegen eines systemischen Modernitätsdefizits verloren, sondern weil er aus ideologischen Gründen, spezifisch europäische Traditionen (der christlichen Sozialethik, der Aufklärung) ablehnte.

Natürlich dürfen die Schattenseiten nicht verschwiegen werden: Die in der Ära Thatcher-Reagan begonnene Politik der Deregulierung stößt an die Grenze der Gefährdung des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts; die

Rechtsstaatlichkeit der Union wird durch Diskreditierung des Menschenrechts wie im Falle der Abtreibungsregelungen oder des Euthanasiegesetzes der Niederlande in Frage gestellt; die Modernisierungserfordernisse der Sicherung des Wohlstands führten zusehends zu einer, wie *Habermas* es nannte, *Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt* durch ökonomistische Zweckrationalität; die landwirtschaftliche Planwirtschaft der Union bis hin zur Subventionierung der Vernichtung von Lebensmitteln bleibt im Angesicht weltweiter Armut ein moralischer Skandal usw. Dies alles muß gesehen werden. Dennoch ist die gerade in fundamentalistisch orientierten christlichen oder islamischen Kreisen artikuliert Kritik einer "Dekadenz des Westens" dann unglaublich, wenn sie nicht auch die positiven lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen der Menschen berücksichtigt.

Ökonomisch und politisch ist die kleineuropäische Union zunächst eine Erfolgsgeschichte. Von daher möchte ich zusammenfassend drei Thesen zur Identität der Europäischen Union als Beitrag zur Gestaltwerdung Europas formulieren:

Die erste These lautet:

Die Identität der Europäischen Union ist eine ökonomisch-soziale, nämlich – in einer spezifischen Architektur der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft – durch Verknüpfung von Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit um des Wohlstands für alle willen. Dieses identitätsstiftende Ordnungsmodell ist notwendig verknüpft mit der institutionellen Ausgestaltung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit.

Die zweite These lautet:

Die Identität der europäischen Union ist eine geschichtliche, nämlich der Verknüpfung christlicher (katholischer/protestantischer) und aufklärerischer Traditionen unter den Bedingungen der Moderne und also selbst noch unter dem Vorzeichen der Säkularisierung.

Die dritte These lautet:

Die Identität der Europäischen Union ist eine kulturelle in Bewahrung und Ausgestaltung der kulturellen Vielfalt der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Identität findet ihren besonderen institutionellen Ausdruck in den Mitwirkungsrechten aller Staaten, weitgehend unabhängig von ihrer Größe.

2. 1989 und die Folgen für die Gestaltwerdung Europas: "Osterweiterung"

Mit der Revolution von 1989 in Mittel – und Osteuropa und dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjethegemonie stellt sich die europäische Frage neu. Nach der Ost-West-Konfrontation gibt es für eine kleineuropäische

Union keine politische, geschichtliche oder moralische Plausibilität mehr. Damit ist Europa insgesamt aber vor erhebliche Herausforderungen seiner Gestaltwerdung gestellt, die ich an der Ambivalenz des Begriffs *Osterweiterung* erläutern möchte.

Übrigens sei daran erinnert, daß die Gründerväter der Europäischen Gemeinschaft sehr wohl von vornherein an das *ganze* Europa gedacht haben. *Robert Schuman* schrieb 1963: *Wir müssen das geeinte Europa nicht nur im Interesse der freien Völker errichten, sondern auch, um die Völker Osteuropas in diese Gemeinschaft aufnehmen zu können, wenn sie, von den Zwängen, unter denen sie leiden, befreit, um ihren Beitritt und unsere moralische Unterstützung nachsuchen werden. Wir schulden ihnen das Vorbild des einigen, brüderlichen Europa. Jeder Schritt, den wir auf diesem Wege zurücklegen, wird für sie eine neue Chance darstellen. Sie brauchen unsere Hilfe bei der ungeheuren Aufgabe der Umstellung, die sie zu bewerkstelligen haben. Unsere Pflicht ist es, bereit zu sein.*

Der Begriff Osterweiterung löst in den Ländern jenseits des ehemaligen Eisernen Vorhangs erhebliche Widerstände, Befürchtungen und Verärgerung aus. Dahinter steht nicht nur das historische Gedächtnis wiederholter Verwundungen seitens der westlichen Kirchen und die daraus gewachsene Phobie des Ostens gegenüber dem westlichen Europa. Dahinter steht auch die in langen Jahren der Sowjetdiktatur geschärfte Angst vor jeder Art von Hegemonie. Von der ökonomischen Hegemonie der EU, wie sie im kolonialistisch assoziierten Begriff Osterweiterung insinuiert wird, befürchtet man kulturelle Überfremdung, die Auflösung sozialer Milieus und gesellschaftlicher Solidaritäten, die Erosion religiös-moralischer Verwurzelungen. Diese Gefahren, die sich allesamt in der Angst vor Enttraditionalisierung bündeln und nicht unbedingt aus modernitätskritischen, sondern aus vormodernen Gesellschaftsauffassungen speisen dürften, sind gewiß nicht zu unterschätzen. Aus meinen vielen Gesprächen in Osteuropa kann ich mich aber zumindest der Frage nicht ganz erwehren, daß dahinter nicht selten auch die Angst der Eliten, zumal aus den alten Apparaten, vor einer Ablösung durch neue technologisch-wissenschaftliche und ökonomische Eliten mit stärkeren kommunikativen und organisatorischen Fähigkeiten steht.

Schwerwiegender und weiterführend ist aber die Einsicht, daß der Begriff Osterweiterung trotz aller Einwände durchaus seine Berechtigung hat. Man kann die Folgen von 1989 nämlich nicht so lesen, daß man die Folgen von 1945 ganz aus dem Blick verliert; 1989 muß also nicht nur nach vorne, sondern auch nach hinten gelesen werden. Das bedeutet: Die

Osterweiterung zielt nicht einfach auf die Erweiterung eines territorialen, sondern eines historischen Raumes ab, nämlich der Überwindung der Folgeschäden des 2. Weltkriegs. In dieser Hinsicht geht es nicht einfach um Hegemonie, sondern um den Ausgleich historischen Unrechts.

Diese Reparatur wird nur zum geringsten Teil mit Transferleistungen alter entwicklungspolitischer Logik gelingen. Im wesentlichen wird es um den Aufbau der institutionellen, rechtlichen, ordnungspolitischen und vor allem bildungspolitischen Grundlagen eines Gesellschaftssystems gehen, in dem Wohlstand effizient und gerecht hergestellt werden kann. Die östlichen Länder Europas werden um eine Modernisierung ihrer Gesellschaften gar nicht herumkommen, wenn sie Wohlstand, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie wollen. Alle Länder Osteuropas werden sich der bekannten Modernisierungsmittel bedienen müssen: berufliche, geographische und soziale Mobilität, Differenzierung der Gesellschaft in ökonomische, politische, kulturelle und soziale Funktionssysteme, Steigerung der allgemeinen Partizipationsbereitschaft und – fähigkeit und Individualisierung des sozialen Zusammenhalts einschließlich der Austragung ihrer Konflikte. Auch die Kritik an dieser Modernisierung, etwa die kirchliche an dem damit unweigerlich gegebenen Säkularismus, ist ein Moment der Modernisierung selbst, und zwar eines emanzipatorischer Substanz. Ohne diese Modernisierungsleistungen werden weder der britische Telefonkonzern Vodafone in Litauen, noch der deutsche Elektronikriesen Siemens in Rumänien, noch der französische Pharmakonzern Rhone-Poulenc in Ungarn investieren, aber umgekehrt werden solche Investitionen erhebliche gesellschaftliche Modernisierungsschübe nach sich ziehen.

Wenn die Osterweiterungsdebatte im Kern die Modernisierungsfrage hat, dann kommen auch die ideologischen und faktischen Grenzen des Begriffs in den Blick. Unabhängig von hegemonialen Befürchtungen wird nämlich den Ländern Osteuropas eine „List der Vernunft“ zu Hilfe kommen: die Globalisierung. Ihre kommunikativen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Vernetzungen reichen längst bis in die Tiefe der Ukraine, so daß wir vor dem paradoxen Phänomen stehen: Je weiter wir nach Osteuropa kommen, je weiter wir uns damit auch zeitlich von einem EU-Beitritt entfernen, desto unbedeutender wird zwar der Modernisierungsdruck der EU, desto relativ bedeutender wird der Faktor Globalisierung. Soziologen sprechen von einer weltweiten *Aufwertung* der Peripherien zu Semiperipherien als Folge der Globalisierung. Wir sollten deshalb die Debatten des 19. Jahrhunderts nicht wiederholen. Es geht in der Frage der Osterweiterung bzw. des EU-Beitritts oder der Gestaltwerdung Europas insgesamt nicht

um weltanschauliche Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Ost und West, sondern es geht um grundlegende Optionen der Mitgestaltung der Globalisierung. Es gibt gute Gründe, das Ordnungsmodell der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft aus den Wurzeln europäischer Traditionen heraus für stark genug zu halten für solche Mitgestaltung.

Folgen wir in der Gestaltwerdung Europas bei der sogenannten Osterweiterung den Prinzipien der EU, wie sie im Amsterdamer Vertrag festgelegt sind, also der menschenrechtlichen Grundlegung, der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, der marktwirtschaftlichen Effizienz, der sozialstaatlichen Gerechtigkeit, der subsidiären politischen Partizipation und dem Schutz der kulturellen Vielfalt, dann wird die Gestaltwerdung Europas kaum nur ökonomischen Rationalitäten folgen. Gerade in Bezug auf die Wahrung kultureller Vielfalt müßte nach dem Anspruch der EU dann statt von Osterweiterung von *Europäisierung der EU* gesprochen werden. Mit der Frage der Erweiterung ist natürlich unausweichlich die politische Herausforderung der Vertiefung der Gemeinschaft aufgegeben. Nicht zufällig stehen wir mit der Terminierung verschiedener Beitritte auch am Rand einer Verfassungsdebatte. Möglicherweise wird die Einberufung eines Verfassungskonvents schon auf dem Regierungsgipfel im Dezember beschlossen. Die Gestaltwerdung Europas mündet damit in einen europäischen Gesellschaftsvertrag

Zusammenfassung:

Die Europäische Gemeinschaft hat auf der Grundlage unterschiedlicher Traditionen eine politisch-ökonomische Ordnung mit normativem Gehalt, wie die Sanktionsdrohung des Artikel 13 des Amsterdamer Vertrags gegen Staaten, die Menschenrechte verletzen, zeigt, geschaffen. Diese Vergemeinschaftung hatte und hat positive Wirkungen auf die Lebensbedingungen der Menschen ihres Kompetenzbereichs; dazu gehören: Wohlstand, politische Partizipation und kultureller Schutz auf verschiedenen Ebenen. Dieser Prozeß wird in einer weitergehenden überstaatlichen und unterstaatlichen, also regionalisierenden Institutionalisierung fortgesetzt und vertieft werden, ohne daß damit notwendig die Auflösung nationaler Identitätsbildung gegeben sein müßte. In diesem Sinne ist die EU das institutionelle Ferment einer Gestaltwerdung Europas zur Mitgestaltung der Globalisierung. Der notwendigen Institutionalisierung geht aber eine Vergewisserung der kulturellen Grundlegung in einem Gesellschaftsvertrag voraus, sofern man sich nicht mit einer segmentären Institutionalisierung nach ökonomischen Kriterien begnügen will. Dieser kulturelle Prozeß der Vergemeinschaftung bedeutet auch und ineins die

Europäisierung der EU wie die Modernisierung osteuropäischer Gesellschaften.

III. DER BEITRAG DER KIRCHE ZUR KULTURELLEN GRUNDLEGUNG DER REZEPTION UND MITGESTALTUNG DER GLOBALISIERUNG IN EUROPA

Hier, an der Frage der Vergewisserung der kulturellen Grundlagen Europas, möchte ich nun den Beitrag der Kirchen in diesem Prozeß markieren. Was muß in der Grundlegung des kulturellen Selbstverständnisses Europas aus Sicht der Kirchen bedacht werden? Ich formuliere in einigen Kernaussagen, die ich jeweils begründe.

1. *Ein Selbstverständnis Europas muß die Frage beantworten: Wer ist der Mensch?*

Die Antwort ist deshalb heute so drängend, weil die Gefährdungen der Integrität menschlichen Lebens bedrohlich wachsen. Das löst Ängste aus, die keineswegs private sind, sondern gesellschaftliche Zusammenhalte gefährden. Die Kirchen werden diese Ängste nicht besänftigen, sondern die anstehenden Debatten entschieden fördern. Diese Debatten beziehen sich auf den Schutz ungeborenen Lebens, auf die Frage nach der Euthanasie, auf die Gefahren der Biotechnologie, auf die technische Zersetzung von Freiheitsräumen insgesamt. Wir erinnern in diesem Zusammenhang an die christlich-europäische Tradition der Rede von der Würde des Menschen im Angesicht Gottes. Dieses Konzept der Personwürde ist auch heute für das geistige Selbstverständnis Europas unaufgebbar. Wird sie aufgegeben, ist das Projekt Europa gesellschaftlich insofern fundamental in Frage gestellt, als der Schutz der Personwürde sich zu bewähren hat an den Schwächsten, also den Ungeborenen, den Alten, den Kranken. Dort wo dieser Schutz in Frage gestellt wird, ist gesellschaftliche Solidarität bodenlos geworden, sie wird zum instrumentellen und partikularen Zweckbündnis der Starken gegen die Schwachen.

Auf diese alle christlichen Kirchen verbindende Insistenz auf die Personwürde des Menschen als Kern des europäischen Selbstverständnisses habe ich vor einigen Jahren in einem Vortrag vor der *Belgrader Akademie der Wissenschaften* hingewiesen. Dabei hätten wir, so sagte ich damals, von der Orthodoxie die theologal-doxologische Mystik dieses Einsatzes für die Personwürde neu zu lernen, wenn er überlebensfähig sein will. Umgekehrt

hätten die östlichen Kirchen deutlicher an die westlichen Traditionen der sozialetischen Bewährung unseres Glaubens anzuknüpfen. Wir sollten hier, so meine ich, vor allen theologischen Fragen, ein orthopraktisches, diakonisches Bündnis zwischen Ost - und Westkirchen schließen: Es kommt nicht so sehr darauf an, ob wir für oder gegen die Moderne sind — es kommt darauf an, daß wir gemeinsam an der Seite der Modernitätsverlierer stehen.

2. Das Selbstverständnis Europas muß die Frage beantworten: Welches Konzept von Freiheit trägt uns?

Das christliche Konzept menschlicher Freiheit ist sowohl subjekt - und gemeinschaftsbezogen. Menschliche Freiheit ist unaufgebbar individuelle Freiheit und soziale Gebundenheit. In dieser Hinsicht gibt es, bei unterschiedlichen Akzentsetzungen dieser Pole, eine völlig ungebrochene europäische Tradition christlicher Theologie gegenüber aufgeklärter und moderner Philosophie. Der Dissens betrifft die Konstitutionsbedingungen der Freiheit als theonomer oder autonomer, und damit die Frage nach den normativen Verbindlichkeiten freiheitlicher Bindungen, bzw. nach motivationalen Ressourcen für diese Verbindlichkeit. Diese ungebrochene Tradition muß heute von Kirchen neu erinnert werden. Denn es gibt in Europa derzeit eine unhaltbare Überakzentuierung individueller Freiheitsrechte. Das hat historische Gründe: Einmal hat kein Kontinent so unter kollektivistischen Ideologien gelitten wie der europäische. Es handelt sich also um eine Gegenbewegung; zum anderen gibt es aus den Erfahrungen der konfessionellen Gegensätze in Europa eine tiefsitzende Furcht vor kollektiven Machtansprüchen im Raum öffentlicher Freiheit. Individualfreiheiten wehren also immer Kollektivfreiheiten und aus ihnen gefolgerte Ansprüche ab. Und schließlich zeigt die Überbetonung individueller Freiheiten auch eine politische Schwäche an: Pluralistische Gesellschaften erweisen sich immer weniger als steuerbar und konsensfähig, daß immer wieder nur der Rekurs auf individuelle Selbstbestimmungsrechte als Minimalkonsens durchsetzbar ist.

Blickt man auf den Entwurf zur Grundrechts-Charta der EU, so ist auch hier nur von individueller Religionsfreiheit die Rede. Der Schutz der Vergemeinschaftung der Religion als Grundrecht fällt aus. Damit aber begibt sich Europa einer zentralen Ressource für gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt überhaupt und zwingt zu dem Schluß, daß wir dringend

einer Debatte über kommunale Bindungen der Freiheit zur Erneuerung des geistigen Selbstverständnisses Europas bedürfen.

3. Ein Selbstverständnis Europas muß die Frage beantworten: Wie beerben wir unsere Geschichte?

Diese Frage ist einer Religion, der Erinnerung konstitutiv ist, nämlich Erinnerung ans Kreuz, für die Ausprägung europäischer Identität immer wesentlich gewesen. Genau dieser christliche Grundzug wurde auch zu einem Grundzug Europas. Der Kontinent war in seinen besten geschichtlichen Phasen fähig, zu beerben, und fähig zur Erinnerung. In seinen unglücklichsten Phasen hat Europa seine Erinnerung aufgegeben und ist in nationalistische oder völkische Mythen geflüchtet. Nichts hat die Identität Europas so gefährdet, wie die Zerstörung seiner geschichtlichen Erinnerung. Es ist unserem Selbstverständnis nicht beliebig, ob wir uns an die Definition der Würde des Menschen auf dem IV. Laterankonzil (1215), einer Sternstunde des europäischen Geistes, erinnern. Es ist unserem Selbstverständnis nicht beliebig, ob wir die Schreie der Ermordeten und Deportierten vergessen oder nicht. Denn für Europa, wie für die Kirchen, gilt: Wir haben nicht nur eine Geschichte, wir sind Geschichte in identitätsbildender Konstitution.

Diese konstitutive Geschichtlichkeit hat heute zwei politische Herausforderungen zu bewältigen: Einmal müssen Konzepte entwickelt werden, die diese Geschichte in Geschichten anschaulich machen, also die Bewahrung europäischer Vielfalt im kommunikativen Gedächtnis der Völker. Zum anderen muß anschaulich werden, wie wir geschichtliche Trennungen überwinden. Hier geht es vor allem um die Trennung zwischen Byzanz und Rom im Jahre 1054. Die Fähigkeit, zu beerben, hat in der Fähigkeit der Aussöhnung ihren Maßstab. Die Kirche wird diese Aussöhnung anstiften, indem sie die Perspektive der Opfer einnimmt und einbringt, Geschichte also vom Kreuz her liest. Das betrifft auch eine der brennendsten Fragen der nächsten Generationen: Europa, wie hältst du es mit dem Islam?

Ein Strang europäischer Geschichtlichkeit verdient hier besondere Beachtung: die spezifisch europäische Vernunftkonzeption. Sie verdient besondere Beachtung aufgrund ihrer theoretischen Dynamik, also in den Wissenschaften, ihrer praktischen, also etwa in den Verfassungsentwürfen und Gerechtigkeitskonzepten, ihrer ästhetischen Dynamik, also in den Kunstwerken, die heute zu recht als Weltkulturerbe bezeichnet werden und

doch unverwechselbar zu Europa gehören. Diese Vernunfttradition gründet in einer Zentralformel europäischen Selbstverständnisses, nämlich Anselms "fides quaerens intellectum". Sie wurde von Thomas von Aquin zu systematischer Reife entfaltet und enthält eine doppelte Stoßrichtung, eine ideologiekritische und eine historische. Ideologiekritisch: Sie wehrt die Gefahr des Fundamentalismus ab, indem sie den Glauben zwingt, sich argumentativ zu verantworten. Umgekehrt: Indem sie den Absolutheitsanspruch wissenschaftlicher Rationalität abwehrt und ihn je neu überbietet. Die historische Stoßrichtung: Sie setzte eigentlich die Tradition der Aufklärung in die Lage, die Brücken zu den christlichen Wurzeln nicht abubrechen, denken wir an Rousseaus schöpfungstheologisch inspirierten Gesellschaftsentwurf, denken wir an die Ideenlehre in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, denken wir schließlich an die naturrechtlichen Kerne aller modernen Verfassungen. Und nochmals umgekehrt: Die Anselmische Formel befähigte unsere Kirche im II. Vatikanischen Konzil, Anschluß an die Tradition der Aufklärung zu finden. Diese Formel bleibt für die Kirchen in Bezug auf ein geistiges Selbstverständnis Europas grundlegend und ebenso virulent, weil sie gegenwärtig von zwei Seiten gefährdet wird: Einmal von einer postmodernen, selbstgenügsamen Religiosität in beliebiger Beschwichtigungstranszendenz, zum anderen durch eine technische Revolution, deren Folgen immer weniger kontrollierbar sind. Gerade weil die Kirche auf dieser Tradition eines vernunftbezogenen Glaubens, wie einer transzendenzbezogenen Vernunft insistiert, darf sie als Hüterin europäischer Identität in Anspruch genommen werden. Das bedeutet auch die Wahrung des universalistischen Erbes dieser Vernunfttradition, die ihrerseits in den universalistischen Gehalten des christlichen Glaubens wurzelt. Von ihm her ist Europas Verträglichkeit, Verantwortung und Fähigkeit zur Mitgestaltung der einen Welt zu begründen. Und schließlich in der geistesgeschichtlichen Kernfrage der Aussöhnung zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa: Ist die Aufklärung Erosion und Zerstörung des Glaubens, wie viele Orthodoxe argwöhnen, oder ist sie Ausdruck und Bündnispartner des Glaubens, wie wir sagen? Jedenfalls wird es in Europa letztlich keinen umfassenden Konsens geben, der diesen Konsens nicht theologisch verwurzeln kann als Aussöhnung zwischen den orthodoxen und westlichen Kirchen. Ohne Aussöhnung keine Einheit.

Wenn ich in diesen zentralen Punkten, der Humanität, der Freiheit, der Geschichtlichkeit Europas geistiges Selbstverständnis und den kirchlichen Beitrag dazu markiert habe, so werden manche gewiß theologische, näherhin ekklesiologische Begründungen vermißt haben. Ich hätte also doch

sehr ausführlich von der eucharistischen Ekklesiologie des Konzils sprechen müssen, von der typisch christlichen Verbindung von Mystik und Diakonie, wie sie sich im europäischen Typos der Heiligen personalisiert hat; ich hätte ausführlicher zu sprechen gehabt von den theologischen Differenzen und Brücken zwischen Orthodoxie und westlichem Christentum. Stattdessen habe ich mit den angeführten Thesen nur Essentials eines europäischen Selbstverständnisses und kirchliche Einsatzpunkte benannt.

Lassen Sie mich aber abschließend wenigstens diese Einsatzpunkte sozialetisch konkretisieren, wie ich es bei der II. Europäischen Bischofssynode vor zwei Jahren in Rom unter dem Leitbegriff der “politischen Diakonie für Europa” getan habe.

Hiermit beschreibe ich die Leitlinien der Bemühungen der ComECE sowohl in der kritischen Begleitung politischer Entscheidungsprozesse in Brüssel, wie in der Rückbindung der damit verbundenen Fragen an die Bischofskonferenzen der Mitgliedsländer, wie in der politischen, rechtlichen, sozialen und ökonomischen Orientierungsarbeit in unseren Akademien, Symposien oder auch Erklärungen zu fundamentalen Herausforderungen. Gerade in den internationalen Symposien ist uns, nebenbei gesagt, ein außerordentlich wirksames Instrument der politisch-orientierenden Mitgestaltung durch Vernetzung und Diskurs höchst heterogener Ansätze, Interessen und Institutionen — der Politik, der Ökonomie, der Sozialwissenschaften, der Brüsseler Institutionen, der Kirchen innerhalb der EU, der Kirchen und kulturellen Institutionen Osteuropas – zugewachsen. – Zu den Leitlinien:

– *Den Beistand der Kirche für demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Institutionen.* Wir können nur glaubwürdig für gerechte, also dem Evangelium gemäß soziale und kulturelle Teilhabe aller eintreten, wenn wir selber gegenüber nationalen und neuen supranationalen und regionalen politischen Strukturen gesprächsfähig sind. Damit müssen wir als Kirche auch jene unserer Strukturen reformieren, die uns bisher vorrangig im Gegenüber zu Politik und Gesellschaft getragen haben. Unsere Präsenz gegenüber neuen supranationalen Institutionen sollte ebenso entwickelt werden wie neue regionale Kooperationen, die die “Grenzen” nationaler Bischofskonferenzen überschreiten. Wollen wir warten, bis solche gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen längst abgeschlossen sind, um dann wieder zu reklamieren, eigentlich sei das alles christlichen Ursprungs und werde diesem aber weithin nicht gerecht?

– *Die Mitverantwortung der Kirche für eine effiziente und gerechte Wirtschaft,* die Menschen eine Chance auf Teilhabe und damit

Lebensperspektive gibt, und zwar in Mittel-Osteuropa wie im Westen. Dies betrifft vor allem die Teilhabechancen auf den Arbeitsmärkten und die intergenerative Gerechtigkeit, also im Blick auf die kommende Generation, deren Existenz durch überhöhte Staatsverschuldung gefährdet ist. Dieses Engagement zielt darauf ab, Markteffizienz und soziale Gerechtigkeit, Eigenverantwortung und Solidarität zu versöhnen, wie dies in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft entworfen wurde und heute neu zu komponieren ist. Dies setzt unsere Gesprächsfähigkeit mit den staatlichen, aber auch mit den wirtschaftlichen Akteuren voraus. Der Dialog mit den Gewerkschaften, mit den Unternehmern, mit den Arbeitnehmern in den neuen aufstrebenden Bereichen der Wirtschaft und mit dem Management muß intensiviert oder neu begonnen werden. Wie anders sollten wir den Schwächsten beistehen können, als auch durch solche Präsenz in Anwaltschaft und Einmischung?

- *Die Förderung von neuen Formen gemeinschaftlicher Netzwerke.* So sehr die Staaten in ihren sozialen Leistungen immer mehr überfordert werden, so sehr müssen neue Formen von Solidarität und Teilhabe vorangetrieben werden, in der vor allem jene Eigenverantwortung des Menschen gefördert wird, die vor jedem Kollektiv und vor jeder Sozialverwaltung zur Solidarität befähigt und ihre marxistische und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Aushöhlung überwindet. Seit Jahren werden diese Projekte unter dem Begriff "Zivilgesellschaft" zusammengefaßt. Viele Menschen trauen gerade den Kirchen wegen ihrer gottesverwurzelten moralischen Kompetenz hier entschiedene Anstöße zu. Sie erwarten dies aber auch von uns.

- *Den nachhaltigen Einsatz für europäische Einigung.* Dabei ist auch außerhalb der Kirchen, zumal nach der Katastrophe im ehemaligen Jugoslawien, deutlich geworden, daß es diese Einigung zuerst und zentral nur als Versöhnung geben kann. Die Offenheit der EU für alle Völker ist im Anspruch dieses Versöhnungswerks für die Kirchen keine Randfrage, sondern Maßstab der Glaubwürdigkeit europäischer Politik. Und die Aussöhnung mit der Orthodoxie gilt uns nicht nur als theologisch-spirituelle Herausforderung, sondern gilt uns als Herausforderung für die Authentizität der *einen* europäischen Geschichte. Darum sind wir gerufen, in unseren Ländern und zwischen ihnen in vielfältiger pastoraler und sozialetischer Kooperation, zwischen Gemeinden und Verbänden, in gemeinsamen Akademien, in der Förderung von Begabten, in der regionalen Vernetzung von caritativen Initiativen ein europäisches Versöhnungswerk zu formen, das seine Quelle hat im unverdienten Versöhnungshandeln Gottes, das wirksam werden will in der Versöhnung der Menschen und der Völker.

IV. SCHLUBBETRACHTUNG: DIE GESTALTWERDUNG EUROPAS ALS MITGESTALTUNG DER GLOBALISIERUNG

Die Ausgangsfrage meines Beitrags lautete: *Gibt es eine spezifisch europäische Rezeption und Mitgestaltung der Globalisierung, und wie läßt sich eine europäische Identität als Projekt des politisch-gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Handelns im globalen Referenzrahmen fassen?*

Ich möchte die Antwort, die gleichzeitig den Orientierungsrahmen der Arbeit der ComECE in Brüssel abstecken sollte, in Abgrenzung vom liberalistischen Modell der Globalisierung versuchen.

Die liberalistische Konzeption von Globalisierung bevorzugt drei Grundthesen:

- Die global wirksame Marktdynamik, die von multinationalen Unternehmen im Transfer von Geld, Gütern, Arbeit und Dienstleistungen wirksam organisiert wird, sorgt an sich schon für Wohlfahrt. Deshalb ist in der globalisierten Ökonomie wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Steuerung kontraproduktiv.

- Nationale Ökonomien müssen sich durch Liberalisierung, Deregulierung und Flexibilisierung anpassen.

- Wettbewerbsfähigkeit entsteht durch Stärkung der Marktkräfte.

Diese Sicht der Globalisierung hat zunächst einmal ihr kritisches historisches Recht, weil sie bestehende Macht- und Besitzverhältnisse aufbricht. Gerade im teilweise korporatistisch verhärteten Westeuropa sehen wir uns zusehends mit Problemen konfrontiert, daß Insider, im Kartell von Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbänden, sich gegen Outsider abschnitten: Arbeitsbesitzer gegen Arbeitslose. Hier müssen institutionelle Verkrustungen aufgebrochen werden. Zu Recht macht der Liberalismus auch Front gegen Protektionismus gegenüber Schwellenländern und der Dritten Welt. Zu Recht auch stellt er sich in die Perspektive der Effizienz als Grundlage jeglicher Verteilung nach den Kriterien der Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität.

Dieses umfassende Marktvertrauen unterschlägt aber, daß die Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien selbst Grundlage effizienter und effektiver Marktwirtschaft sind; das gilt zumindest für den Schutz des Eigentums wie für seine Sozialpflichtigkeit. Damit wird im Liberalismus die Notwendigkeit der sozialen und ökologischen Gestaltung von Märkten in Frage gestellt. *Zweitens* transportiert die liberalistische Globalisierungsvariante ein einseitig ökonomistisches und damit individualistisches Menschenbild und ist deshalb offensichtlich bereit, kulturelle Verluste und Entwurzelungen in Kauf zu nehmen. Sichtbar ist die individualistische kulturelle Entwurzelung an

der dramatischen demographischen Implosion in Europa. *Drittens* scheint mir damit eine Rückbindung an eine wesentliche Errungenschaft der Neuzeit und Moderne, die freilich christlich vorgeformt war, tendentiell aufgekündigt zu werden, nämlich der Zusammenhang von ökonomischer und politischer Partizipation, von Wohlstand und Demokratie.

Die spezifisch europäische Antwort unter den faktischen Bedingungen der Globalisierung lautet vielmehr aus kirchlicher Sicht:

Ökonomisch: Die marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzipien gewährleisten offensichtlich am ehesten den Wohlstand der Menschen. Diese sind aber zurückzubinden an die sozialen Prinzipien gerechter Verteilung und Teilhabe, der Solidarität mit den Schwachen, der Achtung der Personalität des Menschen und der Nachhaltigkeit. Dies ist das Modell der *Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*.

Politisch: Die demokratisch-rechtsstaatlich, menschenrechtlich grundlegete Teilhabe aller auf den verschiedenen subsidiär zu organisierenden institutionellen Ebenen. Dabei wird die regionale Präferenz der politischen Partizipation die nationalstaatliche Präferenz erheblich modifizieren und depotenzieren, ohne sie allerdings aufzulösen.

Kulturell: Die Erinnerung unserer kulturellen Herkunft in seiner historisch gewachsenen Vielgestaltigkeit, die christlichen und aufklärerischen Traditionen des Westens und Ostens, aber auch die unterschlagenen Traditionen des Islam in Europa und der vernichteten jüdischen Traditionen bestimmen die politische, ökonomische, soziale Gestaltwerdung Europas als spezifische Rezeption und Mitgestaltung der Globalisierung. Es ist dieser Herkunft trotz aller Katastrophen eine Kultur des Austausches und der Anerkennung des Anderen in der Vielfalt wesentlich gewesen. Gerade dieser kulturelle Kern der Anerkennung des Anderen ist in der nationalstaatlichen Epoche des Kontinents diskreditiert worden. Unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung könnte Europa wieder Anschluß an seine besseren Traditionen finden.

Mir scheint, daß die kulturellen Grundlagen der Gestaltwerdung Europas auf dem II. Vaticanum in seiner eucharistischen Ekklesiologie gleichsam in nuce vorgezeichnet wurden. Die in und aus Ortskirchen bestehende und verbundene Universalkirche könnte dieses theologische Modell auch als kulturelles Modell der ethischen Gestaltung der Globalisierung ausweisen. Dies wäre der eigentliche Gegenpol zum liberalistischen Konzept. In einer Bischofssynode über die Globalisierung, das ist mein dringender Wunsch, sollte so in eine weltweite Herausforderung eine Schneise der Inkulturation und Evangelisierung geschlagen werden. Der weltweite Einsatz des Papstes hat ja einer solchen Bischofssynode über Globalisierung längst den Weg gewiesen.

MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION

MARY ANN GLENDON

As its name signifies, the Catholic Church is no stranger to globalization. The Church's mission from the beginning has been to spread the Good News to every corner of the earth. In the course of pursuing that mission for 2000 years, she has time and again confronted challenges posed by transformations of culture as well as by cultural differences. The Church has always understood that great transformations – the fall of the Roman Empire, the Enlightenment, industrialization, democratization, globalization – are phases rather than culminations. (As Paul said to the Corinthians, 'The world as we know it is always passing away').

Unlike some other religions, however, Catholicism does not stand aloof from 'the world'. On the contrary, the Catholic social tradition is one in which the faithful are obliged to be active in working for justice, freedom, respect for the dignity of the person, the common good, and peace. Pope John Paul II emphasized that point in an important address to university professors and students, telling them: "The Christian cannot limit himself to analyzing historical processes as they happen, maintaining a passive attitude, as if they were beyond his capacity to intervene, as if we were led by blind and impersonal forces".¹

Those two propositions – the constancy of change and the obligation to be concerned with the world – bring us to the mission of this Academy and to the topic of this plenary meeting. For to be effective in the world, we must try to understand it. And to understand what is going forward in the world today, one must try to understand the phenomena collectively known as globalization.

¹ "Social Change Hinges on 'Small Daily Options'", ZENIT, April 9, 2001, No. 1040907.

Pope John Paul II has counseled and modeled a cautiously hopeful view of globalization. Provided that the principle of common humanity is recognized, he said in his *World Day of Peace Message* for the Year 2000, 'this recognition can give the world as it is today – marked by the process of globalization – a soul, a meaning and a direction. Globalization, for all its risks, also offers exceptional and promising opportunities, precisely with a view to enabling humanity to become a single family, built on the values of justice, equity and solidarity'.² Most of the papers presented to the Academy at this meeting have taken that same approach, exploring the perils and the promise of the economic aspects of globalization.

The Holy Father, however, has placed special emphasis on the cultural as well as the economic aspects of globalization. They are, of course, related. Many of the participants this week have expressed concern that economic globalization is increasing the gap between rich and poor nations and peoples, even as it makes them more interdependent. But what is the nature of that concern? It is not only that many members of the human family are suffering severe material deprivation. It is also that those on either side of the gap may come to regard those on the other side as *radically* 'other' – in other words, to reject their common humanity. While advancing economic freedom and individual liberty for many, economic globalization seems to bring new risks that human beings will be treated as instruments or objects.

In this new context, it seems fair to say that the Church has become the principal institutional advocate in the world of the need to re-unite the two halves of the divided soul of liberalism – its commitment to human liberty and its acknowledgment of a single human family for which all bear a common responsibility. In his speech to the U.N. on its fiftieth anniversary in 1995, for example, the Holy Father issued the following plea: 'Inspired by the example of all those who have taken the *risk of freedom*, can we not recommend ourselves also to taking the *risk of solidarity* – and thus the *risk of peace*?'³

It is important to note, however, that 'solidarity' in Catholic social thought diverges in important respects from similar-sounding secular ideas. The Church teaches solidarity, not as a set of policies or programs, but as a *virtue* which relates to the perfection of the individual,⁴ by inclin-

² *World Day of Peace Message, 2000*, Par. 5.

³ *Address to the United Nations*, October 5, 1995, Par. 15.

⁴ See Ernest Fortin, 'Church Activism in the 1980s,' in *Human Rights, Virtue, and the Common Good*, Vol. 3, 273-74.

ing us to overcome sources of division within ourselves (personal sin) and within society ('structural sins').⁵ The virtue of solidarity is inseparable from personal reform and requires constant practice.

For those of us who believe that the social teaching of the Catholic Church offers important ethical perspectives on economic globalization – and even the hope of helping to humanize and optimize the benefits of that process – the cultural effects of globalization are of great concern. Globalization seems to be spreading a thin transnational culture that is not only resistant to ethical perspectives, but inimical to respect for the dignity of all members of the human family. The values of productivity and efficiency, so prized by the market, are not so fine when they seep into the intermediate institutions of civil society or when they become normative in family relations. A transnational popular culture seems to foster an ethos charged with materialism, hedonism and hyper-individualism. The increased geographic mobility of our times has acted as an accelerant for the spread of these new values, by eroding the particular cultures where virtues and habits of solidarity are rooted. In his popular and largely affirmative book on globalization, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman has written that 'the more I observed the system of globalization at work, the more obvious it was that it had unleashed forest-crushing forces of development and Disney-round-the-clock homogenization which, if left unchecked, had the potential to destroy the environment and uproot cultures at a pace never before seen in human history'.⁶

Needless to say, the Catholic faithful are not exempt from these influences. All too many Catholics resist the teaching that living the whole Christian faith means living the preferential option for the poor. All too many others embrace a secular understanding of solidarity, which leads them to trivialize the problem of sin, to ignore the moral teachings that make a commitment to solidarity sustainable, and to look mainly to government bureaucracies for 'social justice'.

The effects of globalization upon culture thus pose a special challenge to a Church that seeks to spread Christianity through 'inculturation'. Globalization, coming in the wake of industrialization and urbanization, tends to accelerate the decline of the mediating structures of civil society (families, parishes, neighborhoods) where the virtues that might serve to humanize globalization are instilled, reinforced, and transmitted from one

⁵ *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, Pars. 37, 38.

⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Rev. ed., 2000), 23.

generation to the next. The culture-destroying aspects of these changes have alarmed even secular observers like Friedman who see them as undermining the benefits of globalization itself, especially in developing countries: 'You cannot build an emerging society... if you are simultaneously destroying the cultural foundations that cement your society and give it the self-confidence and cohesion to interact properly with the world... [W]ithout a sustainable culture there is no sustainable community and without a sustainable community there is no sustainable globalization'.⁷ While noting the problem, Friedman has absolutely nothing to say about how to counter those effects!

So how can the Church mediate her teachings, 'ever ancient and ever new' through the turbulence and fragmentation that characterize what theologian Frederick Lawrence calls 'the contemporary diaspora situation' of Christians in a secularized world?⁸ That is an enormous challenge both for the Holy See as an actor in international settings and for all Catholics. In both cases, there are two essentials: understanding the world and personal formation of the actors. And of the two, formation must have priority. As the Holy Father strikingly put it in his address to university professors and students: 'It is part of Christian realism to understand that great social changes are the result of small and courageous daily options. You often ask yourselves: When will our world be configured to the Gospel message? The answer is simple: When you, in the first place, act and think permanently like Christ, at least part of that world will be given to Him in you'. Regarding globalization, and perhaps thinking of our Academy's work, he went on to say that 'to promote a global culture of those moral absolutes that are a person's rights, it is necessary that each Christian begin with himself...'⁹

The Church's work in the ever-changing world is thus perhaps best regarded as an ongoing crusade to shift probabilities in favor of what John Paul II calls the civilization of life and love. Globalization undoubtedly poses formidable challenges to that never-ending task. But the resources that the Church brings to meet those challenges are formidable as well. Some recent developments that seem especially encouraging are:

The Transcultural Catechisms. The recognition by the 1985 Synod of Bishops that globalization offers new opportunities for the spread of the

⁷ Id., 302.

⁸ Frederick G. Lawrence, 'The Church and American Culture' (Unpublished paper, 1998).

⁹ "Social Change Hinges on 'Small Daily Options'", ZENIT, April 9, 2001, No. 1040907.

faith inspired the *Catechism of the Catholic Faith*, now available in many languages. Recognizing that many Catholics are lamentably unfamiliar with the Church's social teachings, the Holy Father has also commissioned the preparation of a 'social catechism'.

Formation for a Mobile People. With traditional parishes eroded by geographic mobility, the Church's burgeoning lay organizations (e.g., Regnum Christi, Comunione e Liberazione, Focolare, Opus Dei, the Neo-Catechumens) are helping to fill the resulting needs for formation and fellowship among adult Catholics.

Solidarity through Subsidiarity. With regard to the problem of how to move from the principle of solidarity to its practical implementation under diverse social and political conditions, the Church's principle of subsidiarity is attracting increasing attention from political thinkers and actors. (Since this potentially useful idea is one that needs to be deepened and developed, it may at some point merit the attention of this Academy).

The Dialogue with the Natural and Human Sciences. In an era when relativism and historicism prevail in secular academic circles, the Catholic Church stands as an unabashed defender of reason.¹⁰ Hers is not the calculating reason of Hobbes in the service of the passions, nor narrow scientific rational-*ism*, but rather the dynamic, recurrent, and potentially self-correcting processes of human knowing. That permits her to take modern historical consciousness seriously, but to find the basis for a genuine transnational culture in 'the dynamic unity of the human mind in its related and recurrent operations'.¹¹ Her commitment to reason, moreover, both invites and requires her to engage the modern natural and human sciences at the highest levels. (Christians, Pope John Paul II reminds us, are obliged not only to bring light to the world, but also to remain open to discover 'every fragment of truth... in the life experience and in the culture of individuals and nations').¹²

It must be admitted, however, that none of these developments is more than a beginning. The Church has yet to work out the social, cultural, and political methods that will mediate the truths she possesses in the ever-changing world. What may be required, therefore, is nothing less than a large-scale re-appraisal and renewal of the educational apostolate

¹⁰ See, especially, *Fides et Ratio*.

¹¹ Matthew L. Lamb, 'Divine Transcendence and Eternity: The Early Lonergan's Recovery of Thomas Aquinas', in *Continuity and Plurality in Catholic Theology* (1998), 75-76.

¹² *Centesimus Annus*, Par. 46.

of the Church.¹³ The Church needs to make manifest not only that Catholic Christianity is in harmony with full-fledged intellectualism, but that the intellectual apostolate is integral to her mission.

Needless to say, these challenges and opportunities for the Church also constitute challenges and opportunities for this Academy!

¹³ This is the principal message of Dr. Lawrence's excellent paper, cited above. Dr. Lawrence and Father Matthew Lamb, cited in note 11, pursue the dialogue with the natural and human sciences at the Boston College Lonergan Institute.

AN EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY FOR A CHRISTIAN CULTURE OF GLOBALISATION

GIUSEPPE TOGNON

Premise

The fundamental task of the Church does not change: it is to evangelise, to catechise, and to bear witness to Christ and his message. But history provides no truce, and Christians, immersed as they are in the world, do not have a moment of rest. Today's challenge is called globalisation. We can be in disagreement with the way in which the subject has become topical; we can dispute the view that globalisation is a new phenomenon; and we can refuse to believe that it is a decisive problem for faith. But we cannot deny that globalisation constitutes for believers of all religions an extraordinary opportunity. One is dealing here with rethinking the relationship between the economy and society so that the ethical approach to man becomes central in the debate about the governance of the world and so that membership of the Church becomes the premise for a personal commitment in favour of the whole of mankind. The appeal of John Paul II to the powerful in favour of the poor majority of the world has been so strong and unceasing that it goes beyond the traditional Magisterium of the popes. The subject of globalisation can become the social subject of the Church in the new century just as during the twentieth century there was the appeal to peace and the regulation of conflicts between nations. It is probable, as was the case then, that none of the problems drawn attention to by the Magisterium will find a complete solution, but it is in itself important to know that the early Covenant between God and a small people – that of Israel – has in definitive fashion been extended to the whole of humanity.

In the debate underway about the economic and cultural globalisation of the world, Catholic universalism thus finds itself in the forefront at a

decisive stage of history. Even though there are no 'Catholic recipes' for all the problems (and this is something which is fitting), it is not of secondary importance to ask oneself what the most suitable ideas and cultural strategies might be so as to provide an intellectual contribution on the part of involved members of the laity. My modest contribution to the discussion seeks to be that of pointing out – taking as given the framework offered in the paper by Msgr. Homeyer – certain opportunities which present themselves today to Catholicism and at a more general level to the Christian tradition. I will point out in particular two which are available to us from a vast collection of scholarly contributions and which are mature enough for a more general reflection: 1) the resistance to cultural homogenisation which through a positive evaluation of all cultural histories and practices of life, such as the use of languages, may lead us to rethink our educational strategy without repudiating modernity and without abandoning democracy. 2) The transformation of the dominant model of rationality, based upon forms of the technical, in a form different from human lordship over the world which may help wealthy mankind to grow spiritually at least as much as it has grown materially.

I. The Catholic Church, too, has been for centuries an instrument of cultural homogenisation and of dominion and this has caused by no means few problems between the peoples of the world and for the governance of the world. But it would be foolish not to remember, precisely today when within the Church there is a keenly-felt awareness of the need to recognise her own errors as well in order to achieve a reconciliation which is not banal in character with the world, that Christians have already experienced at a direct and immediate level the end of secure universalism and that the whole of the modern epoch has constituted a new stage in evangelisation and inculturalisation. Modern Christian culture has made decisive contributions to democracy and social justice, not least because it has always espoused a healthy distrust towards all those ideologies which proposed 'the new man'. At least two very important initiatives deserve to be brought to mind, which thanks to the new season of missionary activity changed the face of modern society, beginning in the sixteenth century: care for communities with respect for their traditions and above all else for their languages – the sanctuary of identity – and the practice of teaching. The modern Christian Church, and not only the Catholic Church (one thinks of Luther and the political and religious use of German), found in the use of speech and its linguistic deposits the essential key both by which to foster

changes in habits and customs and by which to establish resistance to every attempt to deny the communitarian basis of peoples.

The case of languages, of their recognition, of their survival, serves as an example because it has been for some time at the centre of national and international cultural policies. The year book of the languages of the world, published in the United States of America, lists more than six-thousand spoken languages, of which about two thousand have a literature and two thousand have translated, or are translating, the Bible. Statistics applied to languages tells us that the first ten languages of the earth are used by communities with more than a hundred million people: after Mandarin Chinese we find English, Hindi, Arabic, Spanish, Bengali, Portuguese, Indonesian Bahasa, Japanese, and Russian. The experts in the field tell us that the great European languages are to be found in the category of languages spoken by a minimum of ten million people, together with Nepalese or Aramaic, Turkish, Ukrainian and Persian. They tell us that some languages which have been decisive for Western history and civilisation, such as Hebrew, are spoken by communities which may even have a few hundred thousand people and they also tell us that every year languages and dialects disappear in some parts of the world. The statistical framework demonstrates unknown and non-traditional hierarchies, but above all else brings out what is the great paradox of global communication, namely that of a model of society which however effective and universal it may be does not manage, if only to a small extent, to interpret the multiplicity and the wealth of human experiences which are still borne witness to in the world by hundreds of populations that are the bearers of different languages and traditions. The future of humanity lies precisely in the gap which still exists between the different levels of communication – communication through the mass media and communication through authentic relations – and in the irreducibility of the principle of community to standardisation. In this no man's land, which from many points of view is still unexplored, where different social models co-exist and where antithetical forms of living are practiced, it is possible to work only if one possesses something which is real and personal to be shared, if the message really becomes witness, if the time available is matched by life as lived out and language does not fall into being merely the technical.

The practice of diversity through languages as well can become a first fertile way of approaching things which can constitute an intelligent signal of respect to be launched throughout the world, placing oneself thereby on the side of minorities. Historical linguistics, like many other disciplines

which do not belong only to the humanities, is ready to bear witness to the fact that research into, and the study of, languages is going exactly in the opposite direction to banalisation. Lexicography, which has been a mature, loved and practiced science in all epochs, is, for example, by now clearly on the side of a message of prudence and care in relation to every community. Even the most tenaciously held socio-linguistic theories on the universal matrix of languages do not oppose, but indeed help, the rediscovery of the ethical and not deterministic dimension of the human experience, beginning specifically with research into, and the testimonies to, life which is lived. Languages are always in a state of change and it would be absurd to believe that it is possible to recognise changes if one did not also have a knowledge of previous or lateral stages to the establishment of a so-called classic language. The nature of evidence is always fragile and changes if the research into them is not accompanied by a patient waiting for new elements which are decisive in illuminating deposits of knowledge which had previously lain in the dark. The Latin dictionary by Forcellini, a classic work, has as a frontispiece an illustration depicting a man who is apparently sad and is working under an inscription which reads 'expertus disces quam gravis iste labor' – only experience enables us to understand how important and difficult this work is. The observation is valuable, not least because it brings us to what, in other difficult epochs, was the extremely detailed work of text scholars, translators and librarians. What would Western monasticism have been without the codexes and writing? What would modern science have been without the printing press and the rediscovery of Greek geometry through the codexes? Why did both monasticism and modern science become so specific to one civilisation and not to others? These are well-known questions but they are not because of this fact extraneous to the subject of the governance of globalisation. Certainly there is a need to be understood. I do not approach tradition as something which is limited; I am not thinking only of literature or of the codified outcome of an invention; I am not thinking only of the product of a process; I am thinking, rather, of the symbolic meaning which every experience of human action carries within it and which to be interpreted always requires the living mediation of someone, within the framework of an encounter where communication becomes enriched by many more expressive forms than we habitually use or acknowledge, above all else that of silence. Linguistic mediation, mutual translation into even an elementary dialogue, remains a still unsurpassed example of relations between men where the irreducibility of communication to dominion is affirmed. That which once and for

many centuries was seen as a necessity 'for' power – knowing how to speak other languages in order to change register within the schema of the relationship of dominion and which was first the prerogative of a few people but which subsequently, with the extension of the need for social control to a large part of the bourgeois world, became the commonplace of a Western civilisation – can once again be valuable, if interpreted with intelligence and not banalised, as testimony to a different approach to thinking about the shared destiny of mankind and the processes of technological and economic integration. The anecdote about Charles V is well-known, according to which he spoke to God in Spanish, with women in Italian, with men in French, and with his horse in German. But what could appear to be merely the expression of the arrogance of a powerful man who by his own example decided on what was wanted at the level of appearances can be analysed as the sign of a question which in the sixteenth century was already embarrassing and still did not have a solution, that is to say the reason why the universality of political and economic power, the predominance of one such power, is not automatically accompanied as well by the simplification of habits and customs, languages, and laws, that is to say peace and order, but on the contrary there is a growth in incommunicability and disorder. During the epoch and the political and social context of Charles V some answers could already be found to questions raised by the new models of power. While the power of arms and regal representation was celebrated, its limits were also discovered and a new art of dissimulation and a new scientific method emerged to compensate for the rigidity of medieval stereotypes with *esprit de finesse* and the practice of silence and adaptation. What at the outset was only a question for a few determined scientists and politicians endowed with rare capacities for analysis and foresight, became over the centuries the common premises of the contemporary action of the great secularised masses.

II. To practice languages and encounter people directly in order to know them in the space of a lifetime and to build together a dialogue are only some examples of an intelligent rediscovery of reality which are well located within the challenge of globalisation, as an antidote to indifference and as a vehicle for ethical contents. But they would remain mute experiences if they were not re-understood within wider and more structured forms of relationships involving levels of the governance of society, such as, for example, the form of education. The phenomenon of education should be seen as a relational intra-human event of a special kind, and it is therefore

not useless to emphasise the need for a reconsideration of education which helps us to uphold the irreducibility of human experiences, even the most insignificant such experiences, to an interpretation of the real based upon psychic illusions or the manipulation of false wishes mistaken for authentic needs. Scientists and managers have nothing in the least to fear from a radical and philosophical reconsideration of the meaning of education, and indeed could gain from the reopening of spaces of reflection without which they would run the risk of being the victims of their own results. No pedagogic norm, no teaching figure, no psychological inquiry, and no model of behaviour or of business, can after a certain fashion reduce the 'intellectual' specificity of the moral choice – of the decision – in favour of being, just as there is no knowledge about man, not even religious such knowledge, which can deprive that moral decision of the intrinsic cultural dimension that constitutes its 'empirical' character, historicity. For that matter, for philosophy and theology, whose subject is a special kind of relation between men and God, the real possibilities of success lie, as well, in the capacity to bring back attention to a primordial condition of the human being which does not lose value because of the fact that every human relation, even that which is educational or based upon love, is to a certain extent always partial, asymmetrical, destined for an absence of success or based upon predominance, and unsatisfying taken as a whole. Indeed, from the impossibility of reducing the human relation to a simple definitive exercise of power and the relationship between two beings to a pact from which advantages for all derive, as in the case of a political pact, the spiritual view of life gains force which recognises that every human being will never become only that which is sought of him and that whatever the case he will remain, even in total deprivation, much more than a mere social animal.

With the establishment of contemporary instruction as a mass surrogate for education, Western culture, instead, in dangerous fashion, came to no longer see in the educational relationship that archetypical character which in reality belongs to it and which is the anthropological basis of the universal value of knowledge itself. The intensity of the political exploitation and economicistic consumption of the need to know which emerged in the West with the medieval and modern rebirths was such as no longer to allow the recognition of the 'other reasons' of that need, amongst which, above all else, was the spiritual reason. This was not a defect of historical knowledge or ignorance but rather, if anything, as Nietzsche was to say, of an 'injury of history', of a poisoning. The incapacity of contemporary political reformism to go beyond the formulas of economic reformism has

betrayed the very premises of modernity. Modernity has been essentially the attempt to use the resources liberated by the new economic processes to change and emancipate society from the slavery of dogmatic and material influences: modernity can, in synthesis, be defined as a placing of a bet on production and the use of wealth to achieve new forms of freedom. From the Jesuit *Ratio studiorum* of the sixteenth century to the great mass university systems, modernity has constantly been an epoch of forms of schooling, of training, and of research; in a word, of adaptation to change by an educational route thanks to 'visions of the world' to be internalised through formative processes that were based upon a renewed psychological analysis of human needs. Needs for reforms and needs for clarity went side by side with the birth of colleges, symbolic places where the mission of modernity was concentrated – to progress by learning. From the perspective of centuries, mass schools have been flanked by the obligations to represent established power which were characteristic of the first stage of modern schooling, but they became increasingly less the seat of an educational project and almost always have also betrayed the social demand for emancipation which have supported them economically.

In our time, when it is no longer possible 'to stop the machine' and advance to a mass ascesis, when science and technology make the very possibility of a future for mankind precarious and not only this or that mode of being, that distinction has great value which, beginning with the theory of Weber and his sociological heirs (Parsons, Schutz, Luhmann...), made headway within the contemporary cultural debate between *modernity* and *modernisation*. These are terms which belong to the same semantic family but have real differences of meaning. The difficulties in which philosophy and sciences have found themselves have not allowed it to be declared that the anomaly is created by the existence of some blind 'will' of modern reflection to carry – through an excess of rigour or a paradoxical sentiment of dissolution – the implications of their own lines of reasoning to extremes and thus to fall into nihilistic outcomes. It is no longer even permitted to turn to extraneous solutions or solutions produced by demi-gods because the culture of modernisation cannot burn its bridges with its own acknowledged identity. One has still to place a bet on the effectiveness of that extraordinary historiographical postulate that goes under the name of 'modernity'. If looked at without prejudices, the processes of globalisation, as well, still reveal the characteristics of a series of eschatological meanings of modernity understood as a 'task' and a 'mission', as a constituent ideal reference point for the understanding of what

changes, as a spiritual medicine for the disturbance brought about by greater responsibility not compensated for by greater guarantees of reward. The subjects of the analysis, therefore, are not short on the ground. Rather the culture for their development, if anything, is defective: those that are presented as the positive results of modernity – namely the establishment of rights and freedoms within a framework of increasing legitimation of norms; advanced social differentiation and at the same time its recomprehension within a global process of the expansion of society; freedom through the principle of representation and the recognition of the rights of the person; and the highest possible technological innovation in a substantial maintenance of capitalism – are principles which in order not to be idolatrous require a level of cognitive skills which has increasingly less citizenship within our peoples. We find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: faced with an increase in ignorance and a lack of historical memory we observe an increase in the demand for happiness which it is becoming impossible to satisfy not because of a lack of goods – because, indeed, the global economic risk is one of overproduction – but precisely because of a lack of a new culture of wealth which has little to do with the dominant theories about human capital.

III. The question of how to educate and guide great masses of human beings towards happiness in an open society of the free market is a great political question, before being an educational question, which should be addressed with sensitivity. The policies *for* knowledge assume policies *of* knowledge which are wise and derived from learning. We seem to have a play on words and yet we have before us an ancient truth: democracy, amongst the regimes that are possible, is the only one which is not based only on the ignorance of the majority or the power of the few, and despite appearances and false demagogic forms of modesty has always required the commitment of the most careful and concerned individuals. Democracy needs intelligence and forms of care because it is the least natural and the most rational of possible regimes, being based upon a theory of man and society which side by side with the rule of numbers has amongst its premises certain abstract principles – the principle of individual freedom, of justice, of participation, and of equality – which are not recognisable and acceptable outside a precise model of knowledge based upon experimental research and the sharing of spaces. It is no accident that democracy is an invention of the city. Western society was a *learning society* well before this was discovered by the theorists of

post-industrial society and the 'new' economists. Nothing that concerns forms of knowledge and cultures is thus extraneous to democracy, and indeed one can say that the whole history of the West, including the history of religion, has been a match in favour or against the production and the use of knowledge, as Truth and as Opinion. In a democracy every scientific discovery, every moral and religious experience, every social theory, every artistic expression, and every form of wealth, has become and becomes sooner or later the subject of discussion and political use and has asked to be understood, justified, and if possible reproduced. All decisions are sooner or later placed in the hands of the responsibility of each person, even if most of us do not realise this or strive to flee from choices, except when we refuse to see them imposed from above. As a result, the principal cultural problem of the West is of a deeply ethical nature and involves the increasingly evident detachment between the enormous potential of material wealth, and above all else immaterial wealth, which individuals could have available and the difficulties encountered in creating universal models – 'frameworks' – of behaviour and of sharing.

Economics and political science have for some time demonstrated that the overall poverty of a society can diminish even while within it inequality grows, just as inequality in incomes is not necessarily more important than their level and taking care of immaterial resources. The protection of individuals against the vulnerability produced by globalisation is not, therefore, a secondary aspect of the problem because if people are not aware of the levelling and banalising character that economic development can have on the effective lives of people and groups, conditions are brought about whereby such development advances according to dynamics which deny the reasons in the name of which globalisation is proposed as an instrument of emancipation and democratisation. In the presence of a new stage of major forms of emigration and immigration – of the forced mobility of individuals – and of the mobility of financial capital searching for increasingly large profits, the risks of new forms of alienation, in addition to conflicts, increase, with the consequences of a progressive impoverishment of the universal historical memory and a lowering of the critical consciousness on which to base every possible form of governance. Leaving on the scene an infinity of 'emotional and cultural residues', one helps to increase the number of individuals directed towards a new form of marginalisation which is no longer measurable in terms of material poverty but in terms of social fragmentation and inequality in opportunities to communicate and to take part in self-government. It is, however, useful to remember that the

challenge is complicated by the fact that there must also be a change in the traditional order of the problems which were addressed by theories of education when they worked within the shelter of their respective national contexts and were protected by a more or less shared theory of political action and by a consolidated rationalistic cultural tradition which – differently from Eastern philosophies – adopted as an axiom the principle of sufficient reason, that is to say the belief that everything must have a cause which justifies it and that a man is not to be taken seriously if he does not base himself upon an overall project of reality. These are all cultural conditions or conditionings which are no longer given. The extreme pluralism of forms of rationality and the extreme diversity of life practices hinder believing in a fundamental single intellectual experience, and if in the educational sphere there is a ‘pretence’ that one believes that education draws its own reason from a synthetic vision of society this is because one is dealing with mass problems in a context dominated by the public hand and by forms of politics which are now surpassed, and politics is the place where the crisis of rationality is expressed with greatest evidence. With the recognition of the ideological character of every military, economic and political power, with the decrease in the illusion of the new man and of utopianism, with the theory of the division of the world into blocs and areas whose membership is based on ideological-political considerations left behind us, our society encounters difficulty when counterposing the evidence of globalisation – which has more intense rhythms than those of school learning and selection – with an increasingly less convinced consensus in favour of ‘a society behind desks’ where study is preparatory for work and where childhood is seen as an age which contains all the others and is thus special. The difficulty goes beyond every form of school planning and every theory regarding the curriculum – the subject of attention and concern in the great Western countries as well as those affected (such as the former Communist countries) by forced industrialisation: the ignorance of the great masses of the world who nonetheless are turned towards development and apply pressure to enter the banquet of the rich cannot be overcome in a short period and yet must be seen as a decisive cultural element in the survival of the global model of development.

IV. We are face to face with the fact that the Church, too, should share in the attempt to rethink her own social doctrine at a world level. The future of the social doctrine of the Church does not lie, in my opinion, in a restatement of some of its political and historical implications which by

now have been overtaken by developments or which are overly bound up with European history, but rather in a rediscovery of its ethical and universalistic origin, as a method of trust in man and not only as a method of fear of his works. But here it is useful to recognise that it is not only the Church which finds herself in difficulty because in general it is Western political and economic thought which is straining to renew itself. The set of ideas that we still use in politics are in large measure an inheritance left to us by elites who for more than a century led a Europe of the poor, a Europe to be reconstructed after every fight for national independence, after every insurrection and after every war. Even the welfare state and the social market economy, the great and glorious forms of twentieth-century architecture, are in the final analysis the children of a nineteenth-century social ideology. During our century the advent of democracy and of universal suffrage as the generalised system of representation favoured the organisation of minorities and the development between them of a political dialectic completely inside a subordinated majority but one combative in relation to its own material and civic survival. The modern party became a pedagogic and mobilising instrument in a Europe of the poor at the service of highly educated elites which were revolutionary or conservative, Christian or secular, Catholic or Socialist; the bearers of requests for modernisation, change and ideological globalisation, they needed, to achieve their objectives, a participating public and a mediated consensus which today no longer exists.

The panorama has changed radically. We find ourselves in the era of the Europe of the rich. Welfare has to be dismantled and reassembled in a part of the world where two-thirds of the citizens have found the reasons for their citizenship more in the conservation of their own economic condition (or in the fear of losing it) than in emancipation from material need. A Europe of the rich which makes prosperity the basis, if not even the measurement, of its own happiness and which in fact still attributes to savings (the most private and most traditional form of power) an enormous psychological value, making them indeed into one of the most valuable goods still in circulation but one which is unfortunately very badly distributed and above all badly governed. The yearning for happiness and the appeal to wealth tend to coincide and to become a winning political message, which is banal but effective, proposed in all its longitudes despite every cultural and religious specificity. We live in selfish societies but ones which are no longer able to fight; ones which are ill-at-ease but no longer capable of giving themselves a long-term objective; ones which are intelligent but slothful. Societies where the elites

have been replaced by oligarchies and by groups of entrepreneurs of politics, by heads with many arms and with many means but without a body. The majority is by now made up of the rich and a majority made up of rich people is more anonymous than a majority made up of the poor, less ready to be represented, more changeable and at the same time less free because it has more to lose than the latter. Wealth is experienced as a fundamental criterion of security, as a 'home', because the traditional idea of the emancipation of the individual and of the masses has been replaced by the idea of security and by protagonism through consumption. In this way, overturning every political chronology and every civic history, we witness the paradox of seeing noble and cultured Europe pursue America. We speak of a Europe which 'can' become as rich and as competitive as America! And even the Euro, in the way that it is presented at a popular level, takes part to a certain extent in this expression of competition which takes place completely within the West.

If this is the situation, is it still meaningful for those who intend to remain faithful to a Christian approach to repropose at a planetary level a political vocabulary 'of the poor', specific to a surpassed political perspective, or is it not perhaps necessary to draw up a political proposal which sees wealth and security as the second nature of contemporary Western man and which seeks to speak to this man so as to make him rediscover the meaning of giving and responsibility? It is not of secondary importance to express the profound requests of the Gospel against or despite the West, or rather involve ourselves in a process of the redefinition of our task. In reflecting on globalisation as well it is a good thing to begin from what is experienced and from what is best understood by everyone: what could be more topical than a reflection on the condition of a man who is rich but who cannot understand the real nature of the wealth which is transforming him at a deep level? The Western Christian tradition is an inexhaustible source of wisdom regarding the metamorphoses of wealth and its power, and all contemporary ethical reflection, with the rebirth of practical philosophy and the development of the psychological and social sciences, cannot but gain advantage from the encounter with a Christian wisdom which is critically repropose. The question is the following: 'do we today have a theory about living as Christians in a 'natural' condition of wealth? Do we have available a hypothesis which does not deny to begin with and with hypocrisy this condition, but digs within it and uses it for virtuous objectives? What impedes us from drawing up a phenomenology of wealth as a historical condition of contemporary Western man? Not a mere theory of

wealth and not even only an economic theory, but a theory for the action of Christians in a society of rich people where ancient forms of poverty are accompanied by wealth as a spiritual problem? Memories of the Gospel message should not, obviously enough, either produce an apology for material wealth or even effect a removal of the message of Christ regarding charity. But it is certain that the future of Catholicism, no longer supported by majorities of believers or by the power of sovereigns, cannot be reduced to being 'against' or even to mere witness without the delegitimation of the historical and ethical meaning of faith.

To this end, it is not of secondary importance to rethink as well the role of international institutions and above all to stop and reflect on the deficit of moral legitimation which makes them vulnerable. Otherwise one finds oneself acting in a global context on the basis of a technique which corresponds to a model of rationality specific to a history – that of the West – which does not recognise anything outside itself but which is called in fact to operate as a representative of the world. We need not only a generic adaptation of the contemporary legal and economic model to a planetary dimension but also a substantial rethinking of its limit and a new interaction with the foundations of Christian ethics. Were things to take place in an opposite manner we would always find ourselves in the paradoxical situation in which the Christian message does not coincide with, but even does not manage to detach itself from, the dynamics of capitalism, and finds itself in difficulties faced with peoples who very arduously draw near to the market and strive to escape from under-development. How is it possible that the ideology of the rich and of the West presents itself to that part of the world which is only slightly tasting the advantages of development by reminding them that it is not wealth that brings about happiness and it is not prosperity which generates a full life? How is it possible, without giving rise to rejection and misunderstandings, to preach poverty and a new model of the exploitation of the planet, more concerned and careful about immaterial values, to those who have never had wealth and see it achieved at their own expense by those who despise it?

The exporting of one's own civic and spiritual requirements is not easy, above all else if they descend from a long history of imperialism and exploitation. For this reason, the Christian conscience needs not only to rediscover the principles of the faith but also the forms and the means of the language of the soul. It needs a phenomenology of wealth – by now a universal medium – which is able to involve the old and new rich in an attempt at rethinking inter-human relations. Theological research and the

Christian experience of sharing can help us to understand that side by side with institutions which are the daughters of law and the nations there exists another category of institutions which are more natural and rooted, which are not only an instrument of living but something which helps us to see life as being endowed with higher ends. These are those ends which some philosophers call the 'institutions of the human', based upon an inter-human order different from the legal order, upon a 'topology' of the soul, the specific seat of conscious responsibility that affirms in every latitude a lordship which is higher than that achieved by instrumental reason.

It is my belief that the specific potential of these inter-individual arrangements is intact and that its rediscovery would help us to overcome and to fight the perception that by now everything is finished and ruined. Techniques take pride of place over the soul, procedures prevail over vital relations, the economy kills citizenship, but not everything is by now compromised and Christians have the great responsibility of combating the new forms of fatalism as well. If they are capable of resisting the temptation of joining, in acritical fashion, the newly-born anti-globalisation movement, they will be able to make of their complex cultural tradition an effective instrument of mediation and of constructive criticism at the service of mankind.

**OTHER PAPERS PRESENTED
BY ACADEMICIANS**

L'ONU ET LA GLOBALISATION

MICHEL SCHOOYANS

Échanges et interdépendance

Les termes *mondialisation* et *globalisation* font aujourd'hui partie du vocabulaire courant. A un niveau très général, les deux termes sont pour ainsi dire interchangeables. Le mot français *globalisation* résulte de l'adoption du vocable anglo-américain *globalization*, qui signifie *mondialisation*. Les deux mots signifient qu'à l'échelle mondiale les *échanges* – qui existent depuis longtemps – se sont multipliés, et que cette multiplication s'est faite rapidement. Tel est manifestement le cas dans les domaines scientifiques, techniques, culturels. Cette multiplication des échanges est rendue possible grâce à des systèmes de communication de plus en plus performants, le plus souvent instantanés. Ces systèmes provoquent une offre d'informations sans cesse croissante, prête à l'emploi.

Toujours en ce premier sens courant, les termes mondialisation et globalisation évoquent l'*interdépendance* des sociétés humaines. Une crise économique aux USA; les décisions de l'OPEP concernant le prix du pétrole; les tensions entre Palestiniens et Israéliens – pour ne citer que ces exemples – ont des répercussions de portée mondiale. Nous sommes concernés, interpellés et même affectés par des catastrophes qui se passent loin de chez nous; nous sentons notre responsabilité face à la faim et à la maladie partout dans le monde.

Les religions elles-mêmes dialoguent davantage. Au sein même de l'Église catholique, les communications se sont intensifiées.

Nous avons ainsi acquis une conscience aiguë de notre appartenance à la communauté humaine. Dans ce premier sens, familier, on parlera d'une *intégration*. Le langage commun dira que "les distances ne comptent plus"; que "les voyages rapprochent les hommes"; que "le monde est devenu un village". Le monde tend vers plus d'unité: les Russes et les Chinois partici-

pent, à leur façon, à ce processus. En principe, on ne peut que se réjouir de cette tendance. Il est en outre normal que, pour viser ce but, il faille envisager de nouvelles structures politiques et économiques capables de répondre à ces nouveaux besoins. Mais pas à n'importe quel prix ni dans n'importe quelles conditions.

Unification politique, intégration économique

Depuis quelques années, le sens des mots mondialisation et globalisation s'est quelque peu restreint et précisé. Par *mondialisation*, on entend alors la tendance portant à organiser un gouvernement mondial unique. L'accent est donc mis ici sur la dimension *politique* de l'unification du monde. Dans sa forme actuelle, cette tendance a été développée dans plusieurs courants qu'étudient les internationalistes depuis Victoria et Grotius. Dans le cadre de cette communication, il suffira de citer deux exemples. Le premier modèle remonte à la fin des années 60 et il est dû Zbigniew Brzezinski.¹ Selon ce modèle, les USA doivent assumer le leadership mondial, reformuler leur messianisme traditionnel. Aidés par les pays les plus développés, ils doivent organiser les sociétés politiques particulières en tenant compte d'une typologie classant ces sociétés en trois catégories selon leur degré respectif de développement. Sous le leadership des USA, le G7 (devenu G8 avec l'entrée de la Russie) incarne le directoire préconisé par Z. Brzezinski. Le mondialisme se définit ici à partir d'un projet *hégémonique* dont l'objectif est de taille: imposer la *Pax americana* ou sombrer dans le chaos.

A la fin des années 80 surgit un autre projet mondialiste, dont Willy Brandt est l'un des principaux artisans. Le Nord (développé) et le Sud (en développement) ont besoin l'un de l'autre; leurs intérêts sont réciproques. Il est urgent de prendre des initiatives internationales nouvelles pour combler le fossé qui les sépare. Ces initiatives doivent être prises au plan politique; elles doivent porter prioritairement sur le système monétaire, le désarmement, la faim. Selon le "programme de survie" du Rapport Brandt, il faut mettre sur pied "un organisme de surveillance de haut niveau" qui aurait notamment pour mission de rendre l'ONU plus efficace et de consolider le consensus qui caractérise celle-ci.² La conception de la mondialisation qui apparaît ici n'est nullement rattachée à un projet hégémonique. Elle se

¹ Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Between two Ages. America's Role in the Technetronic Era*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Book Ltd, 1970.

² Cf. *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, Londres, Pan Books World Affairs, 1980. Voir spécialement le chapitre 16, pp. 257-266.

situé dans la tradition de *l'internationalisme socialiste*. Sans doute ne va-t-on pas jusqu'à recommander la suppression des États, mais la souveraineté de ceux-ci devra être limitée et mise sous contrôle d'un pouvoir politique mondial si l'on veut garantir la survie de l'humanité.

En même temps que le terme mondialisation acquérait une connotation plutôt politique, le mot *globalisation* acquérait, lui, une connotation plutôt *économique*. La multiplication des échanges, l'amélioration des communications internationales poussent à parler d'une intégration des agents économiques mondiaux. Les activités économiques seraient réparties entre les différents États ou régions: le travail serait divisé. Aux uns reviendraient, par exemple, les tâches d'extraction; aux autres, celles de transformation; à d'autres enfin reviendraient les tâches de production technologique, de coordination mondiale, de décision.

Cette vision de la globalisation fonde la division internationale du travail sur la théorie des avantages comparatifs élaborée par Ricardo. D'inspiration franchement *libérale*, cette conception de la globalisation repose sur la liberté du commerce et la concurrence parfaite au plan international. Elle favorise les pays développés, riches en capitaux. Grâce à ceux-ci en effet, les ressources, d'où qu'elles viennent, peuvent être exploitées avec plus de productivité. Cette conception ultra-libérale de la division internationale du travail est cependant assortie d'une réserve: s'il y est largement question de la libre circulation des biens et des capitaux, il est moins question de la libre circulation des personnes.³

Globalisation et holisme

Dans les documents récents de l'ONU, le thème de la globalisation apparaît plus fréquemment que celui de la mondialisation, sans toutefois que ces thèmes entrent en concurrence. En 1995, par exemple, était déjà publié *The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*.⁴

L'ONU incorpore les conceptions courantes du double thème que nous venons de rappeler. Toutefois elle profite de l'onde porteuse offerte par la conception courante de la globalisation pour soumettre ce mot à une altération sémantique. *La globalisation des réinterprétée à la lumière d'une nou-*

³ Parmi les premiers théoriciens "modernes" de cette conception on peut mentionner Francisco de Victoria (avec son interprétation de la destination universelle des biens) et de Hugo Grotius (avec sa doctrine de la liberté de navigation).

⁴ Cf. *Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford University Press, 1995.

velle vision du monde et de la place de l'homme dans le monde. Cette nouvelle vision a pour nom le *holisme*. Ce mot d'origine grecque signifie que le monde constitue un tout ayant plus de réalité et plus de valeur que les parties qui le constituent. Dans ce tout, l'apparition de l'homme n'est qu'un avatar de l'évolution de la matière. L'homme n'a de réalité qu'en raison de son inhérence à la matière et, par la mort, il retournera définitivement à la matière. Le destin de l'homme, c'est d'être voué à la mort, c'est de disparaître inéluctablement dans la Terre-Mère d'où il est issu.

Le grand tout, appelons-le, pour simplifier, la Terre-Mère ou Gaïa, transcende donc l'homme. Celui-ci doit se plier aux impératifs de *l'écologie*, aux convenances de la Nature. L'influence du New Age est ici évidente. L'homme doit non seulement accepter de ne plus émerger du monde ambiant; il doit accepter de ne plus être le centre du monde. L'anthropocentrisme judéo-chrétien, renforcé par celui de la Renaissance, doit non seulement être abandonné mais combattu. Selon cette lecture de la nature et de l'homme, la loi "naturelle" n'est plus celle qui est inscrite dans l'intelligence et dans le cœur de l'homme; c'est la loi implacable et violente que la Nature impose à l'homme. La vulgate écologique présente même celui-ci comme un prédateur, et comme toutes les populations de prédateurs, la population humaine doit, dit-on, être *contenue* dans les limites du *développement durable*. L'homme doit donc non seulement accepter de se sacrifier aujourd'hui aux impératifs de Mère Gaïa, mais accepter aussi de se sacrifier aux impératifs du temps à venir. Il doit s'effacer devant les contraintes du "développement durable".

La Charte de la Terre

L'ONU est en train de concocter un document très important systématisant cette interprétation holistique de la globalisation. Il s'agit de la *Charte de la Terre*, dont plusieurs brouillons ont déjà été divulgués, et dont la rédaction est en phase finale. Ce document serait non seulement appelé à coiffer la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'homme de 1948, mais selon certains, elle devrait supplanter le Décalogue lui-même!

Voici, à titre d'exemples, quelques extraits de cette Charte:

"Nous sommes à un moment critique de l'histoire de la Terre, le moment de choisir son avenir... Nous devons nous unir pour fonder une société globale durable, fondée sur le respect de la nature, les droits humains universels, la justice économique et la culture de la paix...

L'humanité est une partie d'un vaste univers évolutif... Le milieu ambiant global, avec ses ressources finies, est une préoccupation

commune pour tous les peuples. La protection de la vitalité, de la diversité et de la beauté de la Terre est un devoir sacré...

Une augmentation sans précédent de la population humaine a surchargé les systèmes économiques et sociaux...

Voici notre choix: former une société globale pour prendre soin de la Terre et prendre soin les uns des autres ou nous exposer au risque de nous détruire nous-mêmes et de détruire la diversité de la vie...

Nous avons besoin d'urgence d'une vision partagée sur les valeurs de base qui offrent un fondement éthique à la communauté mondiale émergente..."

Les religions et le globalisme

Pour consolider cette vision holistique du globalisme, certains *obstacles* doivent être aplanis et des *instruments* doivent être mis sur pied.

Les *religions* en général, et en premier lieu la religion catholique, figurent parmi les obstacles qu'il faut neutraliser. C'est dans ce but qu'a été organisé, dans le cadre des célébrations du Millenium, le *Sommet des leaders spirituels et religieux*. Il s'est agi de lancer l'"Initiative unie des Religions" qui a parmi ses objectifs de veiller à la santé de la Terre et à celle de tous les êtres vivants. Fort influencé par le New Age, ce projet vise, à terme, la création d'une nouvelle religion mondiale unique qui impliquerait aussitôt l'interdiction, pour toute autre religion, de faire du prosélytisme. En somme, l'ONU reprend un projet semblable à celui de Goethe, qui voulait imposer le culte de la Grèce antique comme nouvelle religion pour l'Occident.⁵

Bref, selon l'ONU, la globalisation ne doit pas concerner les seules sphères de la politique, de l'économie, du droit; elle doit concerner *l'âme globale*. Représentant le Saint-Siège, le Cardinal Arinze ne pouvait signer le document final mettant toutes les religions sur le même pied.⁶

Le Paradigme de la santé

Il s'agit ici d'une nouvelle manière de concevoir la santé, élaborée par l'OMS. Ce nouveau "modèle" de santé s'inscrit lui aussi dans la perspective holistique. Il s'agit de répandre de nouveaux modèles d'action sanitaire per-

⁵ Voir à ce sujet David Gress, *From Plato to Nato. The Idea of the West and its Opponents*, New York, The Free Press, 1998, spécialement p. 86.

⁶ C'est à cette occasion que la Congrégation pour la Doctrine de la Foi a publié sa déclaration *Dominus Iesus*.

mettant de passer à l'exécution des programmes de santé décidés par l'ONU. L'objectif premier consiste à veiller à la santé du corps social. On abandonne donc le modèle hippocratique, qui donne la primauté absolue au soin des individus, indépendamment de leur condition sociale.

Selon le nouveau paradigme, l'objectif, c'est "la santé pour tous". Mais cette expression signifie que les malades seront traités selon deux critères complémentaires. D'une part, les malades seront traités au prorata de leur pouvoir acquisitif. D'autre part, il sera tenu compte de l'espérance qu'a l'individu de vivre sans handicap ni maladie. En aucun cas, le malade ne pourra être une charge pour la société. Ainsi, un malade souffrant de paludisme risque fort d'être victime de ce nouveau paradigme. Comme cette maladie atteint souvent les populations pauvres, au pouvoir d'achat extrêmement limité, et que cette maladie, avec ses crises imprévisibles, rend celui qui en souffre peu utile sur le marché du travail, le paludisme ne sera pas soigné comme le sont d'autres maladies économiquement plus rentables et moins onéreuses pour la société. Les critères qui auront été utilisés pour orienter les soins seront également utilisés pour définir les recherches qui méritent d'être entreprises.⁷

Le Pacte économique mondial

Parmi les nombreux *instruments* mis sur pied par l'ONU en vue de la globalisation, le *Pacte mondial* mérite d'être mentionné ici. Lors de son discours d'ouverture au Forum du Millénaire, M. Kofi Annan reprenait l'invitation qu'il avait adressée en 1999 au Forum économique de Davos. Il proposait donc "l'adhésion à certaines valeurs essentielles dans les domaines des normes de travail, des droits de l'homme et de l'environnement". Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU assurait que par là on réduirait les effets négatifs de la globalisation.

Plus précisément, selon M. Annan, pour combler le fossé entre le Nord et le Sud, l'ONU devrait faire largement appel au secteur privé. Il s'agirait d'obtenir l'adhésion à ce pacte d'un grand nombre d'acteurs économiques et sociaux: compagnies, hommes d'affaires, syndicats, ONG. Ce *Global compact* ou *Pacte mondial* serait une nécessité pour réguler les marchés mondiaux, pour élargir l'accès aux technologies vitales, pour distribuer l'information et le savoir, pour divulguer les soins de base en matière de santé,

⁷ Nous analysons en détail ce "nouveau paradigme de la santé" dans *L'Évangile face au désordre mondial*, Paris, Éd. Fayard, 1997, pp. 51-78.

etc. Ce Pacte a déjà reçu de nombreux appuis, entre autres de la Shell, de Ted Turner, patron de CNN, de Bill Gates, et même de plusieurs internationales syndicales.

Le Pacte mondial favorise donc le renforcement et le contrôle des médias, dans le but de faire triompher la pensée “politiquement et économiquement correcte”.

Le Pacte mondial suscite, on s'en doute, de graves interrogations. Peut-on compter sur les grandes compagnies mondiales pour résoudre des problèmes qu'elles auraient pu contribuer à résoudre depuis longtemps si elles l'avaient voulu? La multiplication des échanges économiques internationaux justifie-t-elle l'instauration progressive d'une *autorité centralisée* appelée à régenter l'activité économique mondiale? De quelle liberté jouiront encore les organisations syndicales si les législations travaillistes, incorporées au droit international, doivent se soumettre aux “impératifs” économiques “globaux”? De quel pouvoir d'intervention les gouvernements des États souverains jouiront-ils encore pour intervenir, au nom de la justice, dans les questions économiques, monétaires et sociales? Plus grave encore: comme l'ONU frôle toujours la faillite, ne risque-t-elle pas d'être victime d'une OPA de la part d'un consortium de grandes compagnies mondiales?

Les appréhensions que suscite le Pacte mondial méritent d'autant plus d'être prises en compte qu'elles ressemblent à celles que justifie déjà la Banque mondiale. Fondée en 1944 pour reconstruire, après le second conflit mondial, un monde de justice, de solidarité et de développement, cette institution s'est peu à peu alignée sur les règles du marché et sur la recherche du profit. Elle utilise surtout son pouvoir d'intervention pour imposer des plans d'action impitoyables pour ceux qui ne sont pas économiquement corrects. Le tout avec la connivence des nations les plus riches et à l'abri de toute instance de contrôle. Tout porte à croire que le Pacte mondial, utilitariste dans ses critères de décision, inclinerait à potentialiser les méfaits du libéralisme autoritaire, article premier du credo sécularisé de la Banque.⁸

La mercantilisation du savoir

Un des aspects les plus inquiétants de la globalisation économique est la mercantilisation galopante de l'enseignement et de l'éducation. Ceux-ci deviennent de plus en plus l'objet d'un commerce. On commercialise le

⁸ Voir à ce propos George, Susan, et Sabelli, Fabrizio, *Crédits sans frontières. La religion séculière de la Banque mondiale*, Paris, Éd. de La Découverte, 1994.

savoir comme on commercialise n'importe quel autre produit. S'ils ont l'opportunité d'avoir accès à l'enseignement, les pauvres n'ont accès qu'à un enseignement de qualité médiocre. La discrimination et l'exclusion commencent dès l'école fondamentale. Elles ont pour conséquence d'interdire aux enfants de familles pauvres l'accès aux savoirs de pointe et aux responsabilités correspondantes. Elles bloquent toute possibilité de mobilité sociale. Elles interdisent définitivement aux enfants de familles pauvres d'avoir accès aux programmes de formation continue, essentiels pour l'acquisition des savoirs en évolution rapide et incessante.

En outre, la condition préalable à une globalisation économique, comme d'ailleurs à une mondialisation politique, c'est l'accès de tous à l'alphabétisation et à l'éducation de base. Il est aberrant de vouloir imposer d'en haut une société globale si plus de 50 % de ceux qui sont appelés à l'édifier ne maîtrisent pas leur propre langue, ni les éléments de base du savoir, ni les outils élémentaires nécessaires à l'acquisition de celui-ci. Sans accès généralisé à l'éducation de base, tout projet globaliste ne fera qu'aggraver l'exclusion de très nombreux individus et de nombreuses nations.

Un projet politique servi par le droit

C'est cependant au niveau *politique* et *juridique* que le projet onusien de globalisation est le plus inquiétant. Dans la mesure où, comme nous l'avons vu, l'ONU, influencée par le New Age, développe une vision matérialiste, strictement évolutionniste de l'homme, elle *désactive* nécessairement la conception *réaliste* de l'homme qui sous-tend la Déclaration de 1948. Selon cette vision matérialiste, l'homme, pure matière, est définitivement incapable de dire quoi que ce soit de vrai sur lui-même et sur le sens de sa vie. Il en est réduit à l'*agnosticisme* de principe, au scepticisme et au relativisme moral. Les *pourquoi?* n'ont aucun sens; seul importent les *comment?*

La Déclaration de 1948 présentait cette prodigieuse originalité de *fonder les relations internationales nouvelles sur l'extension universelle des droits de l'homme*. Tel devait être le fondement de la paix et du développement. Telle devait être la base légitimant l'*existence* de l'ONU et justifiant sa *mission*. L'ordre mondial devait être édifié sur des *vérités* fondatrices reconnues par tous, protégées et promues progressivement par la législation de tous les États.

L'ONU d'aujourd'hui a désactivé ces références fondatrices. Aujourd'hui, les droits de l'homme ne sont plus fondés sur une *vérité* s'imposant à tous et reconnue librement par tous: l'égalité de dignité de tous les

hommes. Désormais les droits de l'homme sont le résultat de *procédures consensuelles*. Puisque nous ne sommes pas capables – dit-on – d'accéder à une vérité solide concernant l'homme, et que même une telle vérité n'est pas accessible ou n'existe pas, il faut que nous nous concertions et que nous décidions, par un acte de pure volonté, ce qu'est la conduite juste, car les nécessités de l'action nous pressent. Cependant, nous n'allons plus décider en nous référant tous aux exigences de valeurs qui s'imposent à nous par la seule force de leur vérité. Nous allons engager une *procédure* de discussion et après avoir entendu l'opinion de chacun, nous allons trancher; nous allons prendre une décision. Cette décision sera réputée juste parce qu'elle sera le résultat actuel de la procédure consensuelle. On reconnaît ici l'influence de John Rawls.

Les "nouveaux droits de l'homme" selon l'ONU actuelle sont issus de procédures consensuelles qui peuvent être relancées indéfiniment. Ils ne sont plus l'expression d'une vérité concernant l'homme; *ils sont l'expression de la volonté de ceux qui décident*. Désormais, au terme de cette procédure, n'importe quoi peut être présenté comme "nouveau droit" de l'homme: droit aux unions sexuelles diverses, à la répudiation, aux foyers monoparentaux, à l'euthanasie, – en attendant l'infanticide, déjà pratiqué, l'élimination des handicapés, les programmes eugéniques, etc. C'est pour cette raison que dans les assemblées internationales organisées par l'ONU les fonctionnaires onusiens s'appliquent de toutes leurs forces à arriver au consensus. En effet, une fois acquis, le consensus est invoqué pour faire adopter des conventions internationales qui acquièrent force de loi dans les États qui les ont ratifiés.

Un système de droit international positif

Tel est le nœud du problème posé par la globalisation selon l'ONU. Par ses conventions ou par ses traités normatifs, l'ONU est en train de mettre sur pied un système de droit supra-étatique purement positif qui porte la forte empreinte de Kelsen.⁹ L'objet du droit, ce n'est pas la justice; c'est la loi. Une tendance fondamentale s'observe de plus en plus: les normes des droits *étatiques* ne sont valables que si elles sont validées par le droit *supra-étatique*. Comme Kelsen l'avait anticipé dans sa célèbre *Théorie pure*, le pouvoir de l'ONU se concentre de façon *pyramidale*. Tous, individus ou États,

⁹ Cf. Kelsen, Hans, *Théorie pure du droit*, traduction de Charles Eisenmann, Paris, LGDJ, 1999.

doivent obéir à la norme fondamentale, issue de la volonté de ceux qui définissent le droit international. Ce droit international purement positif, débarrassé de toute référence à la Déclaration de 1948, est l'instrument utilisé par l'ONU pour imposer au monde la vision de la globalisation qui devrait lui permettre de se poser en sujet de pouvoir supra-étatique régénérant souverainement la société mondiale.

Un tribunal pénal international

Contrôlant le droit, se posant même, en définitive, comme la seule source du droit, et pouvant vérifier à tout moment si ce droit est respecté par les instances *exécutives*, l'ONU intronise un système de Pensée Unique. Elle se dote donc d'un *tribunal* à la mesure de son appétit de pouvoir. Ainsi, des crimes contre les "nouveaux droits" de l'homme pourraient être jugés par la Cour pénale Internationale fondée à Rome en 1998. Par exemple, dans la mesure où l'avortement ne serait pas légalisé dans tel État, l'État en question pourrait être exclu de la "société globale"; dans la mesure où un groupe religieux s'opposerait à l'homosexualité ou à l'euthanasie, ce groupe pourrait être condamné par la Cour pénale internationale pour atteinte aux "nouveaux droits de l'homme". C'est là une des menaces les plus graves qui pèsent sur l'Église en tant que communauté visible, et sur les chrétiens, en tant que citoyens du village global.

La gouvernance globale

Nous sommes donc en présence d'un projet gigantesque, qui a l'ambition de réaliser l'utopie de Kelsen, en visant à "légitimer" et à mettre sur pied un gouvernement mondial unique, dont les agences de l'ONU pourraient devenir des ministères. Il est urgent – assure-t-on – de créer un nouvel ordre mondial, politique et légal, et il faut se hâter de trouver des fonds pour réaliser ce projet.

Cette gouvernance globale avait déjà fait l'objet d'un encadré dans le Rapport du Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD) en 1994. Ce texte, rédigé à la demande du PNUD par Jan Tinbergen, prix Nobel d'Économie (1969), a toutes les allures d'un manifeste commandé par et pour l'ONU. En voici un extrait.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ce texte figure dans le *Human Development Report 1994*, publié par le PNUD, New York et Oxford, 1994; la citation se trouve p. 88.

“Les problèmes de l’humanité ne peuvent plus être résolus par les gouvernements nationaux. Ce dont on a besoin, c’est d’un gouvernement mondial.

La meilleure façon d’y arriver, c’est de renforcer le système des Nations Unies. Dans certains cas, cela signifierait qu’il faut changer le rôle d’agences des Nations Unies et que de consultatives elles deviennent exécutives. Ainsi, la FAO deviendrait le Ministère Mondial de l’Agriculture, UNIDO deviendrait le Ministère Mondial de l’Industrie, et ILO le Ministère Mondial des Affaires Sociales.

Dans d’autres cas, des institutions complètement neuves seraient nécessaires. Celles-ci pourraient comporter, par exemple, une Police Mondiale permanente qui pourrait citer des nations à comparaître devant la Cour Internationale de Justice, ou devant d’autres cours spécialement créées. Si les nations ne respectaient pas les arrêts de la Cour, il serait possible d’appliquer des sanctions, tant non militaires que militaires”.

Sans doute, tant qu’elles existent et qu’elles accomplissent bien leur rôle, les nations particulières protègent les citoyens; elles font respecter les droits de l’homme et utilisent dans ce but les moyens appropriés. Actuellement, dans les milieux de l’ONU, *la destruction des nations apparaît comme un objectif à rechercher si l’on veut étouffer définitivement la conception anthropocentrique des droits de l’homme*. En en finissant avec ce corps intermédiaire qu’est l’État national, on en finirait avec la subsidiarité puisque serait mis en place un État mondial centralisé. La route serait alors dégagée pour l’arrivée de technocrates globalisants et autres aspirants à la gouvernance mondiale.

Réaffirmer le principe de subsidiarité

Ainsi, le droit international positif est-il l’instrument utilisé par l’ONU pour organiser la société mondiale globale. Sous couvert de globalisation, l’ONU organise à son profit la “gouvernance” mondiale. Sous couvert de “responsabilité partagée”, elle invite les États à limiter leur juste souveraineté. L’ONU *globalise* en se posant de plus en plus en super-État mondial. Elle tend à régenter toutes les dimensions de la vie, de la pensée et de l’activité humaines en mettant sur pied un *contrôle de plus en plus centralisé* de l’information, du savoir et des techniques; de l’alimentation, de la vie humaine, de la santé et des populations; des ressources du sol et du sous-sol; du commerce mondial et des organisations syndicales; enfin et surtout

de la politique et du droit. Son pouvoir n'est pas seulement de plus en plus étendu; il intègre les facteurs – politique, économique, psycho-social et militaire – qui le constituent, comme dans la Doctrine de la sécurité nationale.¹¹ Exaltant le culte néo-païen de la Terre-Mère, elle prive l'homme de la place centrale que lui reconnaissent les grandes traditions philosophiques, juridiques, politiques et religieuses.

Face à ce globalisme basé sur le sable, il faut réaffirmer la nécessité et l'urgence de fonder la société internationale sur la reconnaissance de l'égalité de tous les hommes. Le système juridique qui prédomine à l'ONU rend cette reconnaissance universelle strictement impossible puisque le droit et les droits de l'homme n'y peuvent procéder que de déterminations volontaires. Il faut donc réaffirmer la primauté du principe de subsidiarité tel qu'il doit être correctement compris. Cela signifie que les organisations internationales n'ont pas à dessaisir les États, ni les corps intermédiaires, ni en particulier la famille, de leurs compétences naturelles et de leurs droits, mais qu'au contraire elles doivent les aider à les exercer.

Quant à l'Église, elle ne peut que s'insurger contre cette globalisation impliquant une concentration du pouvoir aux relents totalitaires. Face à l'impossible "cohésion", "globalisation", que l'ONU s'évertue d'imposer en excipant d'un "consensus" toujours précaire, l'Église doit apparaître, à l'instar du Christ, comme un *signe de division*.¹² Elle ne peut cautionner ni une "unité" ni une "universalité" qui seraient suspendues aux vouloirs subjectifs des individus ou imposées par quelque instance publique ou privée. Devant l'émergence d'un nouveau Léviathan, nous ne pouvons rester ni muets, ni inactifs, ni indifférents.

¹¹ Sur cette doctrine, voir notre ouvrage *Destin du Brésil. La technocratie militaire et son idéologie*, Gembloux, Éd. Duculot, 1973; sur le *faisceau* constitutif du pouvoir, voir spécialement pp. 59-65.

¹² Cf. Lc 2, 33s.; 12, 51-53; 21, 12-19; Mt 10, 34-36; 23, 31s.; Jn 1; 6; 1 Jn 3, 22-4, 6.

ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF REDUCING POVERTY IN A GLOBAL WORLD

BEDRICH VYMETALÍK

Among the most pressing problems of the contemporary world are the growing gulf between poverty and wealth and the menace to ecology. In spite of the enormous riches which the economy produces and is able to produce, the major part of humanity still remains in a state of miserable existence.

Everyday thousands of people are dying in the world of hunger. Almost half of humanity – 2.8 billion people – live on less than 2 dollars a day and one fifth – 1.2 billion – live on less than one dollar a day. At its annual conference in Prague in September 2000, the World Bank published the comprehensive document 'World Development Report 2000-2001 – Attacking Poverty'. It is the result of a survey of more than 60.000 people living in poverty in 60 countries of the world, and it confirms with further facts what John Paul II indicates as the 'shame of present society living in abundance, where the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer, because poverty leads to further impoverishment'.¹

At the same time the gulf between wealth and poverty is intensifying not only between rich countries and developing countries but also within individual countries, even in the most developed countries.

The gulf between rich and poor countries is caused directly by contemporary international relations and the functioning of the economy, moved by market forces aimed at profit without regard to humanitarian considerations.

As long as present market mechanisms are retained, the gap between rich and poor will keep growing. Traditional ideas, such as the belief that

¹ Speech of John Paul II, 5.11.2000 on the occasion of the Jubilee of politicians in Vatican.

economic growth will resolve everything, are already proving to be unrealistic. These ideas urgently need to be reevaluated, above all with the help of moral principles, as well as by the concrete proposals given further in this text.

John Paul II justly emphasizes that in the present globalised world, where the market has the tendency to consider as its sole rule the law of maximal profit without regard to morality, it is necessary to adapt the laws of the 'unrestrained' market to laws of justice and solidarity.²

This appeal is still not finding an adequate response even though there is a widespread increase in consciousness of the need to seek suitable solutions. No doubt certain measures were adopted at the meeting of the UN in 1995. However, such solutions have not been effectively put into practice. Apart from Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, the member states of the OECD do not fulfill even these obligations, according to which they should be contributing help to poor countries with 0,7% of their GDP.³

Of course, the best intentions for helping developing countries do not to have to be fully realized. The differences will continue to increase as long as methods are not devised to create a competitive milieu, where economic growth leads to higher living standards for the people in both developing and developed countries.

Calls for even greater distribution of produced goods will also be increasing. In a world founded on unrestricted profit taking, such calls will necessarily meet with increasing resistance. Therefore, democratic procedures are needed which support the extension of direct participation of citizens in forming suitable structures for the common good of society.

General proclamations to this effect are by themselves insufficient. Essential measures are necessary which would solve these problems step by step.

It is necessary:

- to seek solutions which respond to contemporary possibilities for economic growth and which do not increase the gap between poverty and wealth but enable better living conditions for all people.

- to proceed first to give effective help to countries with inadequate GDP in order to form in them a competitive milieu comparable to the competitive milieu of countries with above-average GDP.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Esprit*, French Review, June 2000.

I. *The Possibility of Step-by-step Elimination of the Main Differences Between Advanced and Developing Countries*

A. The necessity of help to developing countries from advanced countries is generally acknowledged today. It is even more urgent because in the next 25 years it is estimated that world population will increase by 2 billion people, 97% of whom will be in developing countries.⁴ James D. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, rightly considers poverty in the midst of wealth as the greatest world problem.⁵

It may be justly objected that help to developing countries is already taking place and that it is not small.

For example, at the end of 1996, 40 countries among the heavily indebted poor countries had an external debt of more than 200 billion U.S. dollars. Payment of this debt caused the situation of the poor countries to get worse. The deficit represents 465% of the yearly exports of these countries, and in some cases it exceeds more than ten times the yearly export value.⁶ In addition the possibilities of export to developed countries are limited. For example, the export of agricultural products as the main article of export of many poor countries is confronted by the protectionist measures in developed countries.⁷

Unsatisfactory results of the struggle against poverty in countries of the third world have a number of causes. These results are brought about by many factors, internal as well as external. According to the World Bank, internal factors include civil wars, corruption, unsuitable economic policy, deformed price relations, deteriorating conditions for international commerce, and often inability and unwillingness of politicians to proceed to more radical reforms because of unstable political situations in their own countries.⁸

As external factors, the World Bank lists the necessity of expanding market access in rich countries for goods and services from developing

⁴ *World Development Report 2000-2001, Attacking Poverty*. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 2000, p. 6.

⁵ *World Development Report, Attacking Poverty*. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, Introduction.

⁶ Hans Tietmeyer, *The Social Market Economy and Monetary Stability*, Economica Ltd., London, p. 112-113.

⁷ *World Development Report 2000-2001, Attacking Poverty*, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, p. 180.

⁸ Hans Tietmeyer, *The Social Market Economy and Monetary Stability*, Economica Ltd., London, p. 113.

countries, reduction of the risk of economic crises, encouragement of production of international public goods that benefit poor people, and ensuring a voice for poor countries and poor people in global forums.⁹

Many critics point out the wrong approach of lending institutions which undermines the help by connecting it with the acceptance of unrealistic 'Structural Adjustment Programs', which do more harm than good to recipients. Requirements of these programs which are typically aimed at shortening social expenditure, budget expenditure, cancellation of subsidies for basic necessities, orientation toward production of export goods, of cancellation of import duties often bring further reduction of living standards and lead to political instability favoring dictatorships. Evidence exists that such programs of structural adjustment are drawing developing countries further into debt. According to information from the OECD, since the beginning of the 1990s all countries of the third world obtained 927 billion U.S. dollars of development aid in different ways during the years between 1982 and 1990. At the same time these countries made payments to banks of 1345 billion U.S. dollars for debts and interest. Although they paid more, the debts have grown to 1450 billion U.S. dollars in 1990.¹⁰

The coordination of even well-intended help is frequently insufficient. The study of the World Bank, for example, discloses that in the early 1990s in Tanzania there were 40 donors and more than 2000 projects. In Ghana during the same period 64 different government or quasi-government institutions were receiving aid. Coordinating these efforts to support a coherent development strategy is nearly impossible.¹¹

In addition, after experience with a series of financial crises, measures offered by international institutions are accepted with mistrust and considered as interference in domestic policy.

The provided help is still insufficient and does not lead to necessary results. On the contrary, in many cases it deteriorates the situation of the poor countries. Evidently, present forms of help as well mechanisms for providing this help need reevaluation.

To establish a certain consensus of applying acceptable measures is therefore necessary.

⁹ *World Development Report 2000-2001, Attacking Poverty*, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, p. 179.

¹⁰ Jan Keller, *A help that too often harms*, Pohledy, Review for Politics, Economy, Sociology and History, Published by Czech Trade Union Prague, CZ, n° 3-4/2000.

¹¹ *World Development Report 2000-2001, Attacking Poverty*, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, p. 193.

The sole operation of market mechanisms in the present globalised economy is not sufficient and, on the contrary, intensifies differences. Therefore, it is necessary to connect help with application of direct measures which together with market mechanisms lead to forming a competitive milieu in which there exist preconditions for realization of direct investments followed by positive effects of a market character. Of course, this help should not go to countries which do not respect democratic structures and where the danger exists that totalitarian regimes will abuse it.

According to our view the main cause of the unsatisfactory economic situation is the fact that the competitive milieu existing in countries with below-average GDP does not enable progress in more advanced production and other advanced processes. Present conditions of exchange of products between countries with underdeveloped economic processes and countries with above-averaged GDP lead under conditions of existing market economy to steadily growing divergences between poverty in the developing countries and wealth in the advanced countries. To do away with this main cause of the problem it is necessary to form systematically infrastructures in countries with below-average GDP.

These infrastructures must include information technology, education possibilities, and the formation of other necessary factors, such as access to products of scientific and technological research, provision of public health service, as well as the formation of factors of an ecological character.

With the help of these measures a market milieu in these countries will be formed. This will enable direct investments of a market character which, according to experience, are the most suitable way to enable economic progress.

B. In this situation it is to be recommended that *the U.N. puts into place a 'Social Contract of Globalization'*. This would require that member states participate and that an agreement would be reached on measures concerning advantageous help to countries with below-average GDP.¹² Of key importance is the agreement on annual appropriations from economically developed countries to underdeveloped countries. According to this agreement countries with above-average per capita GDP would give regularly in set amounts appropriations for countries which fall below this index.

At the same time this social contract of globalization presupposes agreement concerning:

¹² UN Regional Commission Essay, *Globalization and its Impact on the Global Economy* 24.5.2000, <http://www.un.org/Dept/renyo/no 6199/ESSAY.htm>.

- the mechanism of delivery of appropriations to the central fund
- using resources from this central fund only for projects helping economic and social advancement of developing countries.

Above all these projects should support the step-by-step abolition of the above mentioned main cause of the unequal competitive milieus, which up to now are causing the steady expansion of differences between poverty and wealth.

Financial resources should be given only to countries which will fulfill necessary conditions for the granting of these resources. Among these conditions it is necessary to list the following: no repression of private initiative, as well as the promotion of public goods such as education, health care, and the rule of law.¹³

The U.N. should establish the agreed measures with the help of the institutions which the participants will confirm.

Evidently *the main institution should be the World Bank*, which today also has among its tasks providing credit help and economic consultancy for developing countries with the aim of abolishing poverty.

Financial resources for help should not be passed to state organs of relevant countries. In each country the authorization process of individual projects, allocation of funds concerning these projects, as well as control of their qualified utilization should be provided by the institution commissioned by the UN for realizing the 'Social Contract of Globalization'. This restriction of actions to local organs in countries which will be included in the 'Social Contract', seems necessary in the interests of getting optimal benefits from relevant funds.

Experience within the EU concerning help to economically weaker countries in order to equalize economic levels indicates that such help can lead to acceptable results.

The application of initiative for the HIPC Debt Relief Initiative with active strategic participation of these countries also shows that much needed reduction of deficits may be reached in such a way that it does not lead to new debts.

In this connection the World Bank makes reference to the experience of Uganda as the first country which used this initiative in May 2000. The government of Uganda founded the Poverty Action Fund by means of which the country uses financial resources for agreed purposes with maximal possible transparency.¹⁴

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *World Development Report 2000-2001, Attacking Poverty*, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, p. 204.

Of course, critics point out that this is the first and only case of such an approach. Nevertheless, to seek and to find new forms of help is urgent.

James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, declared in July 2000, 'The United States and Europe do not understand, that without massive effective investment in the developing world, there will be no peace in 20 years'.¹⁵

The 'Social Contract of Globalization' project will in this way be an effective help to prevent further growth of poverty in the globalised world.

II. *New approaches need to be found in a global economy*

There is a growing gap between the poor and the rich which brings about a growing feeling of danger. It has found its expression in numerous protests against globalization, which is often considered as being the cause of the present situation. However globalization as such is not the culprit. Rather it 'globalizes' and sharpens current problems the causes of which need to be looked for elsewhere. Moreover globalization is a historical process that can not be reversed. Just as workers in the 18th century could not stop the advance of industrial society by destroying machines that took away their work, protest against globalization only deflect attention from the real causes of current problems. To a large extent they stem from a misunderstanding of the fact that in a radically changed and changing world, it is not possible to solve problems using the usual old procedures. new means must be found that are better suited to our changing world.

The Coming of Information Society

Our behavior and attitudes are based on our experience of the so-called industrial society spanning the 19th and 20th century, in which we are still living. Its main means of creating wealth were productively allocating capital and manual labor. Its main social groups were capitalists and workers. This society achieved an unequalled growth of wealth and productivity. According to P.F. Drucker, labor productivity of manual worker has increased 50 times¹⁶ in the course of 100 years.

Nevertheless, the age of industrial society has irrecoverably come to its end. The way of wealth creation has changed. The main social groups have

¹⁵ Lidové noviny, Daily Paper, Prague, CZ, 11.7.2000.

¹⁶ P.F. Drucker, *Post-capitalist society*, Czech Edition Management Press 1993, p. 40.

changed as well. A rapid advance of modern technologies, in particular in the information and communication field, together with the so much discussed globalization, calls for new attitudes and new, different ways of thinking. People talk about the coming of information society, post-industrial society, a new economy or even a third civilization wave (Tofler).

The following significant changes have been suggested as being typical for the new society:

The decisive source of growth of wealth are not any longer money, physical capital, or land but human knowledge. Productivity growth is less dependent on manual work, however well organized, than on the utilization of human knowledge and on the way of how well used it is. Under certain conditions one can acquire modern technologies, machines, capital, raw materials. However a more durable competitive advantage under global hyper-competition rests in the use of knowledge, ideas, and innovation. These latter resources add value today and are essential for the growth of society's wealth. Education, and lifelong education in particular, is becoming a challenge and a condition for success. Good basic education of all the children has been proved as an efficient long term investment in a fight against poverty. People working with knowledge and those who manage them (knowledge managers) and who must allocate knowledge (instead of capital) for productive use, have become the dominant society groups.

Side by side to them a large social group of service and ancillary workers without the required knowledge (service workers)¹⁷ has grown. Their humanly acceptable integration into the future global world presents a fundamental social problem and a challenge. The number of knowledge workers in the developed countries is growing (according to Peter Drucker it represents two-fifths of American work force in the United States¹⁸ and the demand of them will grow further). However as more and more knowledge is being incorporated into products, facilities and services, the economic and social situation of the second group is getting rather worse. The transfer of traditional production from developed to developing countries brings certain reduction of poverty in the developing countries, but the gap between poverty and wealth is not being eliminated. A significant portion of profits flows back to the parent country.

In the developed countries the supply and allocation of capital has taken on some new features in recent years. Pension funds and open invest-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14-15.

¹⁸ P.F. Drucker, *Management Challenges for the 21st Century*, Butterworth-Heinemann Oxford, Great Britain, 1999; Czech Edition Management Press, p. 135.

ment funds have become main shareholders in public companies. In the United States, pension funds own 40% of all American publicly registered corporations and probably over 60% of big corporations. A similar trend is beginning to emerge in other developed countries.¹⁹

The funds concentrate large financial power. They invest on behalf of their shareholders but are managed by professionals. Usually they do not invest into a particular company but they purchase shares in an open market where shares frequently pass from hand to hand. Their prime interest is high dividends for the shareholders. Such is also necessarily the interest of shareholders of supranational corporations, which usually have no knowledge about the particulars of wealth creation by their corporations in various countries.

The well-known problem of control and authority in corporate management (corporate governance) and the problem of having influence on corporate performance is presently solved mainly from the viewpoint of fund shareholders, that is, by upholding the shareholder model with the aim of maximizing the share value. The stakeholder model, in which mainly those who actively create the company assets share in the created value, is preferred less. Both models allow for the possibility of extended capital participation by citizens in wealth creation and thus improve the population's material position.

The stakeholder model stimulates the interest in long term efficiency of the firm and can play an important role in satisfying the ambitions of knowledge workers as holders of the decisive asset of a contemporary company. The shareholder model allows other social strata, those that do not work in public limited companies, to participate in share capital.

New aspects of ownership and work

These contemporary changes require new approaches to ownership and work:

In a knowledge society, in which intellectual capital plays the main role in wealth creation, it apparently will be necessary to tie company ownership to the person who is the owner of such capital. The value of most contemporary companies consists of their non-material assets, their accumulated abilities and experience, their trademarks, research, and management skills.²⁰

¹⁹ P.F. Drucker, ed. cit. p. 62.

²⁰ Charles Handy, *The Hungry Spirit. Beyond Capitalism a Quest for Purpose in the Modern World*, Hutchinson, London, 1997; Czech Edition, Management Press, p. 70.

If somebody buys such a company, s/he primarily buys 'a hope that the best employees working in the company will stay there and carry on their work for the new owner' (Charles Handy).²¹ Regardless how the value of the nonmaterial assets of the company is estimated, their true owners are those employees in who keep these assets in their heads. And it is not possible to take the assets from their heads without their assent and preserve their creativity at the same time, as Robert Reich reminds us in a different context.²² Hence to see a company as a sole possession of the people who finance it does not correspond to economic conditions of today. 'In the economy of tomorrow, in which knowledge is an asset, we need to see that everyone has the right to own a part of the assets and wealth which he creates', Charles Handy concludes. From this point of view the stakeholder model is becoming topical for public limited companies and not only for them. Today, when knowledge becomes the main means of production and the holders of intellectual capital are becoming an increasingly more important social group, work, as a practical application of people's knowledge, gains in importance. In turn, a search for ways of stimulating employees' creativity gains in importance, and in particular, ways of stimulating their interest in the optimal results of the company. Making working conditions worse or using authoritarian management methods become contra-productive. Enormous productivity growth in developed countries makes further growth of services possible and, probably, it will permit an increase in investment into the so-called non-productive areas, preferably into a range of useful and needed but unpaid human activities, such as child care, family care and others. Not only production activity but also every useful human activity, in which one realizes himself as a person, can be considered as work.

Thoughts about the so-called end of work, called out by the unemployment growth accompanying the production growth in developed countries, are apparently not well founded. However, in a society based on knowledge and education it is fully justified and needed to promote a culture of work which will allow for self-realization in the production process.

Poverty amidst affluence as a challenge

At a first glance, the changes connected with the coming of information society (or a new economy) are positive. They bring a more rapid growth of

²¹ Charles Handy, ed. cit., p. 141.

²² Robert Reich, *The World of Nations*, published by Alfred Knopf, New York 1991; Czech Edition, p. 118.

wealth, higher productivity and, at the same time, they emphasize the role of the human factor. Human knowledge is becoming the decisive source of the growth of wealth. The main company asset is the intellectual capital. Its ownerships is tied to a particular person and, in its own way, it legitimizes the person's claim for a share of value brought about by this ownership.

Creativity, initiative and resourcefulness are the requirements of a culture of work based on the application of knowledge. In an increasingly more complicated and interconnected global economy cooperation and partnership, network organization and teamwork are becoming an important organizational principle for achieving results. Confidence in the partners to honor agreements and to play by the rules turns out to be necessary for the working of the economy, and it equally applies to those who otherwise do not respect ethical principles.

From this point of view the new economy shows a positive potential for developed countries (where it operates) at least. The perspectives are also positive from the point of view of the church's social doctrine. The assumed growing demand for knowledge workers can expand the perspectives into new fields (internet, business-to-business, and other modern ways of enterprise) and create new job opportunities.

The problem arises however from that the 'positive perspectives' are mostly set into a social framework where ruthlessness is considered a driving power of success and a necessity in market competition. Furthermore, the 'positive perspectives' still apply, and for a long time will apply, to relatively narrow social groups, others being excluded from the benefits.

Global hyper-competition based on a ruthless drive for personal benefits makes the status of workers without education worse and excludes a significant part of them to the society's periphery. Even qualified employees in developed countries are worried about growing job insecurity. Even a prosperous enterprise can be relocated to a different country if it can thus increase profits, as psychiatrist Iver Hartz, professor at the psychiatric and neural clinic Eppendorf in Hamburg, demonstrates on an example of a supranational concern in Hamburg.²³ Even qualified employees then often feel like chess pieces in a game of somebody else's interests and alien powers. It does not improve their contribution to the company's prosperity, nor does it help the economy. Worries and insecurity at work are often identified as the root of a series of health complaints, particularly depression and

²³ Harmut Volk, Wenn sich im Unternehmen die Angst breit macht, *Die Tagespost*, Katholische Zeitung für Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur, 12.10.2000, Würzburg, BRD.

back troubles, which are widespread.²⁴ A society of ruthless competition, in which 'the winner takes all', leaves behind a number of 'other runners on the track' and deepens social differences.

The forms of use of limited natural resources, such as space, clear air and water, are no less important from the viewpoint of the distribution of wealth. For instance the use of space, especially in the form of urban or other land, produces scarcity rent an exclusive appropriation of which further deepens unequal distribution of incomes and property. Call for a taxation of scarcity rent has not met an appropriate response so far.

The attempts of the rich to hide in attractive well-secured 'ghettos', providing them with refined comfort (such as a suburb of Johannesburg or Alphaville in Brazil), do not contribute to the resolution of wide social disparities, rather they raise social tension in the long run.

The growth in poverty amidst affluence becomes a potential serious threat for the contemporary world. It contradicts main principles of Catholic social teaching – its principles of solidarity and common good. The key requirement of the teaching of universal determination of wealth for all people remains unfulfilled. The church defends the right of private property but it asks for such a property creation and distribution that it can serve to everybody. This requirement is more important at present than anytime before.

However these arguments should not lead to a rejection the new economy, globalization, or the whole social transformation, which is necessary for a transition to a new society. Rather they should lead to carrying through a transformation that will be compatible with common sense ethical principles and a real care for human beings. Elimination of poverty amidst affluence is possible and necessary. The impoverishment of workers 100 years ago, caused by a contradiction between work and capital, was no less depressing. The contradiction was gradually and successfully solved through cooperation between labor and capital, through the growth of labor productivity that made higher wages possible. It brought improvement in material conditions of manual workers and their transformation into a middle class. New technology gradually reduced the share of blue-collar work.

Similarly at present there is no other possibility than to search for new solutions suited to present conditions and needs and, as a priority, to strive for social consensus in their implementation. In the search for a solution,

²⁴ *Die Tagespost*, *ibid.*

the possibility of wider capital participation of citizens, as an alternative source of their income, should not be omitted.

Capital participation as a way of improving citizens's material situation

In societies where the main source of people's incomes is employment (wages) only one cannot expect a significant income growth (with the exception of top managers and experts). Employers are not interested in wage growth since it raises their costs. Wage growth without a link to productivity brings a danger of inflation. Proposals for providing an alternative income source show new possibilities. If people are given an opportunity to use a part of their savings for capital participation in companies, they gain another source of income from capital, apart from wages. It does not increase wage costs and, hence, it does not involve inflation risk, neither the competitiveness of companies is threatened. Also, companies have access to additional capital without having to obtain a loan. Citizen participation in productive capital requires such conditions to be created that encourage the particular form of investment. Among other things, it includes preferential tax treatment or other advantages. Positive experience with savings in building societies or with life insurance in some countries may be applied to the area of capital investing. The German Association of Catholic Entrepreneurs (Der Bund Katholischer Unternehmer) published a series of suggestions in this respect applicable in European conditions.²⁵

Experience from the United States appears to confirm that entrepreneurial expectations connected to a wider citizen capital participation in business increases consumer demand even under a zero or low income growth and stimulates economic activity. In the United States, for the first time in history, a large class of employed capitalists has emerged, men and women, whose wealth generating activities involve both labor incomes and capital ownership. More than a half of all Americans are owners of shares either directly or through collective investing.²⁶

The employees' capital participation can be financed from a share in profit or, under certain limited conditions, in the form of 'investment wage', or in other forms. Employee shares, share options, etc. may be used. Public support for citizens' capital participation in business may improve materi-

²⁵ Cf, for example, *Beteiligung der Bürger am Produktivvermögen, Verpflichtendes Ziel der Katholischen Soziallehre*, Paulinus-Verlag, Trier, 1996.

²⁶ James K. Glassman, *Reporter of the Washington Post for Euro, Economic Review*, n° 6, 8/2000 published by Euronews, a.s. Prague, CZ.

al position of the population at large and reduce the gap between the poor and the rich. However people must be free to decide how to invest their savings. For their decision-making, some aspects should be emphasized:

1. Experience and research suggest that companies in which the stakeholders (i.e. those who have economic links to the company) participate both in management and in profit and capital are most efficient. Several studies document this point.²⁷

2. The stakeholder model supports the link between the management and ownership rights in the governance system of a company. It shortens the communication chains and improves the quality of decision making. Among others, Josef Stiglitz, the former main economist of World Bank, referred to this fact at the Annual Conference on developing economies in April 1999.²⁸

3. The stakeholder model can best satisfy the demands of knowledge workers, the owners of intellectual capital who lend their ability to create wealth to the company and necessarily have interest in its long term efficiency. The adoption of the stakeholder model will often be a condition for keeping these workers in the company.

4. The stakeholder model fully corresponds not only to the requirement of economic efficiency but also to the principles of the social doctrine of the church which has always been emphasizing that those who create values should also have an ownership share in the newly created values.

5. Nevertheless, there is a number of activities and branches in the non-profit sector, in the state apparatus, health service, education system, etc., where the stakeholder model cannot be used. Even in these activities participation in productive capital should be made possible through investment funds or publicly traded company shares. There are apparently no other possibilities in the current situation where the proportion of employees in the productive (primary and secondary) sectors permanently falls. At the same time this way extends private ownership to a larger number of participants. In this context Professor Ockenfels observes that the latter approach cannot be considered as immoral,²⁹ since it subordinates ownership to a higher principle

²⁷ Cf, for example, Alan Blinder, *Paying for Productivity*, Washington D.C. Brookings Institution 1999, or Chris Doucouliagos, *Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta Analysis-Industrial and the Labor Relations Review*, Cornell University, October 1995.

²⁸ Josef Stiglitz, *Whither Reform?, Ten Years of the Transition*, Paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C. S. April 28.-30.1999.

²⁹ Wolfgang Ockenfels, *Kann denn shareholder-value-Denken Sünde sein?*, 'Die Tagespost' from 19.8.2000, Würzburg, BRD.

of the universal determination of material goods (*Gaudium et Spes* 69-71). 'God has given earth to the whole human race in order to provide for all its members without excluding or giving advantage to anybody. In this is the core of the universal determination of earthly goods' reminds us John Paul II.³⁰

6. Hence the shareholder model should not be given priority to the detriment of the stakeholder one, nor is it possible to put through the stakeholder model only since it would exclude some classes from ownership. The stakeholder model should be favored where it is possible, since it also better serves to the long term efficiency of the company. The shareholder model should enable those, who otherwise would not have access to private property, to have a share in it. Both models could purposefully contribute to the improvement of citizens' material position.

Income from a standard job and, apart from it, an income from capital property, can form two pillars of material security for a man in the new economy and provide him/her with a more favorable economic environment for his personal and family independence and thus help to extend human freedom.³¹ Also it can be one of the ways contributing to reduction of poverty amidst affluence.

A globalization of solidarity instead of a globalization of ruthlessness

The global economy requires a global solution. All analyses confirm that economic growth on its own does not resolve the problem of poverty, rather, it makes it worse. A growing wave of mega-mergers even endangers the principle of free competition. Hence the philosophy of ruthless growth, on which these developments are based, requires to be reappraised.

In contrast human capital is becoming more and more a decisive economic asset and cooperation and partnership are considered an important organizational principle in the economy. It is found that the economy needs the observance of an ethical code for its smooth operation. It implies that the accent on the values of human development and social protection gains in importance. Then globalization needs not to be regarded as a danger, but as a historical opportunity for the enrichment of human life. Social structures that would stimulate this development need to be supported. The idea of a replacing of the present globalization of ruthlessness with a globalization of solidarity does not need to remain only an empty challenge.

³⁰ *Centesimus Annus* § 31.

³¹ *Gaudium et Spes* §§ 69-71.

CONCLUDING SESSION*

* The two texts published here were presented by Professors Minnerath and Ramirez during the session and are published as such. Because of a lack of time, the authors of the papers discussed did not have an opportunity to comment on the interpretations offered. (E.M.)

LA GLOBALISATION ET L'ÉTHIQUE OU L'ÉTHIQUE DE LA GLOBALISATION?

ROLAND MINNERATH

Les deux formulations suggérées par le titre ne sont pas indifférentes. La première suggère que le phénomène observé est analysé à la lumière de l'éthique, qui a sa consistance propre par rapport à lui. La deuxième laisse entendre que le phénomène contient en lui-même sa propre éthique.

Le but de notre Académie est de faire dialoguer les sciences sociales avec la doctrine sociale de l'Eglise (DSE). Nous avons traité un thème en lui-même orienté sur l'éthique. Nous pouvons donc confronter, dans un premier temps, les types d'approche pratiqués.

La démarche de la DSE est résolument normative. Elle part de l'analyse des situations réelles et exerce sur elles un discernement inspiré par des principes et des valeurs qui sont ancrées dans la nature humaine elle-même. Ces principes ont leur racine dans les besoins universels de l'homme. Ils ont un fondement rationnel et sont confirmés et éclairés par la révélation biblique. Les deux sources de la connaissance que sont la raison et la foi sont les deux sources de la DSE.

La DSE a sa source dans une vision de l'homme, une anthropologie. La personne humaine est au centre de tout l'ordre social et de toute éthique humaine. La DSE est une éthique de la personne insérée dans les différents milieux qui l'humanisent: la famille, l'entreprise, les associations, éventuellement la communauté religieuse, les corps intermédiaires, l'Etat, la société internationale. La DSE est réaliste: elle prend en compte les besoins des personnes concrètes. Les personnes ne sont jamais des moyens de l'agir social quel qu'il soit, mais des fins. La DSE est téléologique: les personnes agissent en vue d'une fin qui révèle le sens de l'action. La DSE est une morale eudémonique: elle consiste à apprendre à vivre heureux. La DSE est normative; elle prétend dire ce que l'homme est. Ses normes sont donc fondées

sur ce que l'homme est. La DSE présuppose que l'homme en société peut maîtriser son destin, se choisir des objectifs sous la forme d'un bien commun. Pour elle, les processus historiques ne sont pas des fatalités. Les hommes disposent d'une marge de manœuvre pour se créer un milieu humanisant. Ils peuvent donc agir en se fixant des objectifs.

Les approches éthiques courantes sont d'un ordre différent. Elles sont généralement fonctionnelles. Elles cherchent à mettre en lumière comment un système donné peut être piloté de façon à répondre à certains besoins. Elles sont des éthiques des systèmes, non de la personne. Les personnes sont des variables des systèmes. Ces éthiques fonctionnelles oscillent entre deux extrêmes: tantôt le système doit être laissé à lui-même, car il est auto-régulateur; tantôt il faut que le système se plie à des directives volontaristes. Dans les deux cas nous avons une éthique systémique. Le libéralisme considèrerait le marché comme le système régulateur, dans lequel la volonté commune ne devait pas intervenir. Le collectivisme construisait un système à partir d'une idéologie dans lequel le jeu des libertés individuelles était proscrit.

Les variantes de cette approche éthique sont multiples. Les éthiques néo-libérales sont des morales du consensus. Elles partent des contraintes des systèmes et se demandent quelle valeur représentent les différentes composantes du système. A un extrême elles disent qu'il n'y a de valeur que marchande; à l'autre que la valeur est celle qu'y attache le corps social.

A partir de ses présupposés propres, la DSE aborde le phénomène de la globalisation en posant, par exemple, les questions suivantes:

- l'analyse du phénomène est-elle menée en vue de discerner des objectifs volontaristes à promouvoir pour répondre aux besoins réels des personnes concernées par la globalisation?
- quel rôle joue, dans l'appréciation du phénomène et sa maîtrise, le principe de la destination universelle des biens de la création?
- à quel niveau faut-il définir des politiques de régulation effective de la globalisation?
- peut-on identifier un bien commun universel, et quelles institutions seraient à son service?

Les travaux de notre VIIe session ont permis de dégager, semble-t-il, trois champs de tension entre la proposition de la DSE et les analyses qui ont été exposées.

1. Tout d'abord au niveau du *diagnostic du phénomène*. Aucune analyse n'est exempte de présupposés de départ. Quelle lecture font de la globalisation les experts (au service de qui?), les pauvres, les entreprises exportatri-

ces, les investisseurs, les gouvernements, les Eglises? Dans nos travaux, je relève trois types d'approches:

a) Une approche résolument normative à partir de la vision de la DSE. C'est celle de *Restrepo* et *Schooyans*. Elles disent les priorités qu'il convient de se fixer pour corriger les effets négatifs de la globalisation.

b) Une approche d'éthique systémique, descriptive (*Crocker*) qui débouche aussi sur une proposition.

c) Des approches d'observateurs qui se veulent neutres, dont le point d'observation est soit une Organisation internationale (*Dembinski*, *Diabré*, *Macedo*), soit une lecture au second degré (*Morandé*).

La globalisation est vécue autrement par les pays qui n'en ont pas eu l'initiative et qui la subissent plus qu'ils ne la choisissent. Ceux-ci sont, pour la plupart, des pays d'ancienne colonisation européenne, qui ont connu les programmes de développement dans lesquels ils ont vu une tentative d'exportation du modèle social occidental. Ils se demandent si la globalisation n'est pas une nouvelle forme de colonisation.

Certaines analyses privilégient la recherche *des causes*, d'autres étudient les effets de la globalisation.

a) *Diabré*: Pour l'heure, la globalisation a été poussée par l'expansion des marchés. Elle a profité à un cinquième de la population mondiale et a marginalisé le reste. A côté de la croissance des échanges, des investissements directs internationaux et des puissantes firmes multinationales, une des caractéristiques de la globalisation est le volume très élevé des transactions financières internationales et leur indépendance croissante par rapport aux opérations économiques réelles. Les pays dits émergents ont exporté de la haute technologie vers les marchés de l'OCDE.

Dembinski: Les trois moteurs de la globalisation seraient 1-la technologie de l'information (flux rapide et stockage, processus en temps réel); 2-le triomphe de l'ethos de l'efficacité (protestantisme et utilitarisme?) sans égard pour ce qui n'est pas son intérêt économique; 3-la société ouverte dans laquelle les passions ne sont plus freinées par la religion ni par la politique (nationaliste, par ex.), le grand régulateur restant le marché et la liberté individuelle.

Morandé: Longtemps la fidélité à la tradition culturelle du groupe servait à fonder la légitimité des actes humains. Puis sont venues les prescriptions de la loi écrite et l'Etat de droit. Au niveau global, c'est l'innovation technologique qui est motrice, notamment l'interaction de l'homme avec la machine intelligente.

Archer invite à différencier l'analyse des rapports entre la culture traditionnelle et les tendances vers l'uniformisation. Les idées et comportements

nouveaux sont reçus et modifiés par les cultures traditionnelles. Il y a des phénomènes de syncrétisme culturel. Avec Glendon, elle relève que l'Église doit envisager différemment son effort d'inculturation dans des cultures qui subissent ces changements rapides.

b) Les analyses ont été plus abondantes concernant *les effets* entraînés par le phénomène.

Morandé: Le développement des nouvelles technologies produit des inclus et des exclus. La technologie crée des machines intelligentes qui homogénéisent et standardisent la notion de ce qu'est une décision rationnelle. Jusqu'ici l'idéologie se basait sur la différenciation entre le passé rejeté et le futur à construire. Aujourd'hui les informations sont traitées en "temps réel"; ne compte plus que le présent (l'économie monétaire, le besoin de jouissance immédiate). Il n'y a plus de dialogue entre les générations. La mémoire historique n'intéresse personne. Le futur est opaque et sans promesse.

Dembinski: La globalisation se manifeste par de nouvelles interdépendances: la financiarisation de l'économie et sa distance croissance par rapport à l'économie réelle; émancipation des très grandes entreprises par rapport à tout contrôle public et même par rapport à leur marché qu'elles conditionnent; le passage d'une économie de biens à une économie de services. Elles tendent à devenir des entreprises globales. Les activités moins globalisables deviennent dépendantes des activités globalisées.

Trois types de conséquences de la globalisation ont été plus particulièrement soulignées:

- La globalisation a entraîné un *appauvrissement des plus pauvres*.

Diabré: L'ouverture des marchés est l'idéologie prescrite aux pays en développement. La société civile s'est mobilisée souvent contre le phénomène (Seattle, Québec). Les économies développées sont les bénéficiaires de la globalisation. De 1970 à 1990 le revenu par tête de nombreux pays en développement a diminué. L'inégalité des revenus par tête s'est accru entre Nord et Sud. Les 10 personnes les plus riches du monde possèdent 1,5 fois plus en capital que le revenu des (40?) pays moins développés. La globalisation non maîtrisée a nui aux plus pauvres par la répartition inégale des investissements (qui recherche les marchés prometteurs et délaisse les pays pauvres en pouvoir d'achat et en formation; elle a accentué l'insécurité de l'emploi). L'ouverture des marchés de capitaux a accru le risque de contagion des crises financières. La libéralisation du commerce a fait chuter les taxes sur le commerce extérieur des pays pauvres. La globalisation a accentué la pauvreté des femmes et des enfants, spécialement en Afrique.

Cette vision a été fortement discutée. Les causes de l'appauvrissement ne peuvent pas être attribuées à la seule globalisation, qui entraîne aussi des effets de redressement. On n'a guère mentionné la dette extérieure des pays en développement dont le service épuise les capacités d'autofinancement des investissements sociaux et des infrastructures.

– La globalisation a favorisé l'expansion de la *corruption*:

Morandé: Alors que l'Etat de droit étend ses tentacules dans tous les domaines, se développe la vie hors légalité: corruption, narco-trafics, évasion fiscale, crime organisé, etc. Il suffit de disposer de l'information pertinente pour que tout ce qu'il est possible finisse par se réaliser.

Macedo s'interroge sur le rapport entre globalisation et gouvernance. La réponse nationale à la globalisation doit être la lutte contre la corruption; l'intégration régionale introduit une pression entre pairs (peer pressure) en vue d'améliorer la politique. On constate que la corruption décline dans le long terme dans les sociétés plus ouvertes, et avec le niveau de développement. La corruption n'est pas liée spécialement aux entreprises privées, mais aussi au secteur étatique. La demande sociale et les entreprises elles-mêmes poussent à réformer les institutions. Plus de transparence, plus de démocratie réduisent la corruption.

– L'impact de la globalisation sur *la culture*:

Morandé: Les cultures nationales ont été relativisées. En profitent les grands mouvements universalistes, y compris les grandes religions. La culture n'est plus chargée de légitimer l'Etat national et sa souveraineté. L'éducation encourage la spécialisation sectorielle au détriment de la recherche du sens des actions par leur finalité: le savoir, pas la sagesse; l'analyse, pas la synthèse.

Averintsev dénonce le mythe du "clash des civilisations", comme si des hommes culturellement homogénéisés allaient devenir meilleurs.

Zampetti voit dans la globalisation l'avènement d'une nouvelle culture, après celle de l'individu absolutisé. L'Etat s'efface davantage devant la société civile et la communauté internationale prend en charge les équilibres mondiaux.

2. La question de *la régulation* et le principe de *subsidiarité*.

La DSE suppose que les phénomènes sociaux peuvent être orientés, contrôlés, corrigés par la volonté commune qui s'exprime par des institutions représentatives chargées de servir le bien commun. La volonté politique est supposée orientée vers des objectifs choisis pour leur qualité éthique intrinsèque. Cette volonté s'exprime aux différents niveaux où elle doit relever un défi. C'est le principe de subsidiarité. Nulle instance supé-

rieure ne doit priver une instance inférieure de sa responsabilité d'assurer les régulations qu'elle est en mesure d'entreprendre.

La globalisation nous place devant des situations encore inconnues de la DSE classique : la question posée est celle des institutions régulatrices des marchés globaux et de leurs effets induits; l'autre est la question même de la permanence du politique.

Le présupposé à toute question concernant une emprise volontaire sur le système est d'admettre que l'homme dispose d'un pouvoir réel sur le cours de l'histoire. Certaines philosophies fatalistes ne l'admettent pas. *Rémond* l'a rappelé. La théorie libérale préconisait le laisser-faire des mécanismes du marché. *Morandé* s'interroge sur la place laissée à la politique: les décisions communes se prennent dans la sphère de la technologie. Les décisions politiques sont *ex post factum*. On parle de 'légitimation par la procédure': celle-ci affecte d'abord les bureaucraties anonymes, puis les comportements personnels eux-mêmes. Le processus affecte l'anthropologie.

a) Pourquoi réguler? Deux types de réponse ont été données:

Arrow: il faut réguler les marchés financiers pour le succès même du marché.

D'autres mettent l'accent sur la nécessité de réguler pour obtenir un meilleur accès de tous à la croissance.

b) Améliorer la gouvernance: personne ne conteste la nécessité d'une gouvernance capable de réguler le marché global, notamment le marché financier.

Macedo: Les marchés opèrent différemment selon le cadre institutionnel. On cite Fukuyama, *The End of history* avec sa vision de l'expansion universelle du marché et de sa victoire sur l'Etat. Le "consensus de Washington" est synonyme de confiance aveugle au marché, et réduction de l'Etat au minimum. La notion de bien commun global fait son chemin. Il n'est pas dit que l'ONU, sauf réforme, soit le mieux à même de le promouvoir. L'UE est exemplaire d'une gouvernance régionale à contrôle démocratique. Dans les pays en développement, l'arrivée du marché global doit entraîner des réformes de gouvernance. Ce n'est pas la globalisation mais la mauvaise gouvernance qui crée de nouveaux exclus. Unité globale doit être conjuguée avec diversité régionale et nationale (UE). Les pays européens doivent améliorer leur gouvernance par rapport à la globalisation, et découvrir leur bien commun régional, en réagissant contre l'incohérence actuelle des quinze politiques de développement et la faiblesse intégrative de la zone euro.

Diabré: La globalisation maîtrisée peut conduire à l'éradication de la pauvreté. L'accroissement des échanges ne suffit pas à entraîner une rédu-

tion de la pauvreté. Il faut une forte gouvernance: des institutions axées sur le marché mais contrôlées par l'Etat (ex Corée du Sud). L'Etat doit veiller à une meilleure distribution des revenus. Il faut une politique macro-économique avec des objectifs sociaux, d'abord en faveur des revenus les plus faibles, en commençant par l'éducation. Diabré regrette que l'investissement international ne suive pas les améliorations apportées à la gouvernance, quand la corruption est mieux jugulée.

Dembinski: La gouvernance devrait veiller à limiter le poids des considérations purement économiques dans l'ensemble de la vie sociale, et éviter que la société entière ne devienne esclave consentant des desseins holistes de l'économie intégrale.

c) Quel devrait être l'organe régulateur? les réponses hésitent entre l'Etat et les organismes internationaux:

Crocker présente un panorama des options en présence: Pour humaniser et démocratiser la globalisation, trois projets existent: 1-l'internationalisme libéral: les Etats nationaux négocient avec les institutions internationales, et reconnaissent de plus en plus leur compétence (Cour Pénale Internationale); 2-le radicalisme républicain: démanteler les Etats – nations et les institutions internationales et confier le gouvernement à des communautés locales alternatives reliées à leur environnement naturel, résistantes à toute globalisation; 3-la démocratie cosmopolite: favoriser la démocratie directe et représentative à tous les niveaux, donner vie à la société civile; partager la souveraineté avec d'autres dans des institutions transnationales. La citoyenneté aura plusieurs niveaux d'actualisation.

Griffith-Jones: Depuis 1990, une année sur trois a connu des crises financières. Les régulations sont encore nationales et sectorielles, alors que les marchés de capitaux et de crédit sont globaux. La difficulté vient du caractère volatile du marché des capitaux, qui se retirent quelquefois sur la base de rumeurs. Les progrès ont été asymétriques: il faut des mesures internationales pour aider les pays en développement à plus de transparence; encourager la participation de ces pays dans les forums comme le *Forum de stabilité financière*; rendre plus flexible l'accès aux liquidités pour les pays pauvres. Il faut favoriser une meilleure information et une régulation financière internationale. Le FMI a amélioré l'information sur les marchés émergents. Les marchés financiers restent opaques. Pour réguler on suggère de taxer le capital des banques créditrices au lieu des banques emprunteuses. Décourager l'excessive facilité de prêt des banques. Introduire des éléments de régulation anti-cyclique (par ex.: pas de prêt à la consommation).

Schooyans déplore que la gouvernance globale sous l'égide de l'ONU exige la fin des souverainetés nationales. Il rappelle le principe de subsidiarité et la nécessaire résistance des corps intermédiaires au nouveau Léviathan.

Restrepo critique Camdessus pour qui les régulations doivent lutter contre la corruption, le népotisme, la bureaucratie, le protectionnisme, mais laisser jouer la main invisible. Mais la pauvreté engendrée aussi par la globalisation ne recule pas. Si l'éthique est la recherche du bonheur (Aristote), c'est en fonction d'elle qu'il faut choisir des stratégies. En particulier, il faut redonner son rôle au politique. Aujourd'hui la participation aux élections baisse partout, parce que le politique ne décide plus rien. Il n'y a pas de vraie participation de tous les citoyens aux décisions qui les concernent. La politique est absorbée par l'économique. L'Etat doit retrouver son rôle de définir et promouvoir le bien commun, de défendre les droits de tous, surtout des plus faibles et des minorités.

Schasching, citant *Centesimus Annus* 58, souhaite que le processus soit régulé par des "agences internationales" travaillant pour le bien commun, avec une attention particulière aux plus faibles et dans le respect de la subsidiarité.

3. La question des *valeurs communes*. Pour la DSE les valeurs qui fondent le droit positif sont inscrites dans la nature humaine. Les normes de moralité découlent toujours d'une réalité substantielle qui est la personne humaine. La personne est le pôle autour duquel s'organisent les relations sociales. La DSE invite les hommes dans leur diversité culturelle à expliciter ce pôle objectif de moralité qu'est l'être humain. Elle n'est donc pas une moralité qui procéderait d'une légitimation de relations sociales ou culturelles contingentes. Sur ce plan la DSE entre en dialogue, mais aussi en contradiction, avec les éthiques systémiques. Des considérations éclairantes ont été émises à ce sujet.

a) D'abord *le constat*:

Crocker passe en revue les différents théoriciens de l'éthique du développement et les domaines de consensus sur ce que devrait être le développement et les domaines de désaccord. En particulier il y a désaccord quand au caractère normatif de l'éthique du développement: les universalistes, utilitaristes et kantien disent qu'il y a des principes valables pour toutes les sociétés; les particularistes, communitaristes et relativistes postmodernes disent qu'il n'y a que des principes de procédure que chaque nation doit choisir selon ses propres conceptions; les tenants d'un consensus transculturel, selon lesquels chaque communauté politique choisissant son modèle

de développement selon des normes adaptables. L'auteur propose comme normative la conception du développement qui assure un minimum de bien-être humain (autonomie et dignité, dialogue critique et délibération et santé physique et participation sociale). Trois directions de l'éthique du développement devant la globalisation sont à considérer: 1-l'hyperglobalisme: le monde devient un marché unique où le capitalisme triomphe et où le rôle des Etats s'efface; 2-le scepticisme qui mise sur les blocs régionaux où grandissent les fondamentalismes et rêve de régimes centralistes forts; 3-le transformationnisme où les Etats réajustent seulement leur rôle devant des réalités nouvelles complexes et variables.

Schooyans voit la globalisation économique et la mondialisation politique comme portées par l'idéologie holiste, inspirée du New Age selon laquelle les humains ne sont qu'un avatar de l'évolution de la matière, voués à la mort, hôtes de la Terre qui est le concept englobant. La valeur suprême est donc l'écologie. Le développement doit être durable, dans les limites des possibilités de la nature. L'anthropocentrisme judéo-chrétien et moderne est rejeté. La loi naturelle est celle de la nature physique et de ses exigences implacables. L'ONU projette un *Charte de la Terre* en ce sens. Selon l'OMS, la santé est vue comme santé du corps social, pas de l'individu. Les soins aux coûts trop élevés ne doivent plus être pris en charge.

b) Comment susciter la prise de conscience des exigences universelles de notre commune humanité? Une précision importante s'impose ici. L'éthique selon le christianisme n'est pas arbitraire. Elle est tendue vers un horizon qui est la vérité de l'homme. Elle n'est pas une éthique négociée, ni adoptée par consensus. Ceci n'exclut pas qu'elle est prête à rechercher avec d'autres le plus vaste accord possible sur des éléments communs. Mais il est clair que ce n'est pas le consensus qui crée l'éthique. Il n'est qu'une étape dans la recherche de la vérité. La DSE distingue entre les comportements orientés vers ce qui est bon et juste et les fondements philosophiques invoqués pour les justifier. La vérité sur l'homme se situe certainement au-delà des systèmes philosophiques. Elle vise la réalité qui leur est sous-jacente.

La DSE encourage le dialogue qui consiste à chercher ensemble la vérité. Plusieurs interventions ont mis l'accent sur la nécessité d'aborder les défis communs avec des attitudes partagées. *Schasching* insiste sur une approche œcuménique et même inter-religieuse concertée de la globalisation. L'évêque *Homeyer* semble dire qu'il n'y a pas de différence entre la DSE et l'éthique protestante. Portant entre confessions chrétiennes, la convergence est loin d'être acquise quant à la place de l'éthique par rapport à la

foi, et aux fondements de l'éthique, sans parler des divergences de vue bien connues sur des sujets aussi graves que le respect de la vie, l'euthanasie, la bioéthique, la recherche génétique.

Si la DSE encourage le dialogue et la recherche en commun de ce qui est bon et juste, elle n'est pas pour autant une morale du consensus. Nous avons relevé l'an dernier que la démocratie ne crée pas la valeur qui la fonde, alors même que notre société globalisée tendait à considérer la démocratie comme une valeur en soi. Le modèle du relativisme des valeurs ne doit pas nous faire illusion. Le résultat des consensus peut-être obtenu par des stratégies de minorités actives, par des manipulations de l'opinion, par des confusions sur les termes de la question. Il faut donc dire que le consensus ne crée pas une norme. La recherche du consensus est un processus perpétuel. Ce qui est moral doit pouvoir être ratifié par les êtres concrets dans toutes les dimensions de leur humanité. La recherche du consensus doit rendre explicite ce qui est inscrit dans notre être. Elle n'a pas de consistance si elle est pure négociation ou rapport de forces.

Crocker a dit justement que le minimum éthique commun ne peut pas être perçu comme une vérité toute faite que les pouvoirs en place imposeraient aux autres. La démarche éthique est toujours un choix librement ratifié ou elle n'est pas. Il faut être attentif aujourd'hui à tous les pouvoirs qui, à travers l'homogénéisation de la culture et des comportements anesthésient la liberté des personnes. La DSE mise sur l'existence d'une sphère de liberté intérieure, la sphère de la conscience, où se prennent les décisions qui engagent la personne.

c) Faut-il rechercher un minimum d'éthique commune?

Le débat fondamental sur l'universalité de l'éthique a été lancé par les remarques de *Crocker*: Il est important que nous prenions mieux conscience que la morale sociale est de l'ordre de la raison. Pour ceux qui croient en Dieu, il n'y a pas de cloison entre ce que la raison admet comme bon et ce que l'accueil de la révélation confirme comme bon. La raison ne s'efface pas devant la foi; elle est illuminée par la foi. Pour les croyants les deux sources de la connaissance que sont la raison et la foi ont Dieu pour auteur.

C'est le propre de la DSE d'inviter les hommes à les découvrir dans ce qui est déjà: l'homme réel engagé dans des relations sociales. Rappelons que le Magistère a salué avec approbation la *Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme* de 1948, puis en a fourni une interprétation compatible avec la DSE, alors qu'ailleurs prévalaient les interprétations individualistes.

Schooyans voit dans la *Déclaration* de 1948 une vision réaliste de l'homme fondée sur la vérité de l'homme, alors que *Morandé* rappelle

qu'en 1948, la *Déclaration* n'a été approuvée qu'à condition que l'on renonce précisément à expliquer le fondements des droits énumérés. *Morandé* poursuit: dans la conception actuelle, il ne peut ni ne doit y avoir de norme objective de moralité invocable devant les nouveaux défis technologiques que sont la fertilisation assistée, le clonage humain, l'expérimentation sur les embryons, les produits transgéniques. Le pourquoi n'est jamais invoqué. La société actuelle est attirée vers le nihilisme de Nietzsche: elle ne veut plus se poser la question du pourquoi. Toute légitimation morale est de type fonctionnel. La société n'est plus mobilisable par aucune idéologie globale. La légitimation par la procédure cherche seulement à standardiser dans la société le critère de rationalité à partir des résultats. La finalité des actes humains est exclue du champ de vision. Le procédé envahit aussi le domaine du jugement éthique de la conscience personnelle. On lui cherche des substituts fonctionnels comme les préférences, les valeurs, mes goûts, les convictions.

Restrepo: C'est la mission des chrétiens laïcs de faire émerger dans la société un consensus sur des valeurs éthiques minimales. Il faut éviter que des minorités puissantes n'imposent leurs vues guidées par des considérations d'intérêt (légaliser l'euthanasie, détruire l'écosystème, la maîtrise de la recherche en biotechnologie). Les valeurs économiques ne doivent pas constituer le seul paramètre de la vie sociale. Car elles hypostasient les traits de la nature humaine corrompue (la recherche du profit, le mépris de l'autre). L'éthique doit imposer une vision de l'homme et du monde, non justifier les comportements désordonnés des puissants.

La globalisation peut-elle être neutre par rapport aux valeurs éthiques? On répondra que toute action commune suppose une légitimation. Le tout est de savoir si la globalisation doit être subie ou maîtrisée et en fonction de quelles valeurs supérieures. Il n'est d'éthique humaine que libre par rapport aux déterminations des systèmes économiques, politiques, culturels, lorsque ces derniers s'imposent comme l'horizon ultime de sens en fonction duquel les humains interprètent leur existence.

Comme *conclusion* rapide, je rappelle que nous avons aussi évoqué la société ecclésiale comme d'une société globale. La comparaison avec la globalisation croissante de la société civile mondiale suggère quelques réflexions.

a) D'abord l'Évangile n'est pas un objet manipulable pour quelque globalisation que ce soit, bien que beaucoup parlent sans considération de globaliser la religion, et autres choses semblables. L'Église n'est à la disposition d'aucune puissance qui voudrait l'utiliser pour ses propres fins.

L'Eglise n'est pas réductible à un projet humain. Les croyants certes sont parties prenantes de tous les processus historiques, mais la nature de l'Eglise est d'être une communauté rassemblée par le Christ, qui demande à ses disciples d'être actifs dans le monde, mais de ne pas être "du monde", sous peine de perdre la spécificité qu'ils ont à lui apporter. L'Eglise a vocation d'être signe de la transcendance de la destinée humaine et aussi de l'unité du genre humain.

b) L'existence d'une Eglise qui traverse tous les peuples et cultures et rassemble les hommes dans la même foi, est un défi à la globalisation en cours. Si celle-ci n'est pas une fin en elle-même, elle peut être un atout pour rapprocher le genre humain et de lui faire prendre conscience de la nécessaire solidarité qui le lie.

L'Eglise a un modèle à offrir: celui de l'unité dans la diversité, sur le modèle trinitaire, rappelé avec force par l'évêque *Homyer*. La globalisation alors ne signifie pas soumission à un pouvoir uniformisant. L'Eglise recherche le pluralisme des cultures pour y incarner le message évangélique. L'universalité n'est pas de l'ordre des systèmes dans lesquels les hommes sont imbriqués. Elle s'incarne dans la diversité. Les cultures ne sont pas des vêtements que l'on met et dépose, elles constituent notre être et doivent donc être respectées. Evangéliser ne signifie pas détruire les cultures, mais les purifier et les amener à se dépasser.

Il faudrait donc souhaiter une globalisation qui libère davantage les hommes des prisons de la misère et de l'ignorance, mais en même temps qui ne les enferme pas dans les nouvelles prisons homogénéisées du nihilisme, dans l'empire du marché et de la pensée unique. La DSE appelle au discernement qui remet au centre de tous les processus l'homme réel et son besoin de liberté et d'espérance.

Nous pourrions nous demander, dans une réflexion ultérieure, comment donner une résonance concrète à ce que nous disait hier le Saint-Père: "l'éthique exige que les systèmes soient ajustés aux besoins de l'homme et non pas que l'homme soit sacrifié au profit du système".

GLOBALIZATION AND THE COMMON HUMANITY: ETHICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

MINA M. RAMIREZ

This Report tries to present a synthesis (without entering into the technical aspects) of the phenomenon of globalization, underscoring the negative and the positive aspects as well as the Challenges of Globalization gleaned from the topical discussions of this assembly with special reference to the most affected – the monetarily poor of the world.

The Approach to Globalization

The objective of the assembly is to highlight the findings of Social Science with regard to Globalization offering these to the Catholic Church for the development of her Christian Social Teachings (President E. Malinvaud).

The approach should be balanced, avoiding two extreme attitudes: 1) to resist globalization without understanding its nuances, and/or 2) to subtly reduce it to one of its many aspects. As an Academy, the PASS wishes to contribute to the Church the positive and negative implications for developing countries of Globalization through the analysis and critique of its underlying values and ethics. PASS at this stage is not looking for unanimity. It is rather challenging one's certainty and bringing out ideas in its plurality. (Prof. L. Sabourin). A great task, it nevertheless is watching for converging points.

Rev. Fr. Prof. Johannes Schasching, S.J. brought to light the historical evolution of *Christian Social Teachings (CSTs)*, the Church's actual point of view and latest development in relation to her all inclusive nature, addressing herself not only to the hierarchy of the Church, but also to other churches, all religions and all women and men of goodwill. By so doing, Fr. Prof.

Schasching set the line which the thinking of the members of the Assembly could pursue given the information and knowledge by outside experts and commentators on the topic being investigated.

Central Points of View of CST's latest development

1. Globalization is not just a plan to be discussed but an opportunity for international agencies to effectively realize the common good.

2. To achieve the above, international organizations should give sufficient assistance to countries needing support for their development.

3. CST views Globalization as an instrument to promote the well being of humankind by working out the equitable distribution of material good.

4. Free international market does not guarantee the common good. Thus the market is in need of rules and the Law from institutions on national and global levels. The reality is that even if big economic powers agree to contribute to the common good, these powers can be vulnerable to political pressure and vice-versa, politics could be subjected to merely economic goals.

5. Markets are to be safeguarded not only by economic but also by social policy.

6. The principle of subsidiarity should be observed in the collaboration of ethical social forces of society to work for the common good with particular attention to the role developing countries can contribute to it.

7. CST requires economic and political measures based on ethical principles and motivation therefore infusing a new economic spirit in life.

8. Important is *to globalize ethical forces*, to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, to create intergenerational solidarity in relation to preserving nature and sustain a balanced ecology.

9. The main preoccupations are the following:

1.1 The benefits of globalization reaches only a small part of humankind.

1.2 Tension exists with the domination of big countries over smaller and weaker ones.

1.3 Globalization undermines cultural identity of smaller nations.

1.4 Globalization is viewed in a limited way and not seen as a multidimensional reality.

1.5 Society and State are being controlled by financial markets and speculation.

The Church offers her collaboration without imposing its views. She,

however, needs to be in touch with human problems. The positive sign is the rapprochement between East and West. Both enter a period worldwide and together could search for a moral framework and more importantly a motivation to transform persons, families, communities and society.

The Topics of Discussion

To assess the reality of globalization outside experts have been invited to address the following topics with two or three commentators on each topic and an exchange of ideas among the academicians:

1. Globalization and Ethical Approaches by Prof. David Crocker.
2. Globalization and Human Development: Ethical Approaches by Dr. Zephirin Diabré.
3. The Global Economy: Emerging Forms of (Inter)Dependence by Prof. Paul Dembinski.
4. The Impact of Globalization on Poverty and Cultural Identities by Prof. Pedro Morandé.
5. Globalization and Institutional Change: a Development Perspective by Prof. Stephany Griffith-Jones.
6. The Impact of Global Financial Flows on Developing Countries by Prof. Jorge Braga de Macedo.
7. Globalization and the Church's New Challenges by S.E.R. Mons. Josef Homeyer.

The Ethical Approaches

It is a consensus of the Academy that one needs an ethical framework in order to shape globalization in the positive direction such that human dignity will be respected, cultural identity will be nurtured, and human rights protected and defended. The paper of Prof. David Crocker is a resource material for ethical principles which should underlie any decision and activity that aims to bring about authentic human development of people and social transformation.

On this topic, Prof. David A. Crocker, highlighted since the 1940s the moral assessment of the theory and practice of development identifying the theorists from Gandhi (1940) Gunnar Myrdal (1960s), Denis Goulet (1971) to Amartya Sen and Nussbaum and Glover (1995) with special focus on the reality of the poor especially in the developing world. Among the many questions being posed starting from a question of the concept

of 'development' itself, significant in the context of globalization implying the 'gap between the rich and the poor' are: 'Who should bring about development – a nation, government, civil society or the market? What role – if any – should more affluent states, international institutions, and nongovernmental associations and individuals have in the self-development of poor countries?'

Amidst the suffering, misery and deprivation experienced in the world, it is a hopeful sign that indeed the 'globalization of ethical forces', i.e. scientists and/or 'wisdom keepers' like Gandhi in different parts of the world, albeit still few in number, reflecting on ethical dimensions – becomes possible. These scientists/wisdom keepers believe that their enterprise should be international. From many nations including poor ones, they are seeking to forge an international consensus. They emphasize a commitment to alleviating worldwide deprivation. While instituting certain development principles and procedures deemed relevant for a poor country, there is a call for sensitivity to the specific country's historical, cultural and social context.

Despite certain agreements with regard to Ethics of Development – that takes into consideration both the quantitative ('having' – satisfaction of physical needs) and qualitative ('being', deeper meaning in life) – specific controversies need to be resolved in this age of globalization, such as: 1) socio-economic model from the North perceived as imposition on the South, 2) specific issues to be addressed: international trade, capital flows, migration, environmental pacts, military intervention and responses to human rights violations committed by prior regimes 3) link between military intervention, and that of international institutions to absolute or relative poverty; and 4) the importance of the ecological issue'.

A continuum has been drawn in relation to development ethics – on the one end 'there is more commitment to the values of individual choice, tolerance of differences, and public deliberation about societal ends and means; and, at the other end, more normative guidance about the good human life but less room for individual and social choice'.

The Church as an expert of humanity will likely accept the empowerment principle articulated by Amartya Sen:

With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even of constructive impatience (Sen, A., [1999] *Development as Freedom*, New York: Knopf, p. 11, cited in Prof. Crocker's paper).

The foregoing process which is balanced in relation to both rich and poor will each have its role in bringing about transformational change both personal and social.

The converging point with the Church in the context of globalization is the ethical view and criterion for evaluating 'development' work – respect for the human and divine dignity of person and integrity of creation, the ultimate 'why' of a commitment to promoting the well-being of all, and not just a few. However, the empirical reality brings out the truth of experience of the gap between the rich and the poor. Hence, a call to all women and men of good will to find out the nature of the gap and to strive to close the gap through a facilitation of 'self-development' or 'self-empowerment', drawing out the best of the inner-giftedness of the person. The more apt term for this undertaking according to Prof. Crocker is not 'development' but 'social transformation' (sociology) 'self-actualization' (Psychology), and in theological language, 'conversion'.

The Phenomenon of Globalization

1. The phenomenon of globalization has not started only at the end of the 20th century. As treated by almost all speakers and commentators, globalization has historical antecedents which could be traced at least 500 years back in the period of colonialisation, expanding territories and trade. The qualitative change in trade between then and now is the free flow not only of goods and services but also of financial capital which due to the communication technology makes possible instant transfer of information as well as decisions affecting networks of people and businesses across the world. Thus a financial crisis in one country can produce a domino effect worldwide.

2. Globalization is a complex multi-faceted reality. Well put by Prof. Paul Dembinski, globalization has been driven by 'technological progress; supremacy of the ethos of efficiency; and 'open society' and free market ideology' leading to the unlimited expansion of economic activity. The volume of trade in money is very much more than trade in goods and services. Together with the World Trade Organization are the main key players of Globalization which are the transnational business corporations or the 'Very Big Enterprises (VBEs)'. By the fact that they master markets, have a command of technology, and maintain an access to finance makes other smaller enterprises dependent on them.

3. Expressed by experts are hopes that Globalization holds a vast potential for the growth of the economy in developing countries. However, fig-

ures and facts especially of the UNDP Report 1999 presented by Dr. Zephirin Diabré show that there is a trend for a widening gap between the rich and the poor among countries and between countries and an increase in insecurities and vulnerabilities of people in these countries. Moreover, there is a tendency for homogenization of culture. Highlighted by Prof. Pedro Morandé in the area of homogenization is a bridging of distance in the processing of information between person and the machine and by virtue of rapid processing of information, social life is organized in 'real time'. Instant communication becomes possible causing tensions (due to simultaneity of processing of thought and decision-making) in intergenerational dialogue. Homogenization expresses itself in the difficulty of governing bodies to legalize new facts not proceeding from them thus tending to resign themselves to 'consequentialists', with the effect of losing trust in historical tradition and national culture. In the realm of education, there is also the tendency due to the global concern for economic profit to do away with 'classical education' in favor of highly prestigious technical disciplines while technology offers new possibilities for understanding complexity and human possibilities to adapt to social changes. While the phenomenon of cultural homogenization is taking place, there is a way for culture to assert itself in different situations leading paradoxically to both homogenization and 'heterogenization' (Prof. Margaret Archer). It is, however, important in my opinion that people are trained to be reflexive and discern which of their cultural elements should be incorporated in the new situations fully conscious of life-values in their culture which will need to be tapped or harnessed for authentic development, inculturation or transformation.

4. That the capital inflows do not make a difference in the growth of a great number of countries is attributed to the lack of fulfillment of requirements for globalization to be successful. Cited by the UNDP report are the following preconditions for globalization to work: comprehensive plans to attract long term investments. "These plans should include a stable political climate, an educated labor force, active technological policies and clear priorities on what sectors foreign direct investment should go to and incentives for domestic firms, and control of speculative movements of short-term capital" (Dr. Diabré). But above all, a most important pre-condition for globalization to work is good governance (Professors Diabré, Braga de Macedo & Griffith-Jones).

5. Good governance is important to alleviate poverty. And corruption is the biggest factor that hinders good governance. It is also governance according to Prof. Jorge Braga de Macedo that promotes institutional

reforms. It has been found out in a study of OECD that corruption spells 'bad' governance and is associated with unsuccessful Globalization: 'Countries perceived to be more corrupt are less open to imports, have a lower degree of integration in the international financial market, but do not necessarily seem to have a less liberal trade policy, at least according to the particular trade policy index used' (Prof. Braga de Macedo). This finding while not implying a causal link between successful globalization and corruption, was debated upon. Academicians from developing countries made explicit their own assessment of the variables involved in the link between corruption and globalization. Professor Paulus Zulu in his commentary expounds on the equally complex phenomenon of lack of good governance (not to be attributed mainly to corruption) in developing countries. That governments in developing countries do not represent interests and divergent views of a people was expounded. In the same vein, regional organizations do not truly represent the interests of the great majority with Africa as a case in point. The complexity of the phenomenon of corruption as main indicator of bad governance was elaborated further by Prof. Juan Llach. His paper threw light on a seeming circuitous way of reasoning largely from the side of 'big business'. Despite the empirical evidence presented by the study of Prof. Braga de Macedo, there are many variables that have not been touched as causing unsuccessful globalization seen from the point of view of developing countries: These are: 1) Agricultural protectionism and subsidies on the part of the developed world, 2) Limitations to the free movement of people, 3) Global warming, and 4) Barriers to knowledge access. There seems to be a need of a more holistic analysis from two perspectives – the side of the 'developed' countries and those of the 'developing and underdeveloped' countries to resolve the issue of globalization and the well-being of peoples.

6. Prof. Stephany Griffith-Jones argues for more support for the concerns of developing countries with regard to Globalization. She is of the opinion that international financial intermediaries could create a new financial architecture for their benefit. She has informed the assembly that standards in the area of transparency are being pressed upon developing countries to improve information for markets without equal corresponding obligations however for disclosure by financial institutions. While Prof. Hans Tietmeyer likewise agrees to requiring transparency of operations and moderate supervision of financial institutions, he warns those who are advocating to set up the IMF-Contingency Credit Lines (CCL) to developing countries. According to him, this can be quite problematic. He believes that

'any country seeking to avail itself of such a facility signals to the markets that it is susceptible to crises, and may well therefore do itself harm'. He calls on developing countries to realize the importance of unambiguous and updated information. For crisis prevention and crisis management, according to Prof. Griffith-Jones, there are moves to introduce some standards for developing countries to observe; and also a move to make representatives from developing countries to participate in the deliberations regarding regulations. This is endorsed by Commentator Prof. Kenneth J. Arrow as long as participants of developing countries really represent the interests of the people. The paper of Prof. Griffith underscores the move to focus on low-income countries instead of just concentrating on middle-income countries.

Challenges from the Commentators

1) An appeal to an understanding of globalization from the point of view of a heightened consciousness and reflection on collective past historical experiences: the unfolding consciousness of the human person of others in other lands (colonial period), deepening of connection with others of a political and legal nature that shifted relationship from force to negotiation. From a consciousness of remoteness, there is a simultaneity of space and time through Internet (Prof. René Rémond; Prof. Morandé); a greater consciousness of different people of difference and values attached to differences, the consciousness of the 'first world' as against the 'third world' and the role of the former to the latter in a spirit of 'solidarity' leading eventually to a radical form of liberalism as demonstrated in Seattle. There is thus the evolvment of Ethics of Development calling for Challenges and defining meaning that the person is determining his/her history. To this phenomenon, John Paul II appeals to the idea of humankind as optimistic in assigning meaning to events (Prof. Rémond).

2) The need for many more evaluators and reflectors in Asia (and in the world at large) – of the phenomenon of 'colonialism', and the growing consciousness of the peoples of Southeast Asia of having been manipulated by 'developed' societies, with an appeal to a development ethics that fosters nationalism which is humanizing and creating a responsible civilizing movement in the world (Prof. Wilfrido Villacorta).

3) An appeal to a discernment – a type of assessment from the standpoint of the poor on their realities – wages, employment of women and men, structural adjustment – social justice as major concern, a call for

more simple lifestyle and the culture of human welfare (Prof. Sergio Bernal Restrepo).

4) The call for graduate education from where political leaders and other leaders are coming from to be a catalyst in society, assisting all sectoral leaders of Civil Society to have a comprehensive understanding of the situation, reflect and act on it in order to develop a theory of social transformatory praxis; they need to have a spirituality of caring, solidarity, and compassion, a call for bringing together the energies of peoples' gifts of minds and hearts (Prof. Mina Ramirez, Prof. Taketoshi, Nojiri). This may be perhaps the meaning of authentic 'intellectualism' (Prof. Ann Glendon) in service of the mission of total salvation of the world by us who make up the Church.

5) The urgency on the part of Catholics in the world to proclaim His Holiness, Pope John Paul II's World Day of Peace Message (2000) to give 'a soul, meaning and direction' to Globalization, 'with a view to enabling humanity to become one single family, built on the values of justice, equity and solidarity'. Solidarity is to be understood by Christians as 'overcoming sources of division' wrought by personal and structural sins (Prof. Glendon).

6) Attention to experts from the first world to get grounded in the reality of the developing country for they may still not realize the 'logic' of the 'deficient' attitudes and behavior in developing countries (suggested by commentaries of Llach, Zulu, McNally, Restrepo). On the other hand, it is important that persons in the 'first', 'second' and 'third' worlds do not just become the victims of economic globalization. In and through faith, they are not to be victims of their suffering, but in the words of the Church, they 'will take up the cross' and work for a continual rebirthing towards the triumph and joy of the resurrection.

7) Take note of non-market economies in developing countries where there is an unwritten sustained contract and social norms revolving around credit, labor, insurance, use of grazing lands and forestry. It is important to study whether the social norms of indigenous communities are benign to all - to chieftains as well as to women and children (Prof. Partha S. Dasgupta).

8) A gentle persuasion for experts to immerse themselves in the concrete lives of the poor in the developing world. Information from such contact gives a qualitative basis for micro or macro policy (suggested by commentaries from Prof. Jerzy G. Zubrzycki, Hon. Justice Nicholas J. McNally, Prof. Ramirez).

9) A harnessing of organized intermediate groups on national, regional and international levels to create movements towards a formulation of adequate economic and social policy to regulate global market economics based on principles of Christian social teachings (Prof. Nojiri).

10) Policy-making that takes into consideration global changes where financial capital is mobile (does not stay within countries); increase in world income through participation of rich countries in poor countries' economy.

11) Sensitivity to the context of persons whose ideas sometimes are difficult to translate due to language barriers.

12) Need for intergenerational dialogue; tradition to be reviewed in the context of on-going experiences (Prof. Pier Luigi Zampetti).

13) A thorough study of the Christian Social Teachings and its underlying philosophy which contains criteria of judgment to assess the globalization phenomenon.