Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People

People on the Move - N° 86, September 2001

The migratory question today
and the role of ICMC^*

Stefano ZAMAGNI
President
International Catholic Migration Commission

1. I would like to open our meeting to-day with a few remarks and considerations about the present status of the migratory question at the dawn of the new millennium. My intention is twofold: on the one hand, to identify those aspects of that question which specifically refer to our organization, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), and on the other hand, to provoke our imagination so that we can improve more and more our capability to serve the cause of the uprooted people. However, let me say, first of all, how impressed I am of the work being done by ICMC in the various parts of the globe where it operates. I am really proud of the significant and excellent results ICMC has achieved so far and for the very high level of reputation it has acquired within the multifarious world of NGOs and, more generally, the international community. Being the only organization established by the Catholic Church that is directly responsible to the Bishops' Conferences, ICMC has been able to show, in practice, that it is possible to effectively combine a declared Catholic identity with a performance that is second to that of no other "lay" organization.
Therefore, let me express my deepest sense of gratitude to all of you, to the 1999 Retiring Governing Committee, and in particular to Michael Whiteley, my predecessor, for the marvellous job of paving the way for a number of important changes in the Commission and to William Canny, our secretary general, for the intelligent work and the exemplary dedication he puts in his mission. I have to offer special thanks to the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, here represented by its President, H.E. Msgr. Stephen Fumio Hamao, for his discrete but enduring help to our Commission. It is mainly because of this help that we are able to ensure that the social teachings of the Church on migration are brought to bear on our everyday practices. I am sure we can confidently rely upon the support and stimulation of the Pontifical Council even in the future, especially in this period which sees the preparation of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of ICMC and the launch of a major fund-raising campaign.
Our hopes for the future are well-founded: three of the five figures recently canonized by John Paul II had a lot to do with migrants' cause in their lives. Aside from Pius IX, whose closeness to and sympathy for Bishop Scalabrini are well-known, and apart from John XXIII, the Pope of Pacem in terris, Msgr.Tommaso Reggio, Archbishop of Genoa, has been elevated to the honours of the altar. In his biography, it is fascinating to discover that Archbishop Reggio was among the first who, towards the end of the 19th century, created in his diocese an organization that, mutatis mutandis, was very similar to our ICMC, both in terms of structure and goals.

2. Migration is as old as humanity itself. However, it is time to recognize that globalization has changed and will continue to change the basic features of the phenomenon under scrutiny. As some scholars point out, today's migrations and the first mass movements that occurred in the 19th century have several features in common. One recollects in fact that in the 19th century and up to the outbreak of the First World War, some 52 million Europeans migrated from their native countries. Up to 34 million of these people moved to the USA. The famous Passenger Act, passed by the Westminster Parliament in 1803, encouraged migration to the former British colonies. By 1860, Great Britain had provided 66%, and Germany 32%, of all Europeans migrating to the Americas and Oceania. By 1880, Germany had become a net importer of workers. While these data have to be remembered in order not to overemphasize differences between the past situation and today's, one should at the same time also recognize striking dissimilarities. One is the introduction of new technologies into production processes, a change that brings countries that are spatially far apart much closer to each other. However, this process has not removed the cultural gaps but has only widened them. That the connection between cultural realities and the adoption of new technologies is of central importance in social integration processes is now clear to everyone. As long as all that is expected of the immigrant is that he or she performs purely mechanical operations, the cultural gap between host and immigrant populations is hardly perceivable. This is not the case when, in order to profitably enter the workforce arena, the immigrant has to acquire and master logical and organizational patterns that are rooted in a clearly defined cultural matrix. The integration of the immigrant in technologically advanced societies produces problems that are far more delicate than those that existed even in the recent past.
A second element of the marked difference between today's migrations and yesterday's is that facts do not seem to confirm the thesis, so fashionable until the 1980s, that the most efficient device to relieve migratory pressure is increased employment opportunities in developing countries. If such a proposition were correct, it would suffice to suggest that these countries adopt labour-intensive techniques to stop, or at least reduce, the extent of migratory flows. However, this is not how things are at the moment. In the first place, in developing countries emigration, far from being an alternative to the process of growth, is an instrument to set this process in motion. This occurs partly thanks to the money that emigrants send back home. This makes it possible for financial resources to reach potential users without having to go through governmental or public agencies. Also, emigration provides the fastest and cheapest way to acquire the skills and knowledge required by the new technological paradigms. In the second place, during the first phases of the growth process, migration-specific incentives are generated. Indeed, the increase in socio-economic inequalities that invariably marks the first stages of development leads growing segments of the population to turn to the migration path. Moreover, as the new economics of migration has clearly demonstrated, one ought to focus on the family rather than on the individual. Within such a perspective, the decision to migrate is perceived as a strategy to diversify risks: some family members emigrate in order to enable those who stay home to stand a better chance of improving their situation. To sum up, it would be a fallacy to think that migratory flows can be stopped simply by relying on the growth factor. Whereas growth is certainly necessary, it is nevertheless insufficient to counteract the push to migrate, at least in the short and medium run.
In the light of the aforementioned considerations, one can understand the feeling of fear pervading western populations: a fear that our societies may in the end turn out to be incapable of controlling growing masses of immigrants who are bearers of cultures that are remote from our own. Faced with fear and uncertainty, the prevailing attitude seems to be that of blockade, and to deal with the problem by "sweeping it under the carpet" and thereby not creatively dealing with a problem of epoch-making significance. As Pope John Paul II stated in his message of June 2, 2000 at the Jubilee of Migrants and Itinerants, "unfortunately, we still encounter in the world a closed-minded attitude and even one of rejection due to unjustified fears and concern for one's own interests alone. These fears are incompatible with belonging to Christ and to the Church."

3. What can help us resolve the dilemma in which advanced societies seem to be entangled? The dilemma is that they are aware that immigration meets their need of labour force; at the same time, they fear it. I feel that an important contribution can be found in the answer to the question: "To whom should immigration be useful?" Is it the host country that is in need of immigrant workers, or is it the immigrants themselves who are in search of a way to escape from the many sources of difficulties in their home countries? When inquiring about the motivations that lead to the acceptance of immigrants by a host country, excluding the motivations based on humanitarian reasons, one ends up with two different positions. One is the position of those who view the migratory phenomenon as the promoter of specific economic benefits for the host country. The argument runs as follows: in order to compensate for the alarming decrease in the working-age population, to counteract the lack of low-profile professional figures, to face the many problems connected with an ageing population, advanced countries need immigrants. Therefore, accesses have to be planned considering local workforce necessities and access quotas have to be fixed admitting only those immigrants whose economic balance is positive for the host country. The other position is held by those who maintain that migratory flows should be judged solely according to the advantages they bring to the countries from where such flows originate.
I have reasons to believe that both positions are untenable and responsible for generating perverse results. My criticism of the thesis maintaining that immigration should be functional only to the interests of the host country is twofold. The first and major objection I raise is that it would be shaped as a new sort of neo-colonialist exploitation, even if veiled by apparently convincing considerations. After having copiously drawn for decades from the mineral resources and various raw materials in developing countries, the rich countries would now try to attract from the former the workforce they need most. What then is to become of solidarity with the least and the most needy, as boasted of in numerous official documents from various international summits? I believe that no supporter of a thesis like the one I have just criticised can ignore this question.
My second objection is that even if one's considerations were restricted to purely economic aspects, a selective immigration policy by quotas would not be sustainable in the long run. A systematic selection of immigrants would result in weakened development chances for countries from which migratory flows originate and they would undergo progressive impoverishment of their human capital at a time when such a capital, as we all know, has become the strategic factor of sustainable growth. (The emigration of the best-qualified workers does not certainly contribute to the growth of the home area). Should this be the case, the absence of endogenous growth would but increase the migratory pressure, with consequences for the Northern countries that can easily be imagined. As recent history teaches, when within one country or region horizontal inequality, i.e. inequality among social groups, rises above a certain critical threshold, the roots for the outbreak of civil conflicts are laid. The latter are nowadays responsible for those large-scale population movements whose logic is believed to obey mostly the same laws that rule labour displacements. It is known for a fact that the high frequency of civil wars in poor countries has become one of the major factors responsible for migratory flows. Furthermore, the element that triggers off the disruption of civil equilibrium is in most cases a changed distribution of power, economic as well as political, among the various social groups. As a matter of fact, the mobilisation of social groups that is conducive to civil war is brought about by an increase in relative poverty, i.e. an increase in horizontal inequalities.
In substance, the weakest point in the thesis under consideration is that it assumes, although implicitly, that population displacements due to push factors can be considered similar to labour displacements which, however, depend essentially on pull factors. Therefore, to argue that migratory movements should be regulated according to the needs of the production systems in the advanced countries, at a time when an epoch- making crisis is ravaging the South, is pure economic myopia and shows a serious lack of political responsibility.
Having said so, I think one has also to admit that the opposite position, by which the judgement of migratory movements are seen only in terms of benefits for the country from which the flows issue, cannot be accepted. In the first place, unrestricted admission would eventually foster the creation of organised political minorities in host countries, opposing the 'invasion' of migrants. The point is that immigration entails substantial social costs and trying to ignore or underestimate them does not aid the immigrants' cause. It instead stirs up often unchecked reactions by residents. As far as the impact of immigration on social costs is concerned, reliable research indicates that at the moment, the net effect of immigrants on natives is positive or on a par, but in the future, it might become negative because of immigrant ageing and/or reunions with relatives. It is easy to imagine its consequences. We have but to think of possible "warring among the poor" that could break out if one did not duly consider the expectations of the various social groups within the local population, should it happen that a resident is denied something that an immigrant had obtained. There is more. Naïve permissiveness would eventually promote entry of individuals planning crimes or prone to being easily recruited for criminal activities into the host country. Moreover, the absence of a shrewd immigration policy would in the long run damage the developing countries themselves, for reasons which can be easily documented.
The question then arises: if these two opposing positions as outlined above are unacceptable, then what characteristics should an immigration policy exhibit? My answer is that a viable and acceptable immigration policy should foster the interest of both sides involved in the migration relation. After all, this is the ultimate meaning of the principle of reciprocity. As we know, an economic transaction between two subjects is sustainable and ethically sound insofar as both parties are in a position to profit from it or to improve their respective starting positions. This is tantamount to saying that while it is legitimate for the host country to try to set access regulations that can prevent migratory flows from seriously endangering its social order, it is likewise true that the host country cannot shun the problem of determining what generated such movements, and must strive to remove or at least actively operate to reduce them. A couple of examples may illustrate this point. It is known that microcredit initiatives in countries or areas generating migratory flows is a powerful incentive for specific categories or groups of migrants to go back home. It is also known that the financial burden for the implementation of such initiatives is far lighter than the costs entailed in the implementation of purely charitable programs. More generally, we must recognise the fact that the lack of access to credit by people defined as 'non-bankable', as is the case with immigrants, nowadays represents a thorny ethical question since it represents a clear-cut instance of a violation of a right - the right to credit.
We know furthermore ? and this is my second example ? that an efficient way of promoting growth in the countries generating the main flows of migrants, would be for those countries to have permission to sell, in the markets of the North, those agricultural items in the production of which they already enjoy a comparative advantage. In concrete terms, this means that rich countries should challenge, with due caution but also the necessary determination, those policies that overtly contradict the free trade principles so often boasted about in official summits and so often embodied in political declarations. The attitude of those painstaking calculators of immigration costs and benefits for the host country (surely a necessary performance) seems rather hypocritical when it neglects to take into consideration those factors that might help solve the migration question by tackling its root causes. In the light of what has been said above, it is surprising, and to a certain extent alarming, that the conclusions reached at the Tampere Conference of the Council of Europe (October 15-16, 1999) contain not even a passing mention of the "Mediterranean partnership" policy, which was the keystone of the 1996 Barcelona declaration. The latter stated that by the year 2010, a free trade area would be created in the Mediterranean basin, with the ultimate purpose of creating a space of shared prosperity capable of decelerating the dynamics of migratory flows.

4. The position defended here forces me to deal with a question that somehow overrules all others. To put it plainly, the basic choice confronting us concerns the model of integration to be adopted by the host country with respect to its immigrants.
As is well known, this has been a source of very animated debate in recent years. Claude Lévi?Strauss indicated possible alternative strategies in this regard. Using somewhat highfalutin terms, he called the first anthropophagous, a strategy of integration which destroys the migrating foreigner's identity by first "devouring", then metabolising, him or her into the host culture. He named the second strategy anthropoemic because it keeps the immigrant in a marginal position, almost a ghetto, within the host country. It is obvious that neither model offered by the famous anthropologist can, in principle, be proposed let alone accepted today, even though historically there have been countries inspired by one or the other. France's long-pursued assimilationist policy, for example, can be traced back, to a certain extent, to the first model. By contrast, the second model inspired the German Gastarbeiter policy and, in some ways, even Italy's policy up to the time of the enforcement of the 1998 law on migrations.
Although differing in form, both integration models share one original flaw: fear, and hence denial, of diversity. In the first instance, fear takes the form of the destruction of the other's identity; in the second instance, it turns into the solidarity/protective approach when faced by the, at times excruciating, suffering invariably implied by the migrant's discomfort. On closer scrutiny, one finds that these expressions and attitudes, although unintentionally, end up in endorsing J. P. Sartre's cynical statement that the others, those who are different, "are our hell" because they look at us, see us as we are, and thus force us to question ourselves.
This may explain why many scholars and politicians nowadays uphold the excellence of the multicultural integration pattern of Anglo-Saxon origin. Todorov defines multiculturalism in terms of "a shared path within cultural pluralism". Along this path, immigrants are accepted not only as individuals but also as members of groups whose role as a guardian of common interests and, more generally, of advocacy, is recognised. All of this, however, must take place in full compliance with two binding conditions. The first is that the recognition of groups and their identities only concerns the private sphere and should not be extended to the public sphere. The second condition is that, in any case, everyone ? native as well as newcomer ? is bound to comply with the common rules of the economic game and accept the institutional framework of the host society.
Multiculturalism then expresses the presence of diverse cultures within one society. The structure and the ruling principles of the latter are those typical of one specific culture and one clearly defined tradition, e.g. the Anglo-American one. Italians migrating to the USA may create "little Italy" and preserve their traditions there; the Chinese, their "China Town", and so on, but when it comes to doing business in the market or participating in political activity, the role played by the various cultures hosted in the country is practically nil. This is like subscribing to the thesis that while public institutions claim their willingness to recognise, and hence safeguard, the interests of single groups, they are in fact not prepared to go as far as to recognise the latter's identities.
It is easy to see the reasons why whoever reflects the thesis of liberal-personalism finds it difficult to accommodate the above-mentioned perspective. If it is true that men need a safe cultural context that enhances the significance of their chosen lifestyle and guides it - in other words, if individual identity is dialogically created in response to our relationship with others - then a society that is truly respectful of freedom cannot deny that the preservation of a safe cultural matrix is a primary good around which the basic concerns of individuals revolve. And if this is as it should be, then one should go as far as the public recognition of cultural peculiarities. This is why, in spite of all appearances, multiculturalism today is undergoing a deep crisis that makes it no longer acceptable, especially in a context where the common good is not visualised as the mere sum of a series of individual good. According to the personalist perspective, common good should also include the good of the various groups represented in the society.
In the light of what has been stated above, we understand why the growing attention paid, in recent years, to the policy that acknowledges cultural diversities has been gathering more and more support. However, such a policy raises a fundamental question. What are the moral limits of a legitimate quest for the acknowledgement of one specific culture at an institutional level? Whereas a multicultural society limits itself by presupposing tolerance with respect to differences, intercultural society, at the very moment it assumes the cohabitation of differences, can no longer ignore the problem of the definition of values that all are bound to conform to. For interculturalism to respect peculiarities, a common ethic of rights is necessary, one that in the present cultural debate can only be the ethic of man's fundamental rights. What then is to become of cultures that ask to participate in the intercultural project, yet refuse to adjust so as to conform to the statute of fundamental rights?
The basic problem facing us today, I think, is the following: how can everyone's basic rights be satisfied and at the same time have a public forum that is the guarantee by which subjects with cultural identities different from the dominant one can peacefully compare their respective positions and pursue their aims without the threat of violence? In other words, how does one acknowledge existing differences and gather consensus around the limits within which they have to be restricted?
My conviction is that an accessible and fruitful way of tackling these issues is to distinguish three different levels of judgement vis-à-vis the bearer of a culture and that of the host country. Once it has been stated that not all features of diverse cultures deserve the same amount of consideration, one has to single out what in a particular culture can be shared, respected and tolerated. Then, there are the intolerable aspects. Obviously, tolerance encompasses the widest possible range of positions and attitudes. Respect is more discriminating, and sharing is even more so. One needs not share a position in order to respect it. One should rather make sure that it reflects a moral stance that, although not coinciding with his, does not reject or repudiate human rights. In other words, all expectations deserve consideration as long as they do not overstep that minimum threshold of values identified by a common standard ? human dignity. That is a universal criterion.
As an example to clarify this point, whilst the expression of religious ideas that discriminate against women may be tolerated ? assuredly not respected, let alone shared ? the practice connected with such an expression cannot be tolerated. Again, whilst we may respect the position of religious movements that advocate the reinstatement of demos (the democratic principle) into the logos (religious truth), the thesis of those who give to political expressions some kind of sacred justification and foundation is unacceptable within our culture. There are claims and positions that cannot be tolerated. Karl Popper reminds us that "we are not asked to tolerate the threat of intolerance", that is, one should not be tolerant with the intolerant, such as the advocates of racist and xenophobic visions.
These are obviously mere exemplifications of a methodological standpoint whose merit is to avoid, on the one hand, the aporias and paradoxes of cultural relativism inborn in the multiculturalistic approach, and on the other hand those of cultural imperialism inherent in quite a few expressions of ethnocentrism ? a position that wants a culture to be judged using another culture, typically a western culture, as the measuring stick. It seems to me that we need to elaborate on such a proposal which has to prove its efficiency in the actual identification, among claims often implicitly put forward by migrants, of those opinions and practices that can be considered as tolerable, those that are respectable and those that can be shared. This exercise is necessary to ensure a firm basis for the mechanism that presides over the migratory process, without it restricting itself ? as is still the case ? to mere emergency actions. That is, what is needed is a policy of immigration instead of a mere policy for immigration. Since for each of the three categories of demands different amounts of resources are implied, it is unthinkable that the safeguard of foreigners' rights, the respect of their cultural and religious links, and the enforcement of a policy regarding their interests may be considered and implemented prior to the definition of the content of the three categories of claims.
5. The refugee and migrant question is very complex; much more complex than it was in the past. A sense of frustration seems to pervade us when we realize that we have no ready-made answers. This is certainly understandable, but cannot be justified. Christians are not "consequentialist": they do not believe that the moral standing of an action depends on the consequences produced by that action. They know too well how the mystery of Salvation operates in their lives. This is why we have to ward off the risk, on one side, of remaining above reality through utopia, and on the other side, beneath reality through resignation. The Christian cannot be led into such temptations, cannot swing between the disenchanted optimism of one who believes that the migratory question can be entrusted to the anonymous and impersonal mechanism of the market, and, on the opposite front, the political cynicism of those who believe, à la Kafka, that there "is a point of arrival, but no way leading to it". The Christian knows only too well that at times of deep crisis, like the one we are going through at present, unexpected spaces open up to let the message of salvation storm into history.
Today, the flows of Catholic migrants are declining, while the flows of non-Catholics entering countries with Catholic or Christian majorities are increasing. Such a reversal of the migratory movement is a novelty for the Church, and poses new problems on the front of pastoral activity (e.g. religious relativism; inter-religious dialogue; etc.). We seem to be not ready yet to meet these new challenges. Whence the feeling of powerlessness and pessimism. We should resist such a temptation. This can be done if we succeed in challenging the mournful expressions of a culture that wants to make us believe that we are going through a time in which it is very difficult to embody values, which does not seem to offer appropriate opportunities for new plans and new testimonies. It will be all the more feasible to oppose this prejudice the more we are convinced that Christian communities do not only cherish traditions of moral reflection. In their multifaceted reality, they are deeply rooted in real life experiences that become laboratories of a new lifestyle. Indeed, by innovative practices, Christian communities and organizations are capable of significantly modifying the political and social context of which they are a part. ICMC is happy and proud to be a significant part of such an endeavor.

* Paper presented at the Regional Consultation of National Directors for the Pastoral Care of Migrants in America (Mexico City, 17-20 September 2000)